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     he collection, pooling, and sharing of intelligence between the forces of 
States involved in multinational military operations is indispensable for their 
effectiveness and is a standard feature of modern coalition warfare.1 How-
ever, such intelligence sharing also raises difficult questions of international 
law, in particular as to whether States sharing or receiving intelligence may 
be regarded as responsible for complicity in the wrongful acts of their part-
ners.2 Consider, for example, a situation in which a State provides intelli-
gence to another which uses the intelligence for drone strikes that are (argu-
ably) unlawful.3 The legal framework governing such questions is complex, 
consisting of general international law, particularly the law of State responsi-
bility; international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of armed conflict; in-
ternational human rights law (IHRL), to the extent it applies extraterritorially 
and in armed conflict; international criminal law, with regard to the possible 
criminal responsibility of soldiers, intelligence officers and their military and 
civilian superiors. That international legal framework coexists with the do-
mestic laws, particularly military and criminal laws, of partner States. The 
applicability of each of these regimes to intelligence sharing engages discrete 
sets of difficulties, which are compounded by structural uncertainties in how 
the different regimes interact.  
 
1. See David Letts, Intelligence Sharing Among Coalition Forces: Some Legal and Ethical Chal-
lenges and Potential Solutions, in NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AND ETHICS (Seumas 
Miller, Mitt Regan & Patrick F. Walsh eds., forthcoming 2021, manuscript on file with au-
thor); Jonathan Howard, Sharing Intelligence with Foreign Partners for Lawful, Lethal Purposes, 226 
MILITARY LAW REVIEW 1 (2018). On the various types of cooperative arrangements in the 
context of military operations, see Berenice Boutin, The Interplay of International Obligations 
Connected to the Conduct of Others: Toward a Framework of Mutual Compliance Among States Engaged 
in Partnered Warfare, 96 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 529, 531–34 (2020). 
2. The focus of this article is State responsibility. I will not be examining the related 
question of complicity-based responsibility of international organizations such as NATO or 
whether in some cases international law imposes any similar responsibility directly on non-
State actors, such as armed groups. On responsibility issues regarding the involvement of 
international organizations in multinational military operations, see generally Paulina Starski, 
Accountability and Multinational Military Operations, in THE “LEGAL PLURIVERSE” SURROUND-
ING MULTINATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS 300 (Robin Geiß & Heike Krieger eds., 
2019). 
3. For an example of a critical analysis of various forms of State assistance, including 
the sharing of intelligence, to the U.S. drone program, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 














Under customary international law, as codified in the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility (ASR),4 States accrue 
responsibility for internationally wrongful conduct attributable to them, nor-
mally because such conduct is committed by the State’s own organs. The 
acts of collecting and sharing intelligence may as such be internationally 
wrongful if doing so would constitute a breach of an international obligation 
arising from primary rules of international law, such as IHL and IHRL, 
which will be addressed in more detail below.5 
Other rules, general or sector-specific, allow for State responsibility to 
arise due to the assistance one State provides to the commission of a wrong-
ful act by another State.6 The most relevant such complicity rule of general 
scope is codified in Article 16 ASR: 
 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an inter-
nationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing 
so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally 
wrongful if committed by that State.  
 
The customary status of Article 16 was affirmed by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Bosnian Genocide case.7 While the customary sta-
tus of the rule was questioned by some authors and States during the ILC 
drafting process,8 no State has formally opposed it since the ILC completed 
its codification project, even if the practice in which the ILC grounded the 
 
4. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 
2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter ILC ASR]. 
5. International law also contains rules in specialized treaties that specifically address 
questions of intelligence sharing, such as the Five Eyes or UKUSA Agreement, but these 
are few and far between and will be outside the purview of this study. See further Scarlet Kim 
et al., Newly Disclosed Documents on the Five Eyes Alliance and What They Tell Us about Intelligence-
Sharing Agreements, LAWFARE (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/newly-dis-
closed-documents-five-eyes-alliance-and-what-they-tell-us-about-intelligence-sharing. 
6. On the notion of special, as opposed to general, complicity rules, see HELMUT AUST, 
COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 189 (2011). 
7. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 420 (Feb. 
26) [hereinafter Bosnian Genocide]. 
8. See AUST, supra note 6, at 169–73, 182–85; MILES JACKSON, COMPLICITY IN INTER-











rule is hardly constant and uniform.9 The ILC set out an even more innova-
tive rule in Article 41 ASR, which categorically prohibits State aid and assis-
tance to another State’s commission of a serious breach of a peremptory 
norm of international law. Article 41’s relationship with Article 16 will be 
explored further below. 
Some aspects of the Article 16 ASR rule are relatively uncontroversial. 
However, the rule’s culpability (mental, subjective, fault) element has pro-
voked much controversy. This is partly because the issue is inherently diffi-
cult and partly because the ILC’s pronouncements on the point were unclear 
and contradictory. The proper interpretation to be given to that element is 
indeed the single most important question in determining the relevance of 
the Article 16 complicity rule in the intelligence-sharing context. The exist-
ence and elements of IHL- and IHRL-specific complicity rules and the ex-
tent of their divergence from Article 16 are also pivotal and unclear ques-
tions. The lack of clarity is exacerbated by the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of States have remained silent on the scope of the culpability re-
quirements of either the general complicity rule or the sector-specific ones. 
In 2018 a workshop was convened at Nottingham that aimed at clarify-
ing some of these issues, bringing together academics, independent experts, 
and government legal advisers. The discussions at the workshop were based 
on a series of hypothetical scenarios that separated out as much as possible 
the discrete legal questions to be examined and progressed gradually in terms 
of complexity. A report published after the workshop summarizes the dis-
cussions and areas of agreement and disagreement.10 This article builds on 
the workshop (although the views expressed here are mine alone). The article 
also builds on recent academic studies on questions of responsibility 
grounded in complicity in international law, with a specific focus on matters 
of intelligence sharing in multinational military operations.11 
 
9. See AUST, supra note 6, at 190–91; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 152–53. See also JAMES 
CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 408 (2013) (Article 16 was ini-
tially a measure of progressive development by the ILC).  
10. Report of the Nottingham Workshop on Intelligence Sharing in Multinational Mil-
itary Operations (2018), https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/documents/news-events/ 
workshop-intelligence-sharing-report.pdf [hereinafter Nottingham Workshop Report].  
11. See AUST, supra note 6; JACKSON, supra note 8; VLADYSLAV LANOVOY, COMPLICITY 
AND ITS LIMITS IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2016); Harriet Moyni-
han, Aiding and Assisting: Challenges in Armed Conflict and Counterterrorism (Chatham House Re-












My analysis proceeds as follows. Part II will draw on literature in legal 
theory and philosophy of intention to explore the fault element of complic-
ity-type rules and set the conceptual foundations for the discussion to follow. 
Section III.A interprets the culpability element of Article 16 ASR, arguing 
that it should best be seen as containing three alternative forms of fault: di-
rect intent, indirect intent, and willful blindness but for which the State 
would be considered to have acted with indirect intent. These are subjective 
forms of fault that depend on what the State officials making relevant deci-
sions (such as the one to share intelligence with a partner) knew, believed, or 
wanted. Sections III.B and III.C examine rules on complicity specific to IHL 
and IHRL. These rules differ from the generally applicable one in Article 16 
ASR in that they apply to State assistance to non-State actors, such as orga-
nized armed groups taking part in multinational military operations, and in 
that they prescribe lesser forms of fault, in particular, risk-based culpability 
for serious violations of these two bodies of law. Section III.D looks at how 
any risk-mitigation measures implemented by States should be conceptual-
ized legally and at whether States can ever be justified in taking proscribed 
risks. Part IV then explores the issue of perspective, explaining that complic-
ity rules are applied both ex ante (by State officials making decisions on 
whether to assist a partner or not) and ex post (by various actors, such as 
domestic and international courts, who may be evaluating whether the as-
sisting State was complicit in a partner’s violation of international law). This 
shift in perspective has significant implications for establishing the assisting 
State’s fault. Finally, Part V examines the two main scenarios of intelligence 
sharing in military operations that may engage the complicity rules of inter-
national law: first, intelligence sharing assisting a wrongful act; and second, 
sharing and receiving unlawfully obtained intelligence. Part VI concludes. 
 
II. ON CULPABILITY IN COMPLICITY 
 
A. On the Elements of Complicity Rules and Article 16 ASR 
 
Any complicity rule must delineate between those interactions between legal 
or natural persons that should be deemed as wrongful or harmful and those 
that are not (and may indeed be socially beneficial). The design of a complic-
ity rule is, therefore, fundamentally about striking a fair balance. A very nar-
row rule may enable too many socially harmful interactions between two 
persons, while a very broad one may inhibit useful cooperation too much. 











the time for all sorts of reasons. They also cooperate with various non-State 
entities, from corporations to armed groups. An overbroad complicity rule 
may have the virtue of stopping harmful transactions (e.g., preventing the 
sale of weapons that would be used by the buyer to kill civilians in violation 
of IHL) but inhibit inter-State cooperation that could advance the welfare of 
the relevant States and their people (e.g., intelligence sharing for the purpose 
of combating terrorism). 12 The balance struck by a complicity rule will 
mainly depend on the calibration of three elements: the causal relationship 
between the assistance provided by the accomplice to the principal’s wrong-
ful act, the culpability required of the accomplice, and the nature of the ac-
complice’s liability—that is, whether their conduct is regarded as equally 
blameworthy as that of the principal so that the principal’s wrong is imputed 
to the accomplice.  
The culpability element of complicity rules is particularly prone to varia-
tion. We can see this reasonably clearly in the ILC’s fashioning of a generally 
applicable inter-State complicity rule in Article 16 ASR. Some elements of 
this rule are less controversial than others. First, it is clear that under Article 
16 the assisting State is responsible for its own conduct in providing assistance 
to a wrongful act, not for the wrongful act of the assisted State itself.13 Article 
16 is, in other words, a non-attributive, non-imputational complicity rule.14 
In some cases, this may be a distinction without consequence; in others, it 
may be crucial (for instance, with regard to the assessment of damages).15 
Second, it is also clear that the parity of international obligations required 
by Article 16(b) does not generally require that the obligations stem from the 
same source; 16 all that is needed is for the obligations to have the same content. 17 
Thus, for example, it would be wrongful under Article 16 for State A to 
assist State B in the commission of inhuman treatment, even if States A and 
B are parties to different treaties, both of which prohibit inhuman treat-
ment.18  
 
12. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 6, at 266–68. 
13. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 1. 
14. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 167–68.  
15. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 10. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 7; 
JACKSON, supra note 8, at 169–71. 
16. For an extensive discussion, see AUST, supra note 6, at 258–65. 
17. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 410 (Article 16(b) “says nothing about the identity 
of norms or sources”).  












Third, there is equally no dispute that the notion of aid and assistance is 
a broad, flexible one.19 The ILC’s view was that it had to consist of positive 
acts (i.e., assistance by omission is excluded),20 but the concept is otherwise 
limited only by the Article 16 requirement of a causal nexus between the aid 
and assistance provided by the assisting State and the wrongful act commit-
ted by the assisted State.21 How that nexus is best described as an operational 
legal test is a more difficult issue. The nexus threshold must be neither too 
high nor too low; on the one hand, assistance need not be the but-for cause 
of the wrongful act, while on the other, Article 16 should not capture inci-
dental or de minimis acts of assistance. The most common formulations 
used in that regard are whether the assistance significantly, substantially, or 
materially contributed to the commission of the wrongful act. 22 I will not 
dwell on the possible differences between these formulations here; the as-
sessment will, in any event, be contextual and fact-specific. In any case, there 
is little doubt that the sharing of intelligence can, in appropriate circum-
stances, constitute aid and assistance in the sense of Article 16—that is, it is 
generally capable of satisfying the causal nexus requirement.23 
However, the fault element of Article 16 remains a matter of great con-
troversy. The controversy stems in part from an apparent contradiction be-
tween the text of the article—which speaks of the assisting State providing 
its assistance “with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act” by the assisted wrongdoing State—and the commentary to the 
provision, which sets out an intent requirement: 
 
Article 16 limits the scope of responsibility for aid or assistance in three 
ways. First, the relevant State organ or agency providing aid or assistance 
must be aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted 
State internationally wrongful; secondly, the aid or assistance must be given 
 
19. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 8; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 153–54. 
20. See Bosnian Genocide, supra note 7, ¶ 432 (distinguishing between complicity and a 
duty to prevent as negative and positive obligations, respectively). For critical analysis, see 
JACKSON, supra note 8, at 155–57; LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 96.  
21. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 155–57; Erika de Wet, Complicity in the Violations of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Incumbent Governments through Direct Military Assistance 
on Request, 67 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 287, 298–301 (2018).  
22. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 5 (“There is no requirement that the aid or 
assistance should have been essential to the performance of the internationally wrongful act; 
it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act.”). See also JACKSON, supra note 8, at 
157–58; Moynihan, supra note 11, at 8–9; LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 184–86. 
23. See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 11, at 8; AUST, supra note 6, at 198; LANOVOY, supra 











with a view to facilitating the commission of that act, and must actually do so; 
and thirdly, the completed act must be such that it would have been wrong-
ful had it been committed by the assisting State itself. 24 
  
According to the ILC commentary, the knowledge requirement is essen-
tially about whether the “assisting or aiding State is unaware of the circum-
stances in which its aid or assistance is intended to be used by the other State.”25 
The ILC then appears to supplement this knowledge requirement by a fur-
ther intent to facilitate the commission of the wrongful act.26 We will look at 
the contradictions in the commentary in more detail below.  
Also, the commentary to Article 16 should be read together with that to 
Article 41(2) ASR, which provides that States must not render aid or assist 
in maintaining the situation created by a serious breach of jus cogens. The ILC 
is explicit that this rule goes beyond that of Article 16 in that it applies to 
assistance after the fact, that is, after the breach of jus cogens has occurred.27 
While the commentary also notes that the notion of aid and assistance in 
Article 41(2) should be read in conjunction with Article 16, the former article 
does not refer to any form of culpability on the part of the assisting State, 
not even knowledge. The ILC explains that there was “no need to mention 
such a requirement in article 41 (2) as it is hardly conceivable that a State 
would not have notice of the commission of a serious breach by another 
State.”28  
 
24. ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 
25. Id. art. 16 cmt. ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
26. Id. art. 16 cmt. ¶ 5 (“A State is not responsible for aid or assistance under article 16 
unless the relevant State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the oc-
currence of the wrongful conduct.”); id. art. 16 cmt. ¶ 9 (“Where the allegation is that the 
assistance of a State has facilitated human rights abuses by another State, the particular cir-
cumstances of each case must be carefully examined to determine whether the aiding State 
by its aid was aware of and intended to facilitate the commission of the internationally 
wrongful conduct.”). 
27. Id. art. 41 cmt. ¶ 11. See also AUST, supra note 6, at 337. 











Scholars and States are broadly divided into two camps with regard to 
the interpretation of the mental element of the (now) customary rule en-
shrined in Article 16.29 First, many scholars advance a knowledge-based the-
ory of the aid and assistance rule.30 It would be unacceptable, so the argu-
ment goes, for a State that is (say) selling weapons to another State that it 
knows the latter would use to commit war crimes to escape responsibility 
under Article 16, simply on the basis that the assisting State’s officials do not 
provide the assistance with the purpose of facilitating or committing war 
crimes, although they know full well that this is what the assistance will be 
used for. This basic normative argument is then supplemented by various 
formal moves—for instance, that the text of an ILC codification project 
should be given priority over the commentary, especially because in the ILC 
drafting process the commentary goes through less scrutiny than the text. 31 
Analogies are drawn to international criminal law, which, as a matter of cus-
tomary law, sets out a knowledge-based test for complicity.32 It would be 
incongruent, under this view, to hold State officials criminally responsible 
for providing assistance to other actors but not the States on whose behalf 
they are acting. This is especially the case since the culpability thresholds of 
international criminal law tend to be higher than for State responsibility (as 
are generally those for criminal law as opposed to civil law). What could pos-
sibly justify a position whereby an individual who acted in their official ca-
pacity on the State’s behalf was criminally responsible for complicity in an 
international crime, but the State on whose behalf the individual acted es-
caped any responsibility? 
Second, there is the intent camp, which argues that a State can be re-
sponsible for complicity only if it provides assistance with the intention to 
facilitate the assisted State’s wrongful act. The intent camp emphasizes the 
need to interpret the text and the commentary together and claims that, re-
alistically, a variant of an intent standard is the maximum to which all States 
 
29. For a succinct account, see Moynihan, supra note 11, at 18–19. See also Nottingham 
Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 6–10. 
30. See, e.g., Vaughan Lowe, Responsibility for the Conduct of Other States, 101 KOKUSAIHO 
GAIKO ZASSHI 1, 8 (2002); Olivier Corten, La Complicité dans le Droit de la Responsabilité Inter-
nationale: Un Concept Inutile?, 57 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 57 (2011); 
JACKSON, supra note 8, at 160–61; LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 226–27. 
31. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 159–62; Giorgio Gaja, Interpreting Articles Adopted by the 
International Law Commission, 86 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2015); 
Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 5–6. 











could agree.33 As a matter of policy, a knowledge-based test would be over-
inclusive and would inhibit State cooperation that can help advance im-
portant public interests, such as the prevention of terrorism. The proponents 
of this view argue that State practice is replete with examples of assistance 
provided to partners with unclean hands, a point that militates against a cus-
tomary rule prohibiting such assistance. They similarly argue that analogies 
with international criminal law are inapposite because criminal law protects 
a narrow set of values and interests that may require different standards than 
the generally applicable law of State responsibility.34 
While this debate has attracted much scholarly attention, most States 
have remained silent on the issue, a fact that contributes to the formal inde-
terminacy of Article 16. The situation was not helped by the ICJ’s foray into 
the issue in the Bosnian Genocide case. There the Court had to decide whether 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was responsible for complicity in 
genocide (prohibited in Article 3(e) of the Genocide Convention) in provid-
ing assistance to the forces of the Bosnian Serbs who committed genocide 
in Srebrenica in July 1995. The Court decided to use Article 16 ASR, an inter-
State rule, by analogy to supply content to the Genocide Convention rule 
that prohibited States from assisting non-State actors in the commission of 
genocide.35 In doing so, however, the Court avoided conclusively pronounc-
ing on the mental element of Article 16. It held in particular that it was not 
necessary to decide whether or not an accomplice to genocide shared the 
principal perpetrator’s specific, genocidal intent (which is itself a step above 
an intent or purpose to facilitate the crime) because 
 
there is no doubt that the conduct of an organ or a person furnishing aid 
or assistance to a perpetrator of the crime of genocide cannot be treated as 
complicity in genocide unless at the least that organ or person acted know-
ingly, that is to say, in particular, was aware of the specific intent (dolus 
specialis) of the principal perpetrator.36 
 
 
33. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 409. 
34. See AUST, supra note 6, at 248–49. See also Helmut Aust, A Path towards the Moral 
Sophistication of International Law? Some Remarks on Miles Jackson’s “Complicity in International 
Law,” EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-path-towards-the-moral-so-
phistication-of-international-law-some-remarks-on-miles-jacksons-complicity-in-interna-
tional-law/. 
35. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 7, ¶ 420. 











On the facts, while there was little doubt that the aid provided by the 
FRY at least partly facilitated the Srebrenica genocide, there was also no ev-
idence that the FRY authorities were “clearly aware”37 that the Bosnian Serbs 
were committing or were about to commit genocide, especially because the 
decision to commit genocide was taken shortly before it was carried out.38 
On the other hand, the Court found that the FRY was responsible for failing 
to prevent the Srebrenica genocide because it was aware, or should normally 
have been aware, of a “serious risk” that genocide would take place in Sre-
brenica and did not act with due diligence to stop it. 39 Note the Court’s use 
of a constructive knowledge standard for triggering the duty to prevent: that 
the State should have known of a serious risk—that is, some significant possi-
bility but not necessarily likelihood—that genocide would take place.40 
The contradictions between the ILC’s text of and commentary to Article 
16 ASR, as well as the ICJ’s reluctance to clarify the mental element of the 
rule, are likely the consequence of an almost existential dilemma as to how 
this complicity rule should be calibrated. A culpability standard that required 
knowledge could be criticized as overinclusive, while one that required intent 
could be criticized as underinclusive. As I will proceed to show, however, 
that dilemma is a false one. Article 16 could—and should—incorporate var-
ying degrees of knowledge and intent, using complementary and alternative 
forms of fault. Subject-specific complicity rules, such as those in IHL and 
IHRL, could do so as well.  
To demonstrate how this is the case requires, however, a theoretical de-
tour. A major factor contributing to the level of disagreement regarding the 
interpretation of Article 16 and its cognates is the terminological and con-
ceptual difficulty of any question of knowledge and intentionality, exacer-
bated by the lack of consistency among the different national legal systems 
in which international lawyers are first trained. Improving our understanding 
of these issues thus requires resort to the accumulated expertise of those 
who have devoted particular thought and energy to analogous questions, 
such as psychologists, philosophers (of the law, of language, and of the 
mind), and international and domestic criminal lawyers. To be clear, my aim 
 
37. Id. ¶ 422. 
38. Id. ¶ 423. 
39. Id. ¶¶ 431–38. 
40. Human rights bodies also generally use constructive knowledge regarding State fault 
for failing to comply with positive duties of protect. In the ECHR context, see Vladislava 
Stoyanova, Fault, Knowledge and Risk within the Framework of Positive Obligations under the European 











here is only to develop a conceptual framework that is good enough for better 
understanding the dilemmas posed by Article 16 ASR and similar State-fo-
cused complicity rules. My purpose is not to set out a full-fledged theory of 
epistemology or intention, nor am I capable of so doing. That said, no 
amount of conceptual “clarification” of the type we will embark upon can 
ultimately overcome substantive moral and political disagreements, which 
conceptual debates may only serve to mask.41 But it is important to know 
what we are really disagreeing about. 
 
B. Culpability from the Individual to the State 
  
Let us first dispense with the supposed difficulty of conceptualizing culpa-
bility in terms of mental elements, or the mens rea of States.42 It is a truism 
that States are abstract legal entities and thus physically incapable of directly 
knowing or intending anything. When, however, we speak of knowledge or 
intention in the context of the law of State responsibility, we do so with the 
understanding that States are composed of and can, in reality, only act 
through human beings. Therefore, to say that State A knows something or 
intends something is simply shorthand for saying that a natural, physical per-
son X, who is acting on behalf of the State—that is, whose conduct is legally at-
tributable to the State—knows or intends something. This process is concep-
tually no different from imputing mental states to legal entities, such as cor-
porations, under domestic law, even if the rules of attribution of conduct 
will obviously be different. Every domestic legal system that allows for the 
criminal liability of corporations must (except in cases of strict liability) at-
tribute to the corporation the mens rea of some specific individual acting on 
its behalf—an ordinary employee, a senior manager, a member of the board 
 
41. See Nicola Lacey, A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?, 56 MODERN LAW 
REVIEW 621, 626 (1993) (“Among these various points, the principal message is this: the 
real source of uncertainty and disagreement in the application of criminal law concepts such 
as intention is not ultimately to do with the concept, but with practical, moral and political 
issues. Should this person be convicted, and of what offence? What is the appropriate role 
of criminal law in this area? Conceptual analysis of mens rea terms, let alone their stipulation, 
is inadequate as a lid to keep a jar containing these kinds of substantive issues shut.”). 
42. In a somewhat different context, see, e.g., James Green, Self-Defence: A State of Mind 











of directors, and so forth.43 Attributing mens rea to States is, again, concep-
tually no different.  
As a matter of international law, it does not matter what position X holds 
in A’s governmental hierarchy. It is perfectly possible for an intelligence 
agent to possess an item of information or intend a certain action without 
the knowledge of their immediate superiors or the highest-ranking officials 
of the State, who may even have contradictory intentions.44 But this is simply 
irrelevant. From the standpoint of the law of State responsibility, the State is 
a unitary entity and remains responsible for the conduct of all of its organs, 
even if the conduct is unknown to the head of State or government or is 
ultra vires.45  
There is thus no conceptual barrier to thinking about the mental states 
of States. These are the mental states of concrete human beings engaging in 
the conduct (the provision of assistance) that is attributable to the assisting 
State and that falls within the purview of Article 16 or a similar complicity 
rule.46 Whatever the mental element required by the rule really is, it is the 
relevant State organ or agent that must act with such mental element—that 
is, the fault lies with an individual or a group of individuals acting on the 
State’s behalf, especially those individuals deciding on or engaging in the 
prohibited conduct (such as the sharing of intelligence).47 That said, it is en-
tirely possible to find that the State acted with fault without identifying these 
officials by position or name. I should add that I should not be taken as 
 
43. For example, for the position in English law see Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. 
Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 705 (House of Lords attributing to a company the 
fault of a natural person who was the company’s “directing mind”); Tesco Supermarkets 
Ltd. v. Nattrass [1971] UKHL 1, 26: “In my view, therefore, the question: what natural 
persons are to be treated in law as being the company for the purpose of acts done in the 
course of its business, including the taking of precautions and the exercise or due diligence 
to avoid the commission of a criminal offence, is to be found by identifying those natural 
persons who by the memorandum and articles of association or as a result of action taken 
by the directors, or by the company in general meeting pursuant to the articles, are entrusted 
with the exercise of the powers of the company.” For a comparative overview of corporate 
liability for bribery in 38 OECD member States, including the various attribution rules used 
in their criminal laws, see OECD, Liability of Legal Persons for Foreign Bribery: A Stock-
taking Report (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.oecd.org/corruption/liability-of-legal-persons-
for-foreign-bribery-stocktaking-report.htm. 
44. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 16–17. 
45. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 7, art. 7 cmt. 
46. But see LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 339–40. 











arguing that there are no hard cases in attributing fault to States. In the in-
telligence-sharing context in particular, and especially with regard to the use 
of knowledge-based fault standards, one major difficulty is that the different 
components of the State may not be exchanging the information they pos-
sess with each other, so that a proper assessment of the risk of sharing intel-
ligence with a partner is never made. I will deal with this issue in more detail 
below.48 But such difficulties, conceptual or evidentiary, should not be exag-
gerated. 
It is, of course, true that in numerous contexts the relevant culpability 
standard is objective—for example, whether the State acted reasonably or with 
due diligence to prevent some kind of harm that it knew or ought/should have 
known about. 49 But this is not because there is some kind of generally appli-
cable presumption against subjective culpability standards or because no 
fault is required at all. Rather, the question of fault or culpability is entirely 
context-specific and a matter of the proper interpretation to be given to the 
primary rule or the complicity rule being applied.50 It is perfectly appropriate, 
 
48. See Part IV. 
49. Responsibility for fault under an objective standard is not equivalent to strict liabil-
ity, which is responsibility with no fault at all. The objective standards are themselves forms 
of fault, just like negligence in domestic law. For a discussion of various fault standards, 
including objective ones, in the context of positive obligations under the ECHR, see 
Stoyanova, supra note 40. 
50. As the ILC explains,  
 
Whether there has been a breach of a rule may depend on the intention or knowledge of 
relevant State organs or agents and in that sense may be “subjective.” . . . In other cases, the 
standard for breach of an obligation may be “objective,” in the sense that the advertence or 
otherwise of relevant State organs or agents may be irrelevant. Whether responsibility is 
“objective” or “subjective” in this sense depends on the circumstances, including the con-
tent of the primary obligation in question. The articles lay down no general rule in that 
regard. The same is true of other standards, whether they involve some degree of fault, 
culpability, negligence or want of due diligence. Such standards vary from one context to 
another for reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose of the treaty provision 
or other rule giving rise to the primary obligation. Nor do the articles lay down any pre-
sumption in this regard as between the different possible standards. Establishing these is a 
matter for the interpretation and application of the primary rules engaged in the given case. 
 
ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 2 cmt. ¶ 3. See also id. art. 16 cmt. ¶ 3 (“the relevant State organ or 
agency providing aid or assistance must be aware of the circumstances”) (emphasis added); art. 
16 cmt. ¶ 5 (“A State is not responsible for aid or assistance under article 16 unless the relevant 
State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful 











for example, for State responsibility for the commission of genocide to de-
pend on the existence of a specific genocidal intent on the part of the rele-
vant State officials, while the State’s responsibility for failing to prevent gen-
ocide would depend on an objective standard of conduct, such as due dili-
gence. A wholly different matter is the proof of such subjective mental states 
as knowledge or intent, which will again depend entirely on the context in 
which such proof is being sought and will normally require inference from 
conduct, with all the problems that this usually entails. 51  
A more difficult question is the extent to which the legal categories of 
mens rea and the “folk,” or lay, intuitions about mental states that support 
them, correspond to actual psychological phenomena. This question can 
only be answered (if at all) by psychologists and neuroscientists and is obvi-
ously beyond the scope of our inquiry.52 My point is simply that to the extent 
that intent and knowledge are workable and coherent concepts, at least in 
law, there is no issue whatsoever with attributing them to the State.  
 
C. Knowledge and Intent Compared  
 
Before looking specifically at the mental element of complicity, it is im-
portant to define knowledge and intent as precisely as possible,53 a task made 
more difficult by terminological inconsistencies and variations between legal 
cultures. Even within a single legal tradition the meaning of the terms can 
vary from context to context, from one area of the law to another. Then 
there are the “folk,” or lay, conceptions of knowledge and intent,54 as well 
as the very nuanced and sophisticated ones found in philosophical scholar-
ship, which has found the question of the definition of intention “both in-
triguing and enormously difficult to answer in any simple terms.”55 All this 
 
51. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 17; A.P. SIMESTER ET AL., SIMESTER AND SULLI-
VAN’S CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE 147–48 (6th ed. 2016).  
52. See Michael S. Moore, Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 179 (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., 
2011). 
53. Intent and intention are synonyms, although the former is more prevalent in formal 
legal contexts. I will use them interchangeably. 
54. There are many different conceptions of knowledge and intent in ordinary usage, 
depending on the context. References to ordinary usage are necessarily reductivist and sim-
plistic. See Lacey, supra note 41, at 627. 
55. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSO-











variation means that it is simply impossible to arrive at any kind of compre-
hensive set of definitions; accordingly, my ambition here is only to draw a 
few important and necessary distinctions. 
First, the legal concepts of knowledge and intent need not align perfectly 
with the “folk” usage of the terms or with how these terms are used by phi-
losophers.56 Ultimately, law has to contain rules about these concepts, and 
these rules serve a multitude of different purposes, a situation that can lead 
to divergence from the usage of terms outside the legal context.57  
Second, knowledge and intent both require objects or referents; they can only 
operate with regard to something. These objects can be (1) actions, (2) the 
consequences/results of those actions, or (3) facts/attendant circum-
stances.58 Philosophical discussions have generally revolved around the rela-
tionship between action and intention—all actions (as opposed to involun-
tary movements) are by definition intentional under some description.59  
Third, knowledge and intent differ in psychological valence—intent is a 
pro-attitude (e.g., approval, admiration, liking, preference) in favor of a certain 
course of events or line of conduct, while knowledge requires no such atti-
tude. The agent wants to commit the action and thereby achieve some result; 
they act with some goal in mind.60 In the legal literature, we frequently say 
that knowledge is a cognitive phenomenon while intent is a volitional one—
that is, it involves the exercise of the free will or choice of a person who is 
pursuing some kind of goal.  
 
56. Id. at 116–17. 
57. See generally R.A. Duff, Intentions Legal and Philosophical, 9 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LE-
GAL STUDIES 76 (1989). 
58. See HART, supra note 55, at 119. 
59. For a classical account, see ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (1957). For a so-
phisticated and more recent exploration of distinctions between beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions and between intentions and intended actions, see RICHARD HOLTON, WILLING, 
WANTING, WAITING (2009). 
60. I am avoiding using the terms desire and motive here. The relationship between 
intention and desire is a complex issue in both the philosophical and legal literature, the key 
issue being whether intention is a species of or entails desire. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, INTEN-
TION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 44–82 (1990); John Finnis, Intention and Side Effects, in 2 INTENTION AND IDENTITY: 
COLLECTED ESSAYS 173 (John Finnis ed., 2011). Motive is a goal further removed causally 
from the intended action and its immediate result. Motive in that sense is also a sub-species 
of intention, but intention relates to consequences that are (in the criminal context) outside 
the defined scope of the elements of the offense, and the intention as to these consequences 
is thus legally not a part of the intent required by the offense. See also SIMESTER ET AL., supra 











A person can thus intend to perform some action, know or foresee that 
the action is likely or not likely to lead to a result, and act with or without the 
intention of bringing about that result. The same action can therefore be 
intentional under one description but not under others. Imagine a scenario 
in which A, a soldier, shoots at a person he sees on a hill and thinks is an 
enemy soldier but turns out to have been B, a member of A’s own unit. The 
proposition that A intentionally fired his weapon is true, as is the one that A 
intentionally fired his weapon to kill the person on the hill, but the proposi-
tion that A intentionally fired his weapon to kill B is false. Whether A’s ac-
tion is regarded as intentional thus depends on the words we use to describe 
it.  
In ordinary language, knowledge and intention can refer to both actions 
and their consequences, but intention cannot refer to facts that are not con-
sequences; in other words, facts that are not causally related to some action 
also being described. One can know that the Earth revolves around the Sun, 
but one cannot intend that the Earth revolve around the Sun. One can know 
that there is such a thing as anthropogenic climate change, but one cannot 
intend that there be such a thing. One can, of course, hope that a certain state 
of affairs is or is not true, but one cannot intend it. Again, intent/intention 
is a mental state tied to action—one can certainly intend to (now or in the 
future) work on ameliorating climate change or act in some way because cli-
mate change exists.61 As a legal matter, however, intent can (confusingly) be 
redefined as hope or belief as to mere existence of attendant circumstances, if 
intent is required for that type of element of an offense.62  
As for knowledge, it is traditionally (but not universally) defined in epis-
temology as a justified true belief, a definition that largely aligns with com-
monsense usage and legal practice. Thus, person A knows that proposition 
P is true if and only if (1) P is, in fact, true; (2) A subjectively believes that P 
is true; and (3) A is justified in so believing, perhaps because the belief is 
formed on the basis of appropriate and relevant evidence.63 A is able in this 
 
61. See also DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra note 60, at 
87–89. 
62. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 145–46. 
63. See generally Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, The Analysis of Knowledge, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 7, 2017), http://plato.stanford.edu/en-
tries/knowledge-analysis/. Disregard of the traditional definition generally turns on the is-
sue of justifiability and so-called Gettier cases. See Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963). See also PAUL BOGHOSSIAN, FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE: 











sense to know anything from whether the lights are on in the room (some-
thing the person can establish through direct perception) to such facts as 
that the Earth revolves around the Sun or humans are causing significant 
changes to the climate (if A has the capacity to examine a sufficient quantum 
of evidence in that regard and has done so). The legal conception of 
“knowledge,” just like that of “intention,” need not, of course, align with 
that of philosophy—this is especially the case with regard to the justifiability 
criterion, which is less important to law than are moral or commonsense 
intuitions about a person’s culpability.64  
Knowledge can relate to circumstances that existed in the past or that 
exist in the present. Thus, A can know that there once existed a person called 
Gaius Julius Caesar who became the dictator of Rome and was assassinated 
on the Ides of March. A can know that dinosaurs once roamed the Earth and 
then became extinct. A can know that another person, B, is sitting with him 
in his room. These are facts that a human being can be certain about, to the 
extent that a human being can know anything. 
However, there are points of fact in the past or present about which one 
cannot be certain—there are many things we do not know for sure, and will 
never be able to know for sure, about ancient Rome or the life of Caesar or 
the extinction of the dinosaurs. We may simply lack sufficient information 
or evidence about specific points in the past or the present—for example, 
whether Vladimir Putin has ever had a very naughty tape starring one Donald 
Trump in his drawer. Similarly, we may have reasonably sufficient infor-
mation—for example, regarding whether there were weapons of mass de-
struction in Iraq in 2003—yet process it in a biased or otherwise erroneous 
way. In short, it is simply a fact of life that we constantly have to make deci-
sions in conditions of uncertainty, conditions no less unclear even if some 
facts in the past or present can, in theory, be known with absolute certainty.65  
We also frequently speak of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that) 
when it relates to circumstances or events in the future. A knows that he will 
eventually die, since every person there ever was ultimately died and since he 
has a sufficient understanding of human biology. A knows that if he drops a 
tennis ball that he is holding in his hand the ball will start falling to the ground 
because this is what has happened every time he dropped something and 
 
64. See further Gregory M. Gilchrist, Willful Blindness as Mere Evidence, 54 LOYOLA OF LOS 
ANGELES LAW REVIEW 405, 428–33 (2021). See also SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 157. 
65. See also Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 070: Uncertainty, Risk, and Ignorance, 
LEGAL THEORY LEXICON, https://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2011/05/ 











because he is familiar with the nature of the force of gravity. A can even 
know something that will occur billions of years into the future—for exam-
ple, that in some five billion years the Sun will exhaust the hydrogen in its 
core, exit its main sequence, expand into a red giant, and engulf the inner 
planets of the Solar System.  
In other words, one can know the future; there are future facts just as 
there are facts in the past or the present. However, the vast majority of future 
facts are contingent and thus not knowable in this sense, but are only assess-
able as a matter of degree of likelihood or probability. This is especially the 
case when a future event depends on the actions of other human beings and 
is thus necessarily contingent, a point of particular importance for our inquiry 
into complicity.66 We will return to it later. 
 
D. A Continuum of Culpability 
 
This brings us to the continuum of the types of fault that we are familiar 
with from comparative criminal law. The diversification of culpability is a 
consequence of ordinary moral intuitions under which the wrongfulness of 
instances of the same conduct causing exactly the same consequences (e.g., 
death) will vary depending on the mental state of the wrongdoer, as will ac-
cordingly the level of responsibility and punishment. Domestic legal systems 
also vary, of course, in how precisely they define the specific points along 
this continuum. 
One example of a carefully crafted diversified approach is the influential 
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute (MPC), which deliberately 
avoids the ambiguity associated with the term “intent”67 and instead distin-
guishes between four culpable mental states—purpose, knowledge, reckless-
ness, and negligence—requiring the proof of the mental state associated with 
each specific material element of a given criminal offense.68 For example, 
MPC section 2.02(2)(a) defines purpose as follows: 
 
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense 
when: 
 
66. See also James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 25 
LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165, 194 (2012). 
67. See MARKUS D. DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE 43–
44 (2d ed. 2015). 
68. Element analysis thus parts ways with offense analysis, which looks at the crime as 











(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is 
his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a 
result; and 
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the 
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.69 
 
Section 2.02(2)(b) then proceeds to define knowledge: 
 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense 
when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant cir-
cumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such cir-
cumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is 
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. 
 
Note how the MPC definition of purpose in section 2.02(2)(a)(i), requir-
ing a “conscious object” to engage in the relevant conduct or to cause a 
specific result corresponds to the philosophical definition of intention in the 
context of goal-driven action. But the purpose with regard to attendant cir-
cumstances in section 2.02(2)(a)(ii) is actually either knowledge (awareness 
that they exist, as also set out in section 2.02(2)(b)(i)), or subjective belief, or 
even mere hope, that they exist (neither of which is knowledge as that term 
is conventionally defined in philosophy).70  
Like most domestic legal systems, those U.S. jurisdictions that base their 
criminal laws on the MPC essentially require that the members of a jury or 
professional judges tasked with determining the culpability of an individual 
establish the subjective mental state of that individual, a task that is of course 
impossible through any direct means. The practical difficulties of inferring 
mental states from an individual’s statements or behavior mean that fine dis-
tinctions of the kind drawn in the MPC can look artificial or impracticable; 
 
69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1985) [hereinafter MPC]. 
70. See also DUBBER, supra note 67, at 53–54. Similarly, see section 5.2(2) of the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 of Australia, under which “[a] person has intention with respect to a circum-











they do not actually correspond to what finders of fact are really doing, es-
pecially if they can exercise a significant degree of discretion and do not have 
to provide full reasoning for their decisions (as is the case with juries).71  
Moreover, our moral intuitions may well lead us to conclude that con-
ceptually distinct mental states are equally culpable, deserving of the same 
condemnation, and that, therefore, the various distinctions regarding mental 
states should be collapsed.72 In fact, in recent years psychologists and exper-
imental philosophers have been testing the working of these intuitions, with 
some striking findings. For instance, in an experiment in which the subjects 
were presented with a vignette in which the protagonist commits an action 
causing a harmful side effect as a consequence of an effect he actually desires, 
the vast majority of subjects, when given a binary choice of descriptions of 
the protagonist’s conduct (intentional v. unintentional), agreed that the 
harmful side effect was caused intentionally but they were not willing to 
agree with that proposition when the side effect was beneficial.73 When given 
multiple possible descriptions, however, the subjects most often chose the 
label “knowingly” for such conduct and showed a capacity for making fine 
distinctions on the basis of their assessment of the protagonist’s desire to 
cause an effect—the greater the assessed desire, the greater the blamewor-
thiness.74 There is an ongoing controversy in this body of scholarship about 
whether and to what extent people’s intentionality judgments are driving 
their moral judgments (as has commonly been thought) or whether it is in 
fact moral judgments about blameworthiness that drive (and bias) “folk” 
judgments about intentionality (i.e., we think that a particular course of con-
duct is blameworthy and therefore think that it is intentional). 75 
 
71. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL 
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 317–22 (2009). See also James A. Macleod, Belief States in Criminal 
Law, 68 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW 497 (2016). 
72. See HART, supra note 55, at 117; JEREMY HORDER, ASHWORTH’S PRINCIPLES OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 190–92 (2016). 
73. See Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 63 ANALYSIS 
190 (2003); Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation, 
16 PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 309 (2003). 
74. See Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle, Can Unintended Side Effects Be Intentional? 
Resolving a Controversy over Intentionality and Morality, 36 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY BULLETIN 1635 (2010). 
75. See further Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle, Enough Skill to Kill: Intentionality Judg-
ments and the Moral Valence of Action, 117 COGNITION 139 (2010); Joshua Knobe, Person as 
Scientist, Person as Moralist, 33 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 315 (2010); Joshua Knobe 












Be that as it may, it is simply a fact that most legal systems have, at least 
in some contexts, long treated as intentional those actions producing certain 
results that were done in mental states that were less clear-cut than the MPC 
idea of purpose76 and that do not correspond neatly with either “folk” or 
philosophical thinking about intentionality.77 In law, intent is “a term of art, 
encompassing many situations that we would not call ‘intentional’ in ordi-
nary language.”78 Thus, for example, many common law systems have used 
a concept of intent that includes not only the MPC idea of purpose, termed 
direct intent, but also oblique, or indirect, intent.79 Oblique intent treats as in-
tentional those consequences of an action that were foreseen by the person 
as inevitably resulting from their action, even though they were not the goal 
of the action.80 For example, A wishes to kill B, who is traveling on a train. 
To do that, A blows up the train, killing not only B but a number of other 
passengers, whose deaths are a matter of indifference to A but which he is 
ready to accept in order to achieve his goal of killing B. The element of vo-
lition here—which could deserve the label of intent—is that A chose to act in 
 
(2013); Jonathan Phillips, Jamie B. Luguri & Joshua Knobe, Unifying Morality’s Influence on 
Non-moral Judgments: The Relevance of Alternative Possibilities, 145 COGNITION 30 (2015); Florian 
Cova, The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Empirical Approaches, in BLACKWELL COMPANION 
TO EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma eds., 2016); Florian 
Cova, Anthony Lantian & Jordane Boudesseul, Can the Knobe Effect Be Explained Away? Meth-
odological Controversies in the Study of the Relationship between Intentionality and Morality, 42 PERSON-
ALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 1295 (2016); Andrew J. Vonasch & Roy F. 
Baumeister, Unjustified Side Effects Were Strongly Intended: Taboo Tradeoffs and the Side-Effect Effect, 
68 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 83 (2017). 
76. See further Sarah Finnin, Mental Elements under Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court: A Comparative Analysis, 61 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 
QUARTERLY 325, 328–33 (2012). 
77. In criminal law, this has especially been the case with regard to crimes involving 
physical harm to other persons. See HART, supra note 55, at 119 (“for the law, a foreseen 
outcome is enough, even if it was unwanted by the agent, even if he thought of it as an 
undesirable by-product of his activities”). 
78. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 443 (2000). 
79. For the classical argument in favor of the inclusion of oblique intent, see Glanville 
Williams, Oblique Intention, 46 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 417 (1987). For a philosophical 
critique of oblique intent, see Duff, Intentions Legal and Philosophical, supra note 57; DUFF, 
INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra note 60, at 74–82 (note however that 
Duff does not argue against responsibility in cases of oblique intent but disputes the con-
ceptual coherence of the notion). For a critique of Duff, see Michael Gorr, Should the Law 
Distinguish Between Intention and (Mere) Foresight?, 2 LEGAL THEORY 359 (1996). See also Finnis, 
supra note 60 (criticizing the notion of oblique intent as misconceived).  
80. I leave aside here the issue of whether having a goal is conceptually distinct from 











the way he did, knowing what the consequences of his action would be.81 In 
proceeding with the action nonetheless, A reconciled himself to the conse-
quences though he may not have desired them as such. In other words, it is 
not that A simply had the foresight that something would happen, but rather 
that while having such foresight, he consciously acted—as he could have 
chosen not to do—in a way that would bring about those results.82 
Jurisprudence has varied from system to system and within systems as 
to whether such oblique intent is a species of intent as such or simply evi-
dential support for an inference that (direct) intent exists.83 In the MPC 
framework, this would be an instance of a person acting knowingly with regard 
to a consequence, “aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will 
cause such a result,”84 a formulation designed to capture the contingent, 
probabilistic nature of such knowledge.85 In the private tort law context, the 
orthodox position in American law is that the concept of intent encompasses 
an oblique form, the equivalent of acting knowingly under the MPC. For 
example, the Restatement of Torts (Second) defines the word “intent” as denoting 
either that “the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes 
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”86 The Restatement of 
Torts (Third) retains this dual definition while modifying the language to make 
it more consistent with the MPC conceptual framework: “A person acts with 
the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose 
 
81. To a level of practical certainty higher in the scale than simply an appreciation of 
high probability. See Williams, supra note 79, at 421. 
82. See HART, supra note 55, at 121–22 (focusing on choice and control over the out-
come with regard to both direct and oblique intent). See also Duff, Intentions Legal and Philo-
sophical, supra note 57, at 87–88 (arguing that under a consequentialist moral paradigm con-
trol over the outcome is the basis of responsibility in cases of oblique intent); Steve Gug-
lielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle, At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology, 
52 INQUIRY 449 (2009) (arguing that moral judgments about blame critically depend on an 
assessment of the agent’s capacity to choose whether to do his action). 
83. See, e.g., DAVID ORMEROD & KARL LAIRD, SMITH, HOGAN, & ORMEROD’S CRIMI-
NAL LAW 90–9 (15th ed. 2018); Beatrice Krebs, Oblique Intent, Foresight and Authorisation, 7 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON JOURNAL OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2018); M. 
Cathleen Kaveny, Inferring Intention from Foresight, 120 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 81 (2004); 
SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 142–43 (all discussing the evolution of case law in Eng-
land and Wales). 
84. MPC, supra note 69, § 2.02(2)(b)(ii). 
85. See DUBBER, supra note 67, at 55. 











of producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the con-
sequence is substantially certain to result.”87 
In addition to the widespread adoption of oblique forms of intent, many 
common law systems have traditionally avoided confining culpability strictly 
to purpose in many other ways.88 For example, the crime of murder is in 
various common law jurisdictions defined as requiring either the purpose to 
kill or the purpose to cause grievous bodily harm without a purpose of caus-
ing death. Similarly, common law systems generally employ the doctrine of 
transferred malice—if A shoots at B with the intent of killing B, but misses 
B and kills C, A will be guilty of the murder of C even though he did not 
desire to bring about C’s death. In some common law jurisdictions, a cognate 
doctrine is the felony murder rule, which imposes responsibility for murder 
on any person who kills another, without desiring to do so, if the death arises 
in the context of the commission of a specific felony, such as robbery.89 Fi-
nally, in the complicity context, the doctrine of joint enterprise imposes crim-
inal responsibility on a person who contributes to the commission of an of-
fense by others with whom he shares a common purpose, such responsibility 
extending even to crimes outside the common purpose but whose commis-
sion was foreseen.90 All of these doctrines (rightly or not) enable the convic-
tion for an offense (e.g., murder) of a person who did not act with the purpose 
of bringing about the prohibited consequence.  
 
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (AM. L. INST. 2010). The commentary then 
further explains,  
 
A purpose to cause harm makes the harm intentional even if harm is not substantially certain 
to occur. Likewise, knowledge that harm is substantially certain to result is sufficient to 
show that the harm is intentional even in the absence of a purpose to bring about that harm. 
Of course, a mere showing that harm is substantially certain to result from the actor’s con-
duct is not sufficient to prove intent; it must also be shown that the actor is aware of this. 
Moreover, under Subsection (b) it is not sufficient that harm will probably result from the 
actor’s conduct; the outcome must be substantially certain to occur. 
 
Id. at 7. 
88. See Moore, supra note 52, at 201–2. 
89. See FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 447–48; DUBBER, supra note 67, at 90–92. 
90. This remains the position under customary international criminal law, although not 
under the Rome Statute of the ICC. This variant of common-purpose liability was recently 
considered by the UK Supreme Court in R v. Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, [2017] AC 387, and by 
the Privy Council in R v. Ruddock [2016] UKPC 7, holding that the common law of England 












Continental/civil law systems have similarly used an umbrella concept 
of intent which includes dolus directus and dolus indirectus (corresponding to 
direct and oblique intent in the common law). (In some systems, those same 
concepts are labeled dolus directus in, respectively, the first degree and the sec-
ond degree.91 In order to avoid confusion, I will not use these terms, but 
they convey the same basic idea.)92 This is also the position in Article 30(2)–
(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which 
provides as follows: 
 
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:  
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;  
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that conse-
quence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
3. For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events. “Know” and “knowingly” shall be construed accordingly.93 
 
The construction that a person is aware that “a consequence will occur 
in the ordinary course of events” is again meant to address the epistemic 
problem of not being able to know the future and therefore allowing for 
contingency. The formulation essentially conveys the same idea as foresight 
of practical, virtual, or near-certainty.94 
 
91. See Finnin, supra note 76, at 332–33. Obviously, these various systems will also use 
the equivalent of dolus in their own language, in addition or as an alternative to the Latin 
terms.  
92. See Mohamed Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law Perspective, 19 CRIMINAL LAW FORUM 
473, 474, 482–87 (2008). 
93. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 30(2)–(3), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
94. For example, the influential project of a draft Criminal Code for England and Wales, 
completed in 1989 by the Law Commission, uses very similar terminology to convey the 
same idea. Section 18(b) of the Code provides that a person acts intentionally with respect 
to: “a circumstance when he hopes or knows that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he 
acts either in order to bring it about or being aware that it will occur in the ordinary course 
of events.” 1 CRIMINAL LAW: A CRIMINAL CODE FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 51 (Law 
Com. No. 177, 1989). The Commission’s commentary on the provision notes the impossi-
bility of knowing the future and the provision’s openness due to contingency and embraces 













Civil law systems frequently also include within an umbrella concept of 
intent the sub-type called dolus eventualis, the closest common law equivalent 
of recklessness.95 Dolus eventualis is still regarded in such systems as dolus, i.e., 
a species of intent.96 It differs from dolus indirectus in that the foreseen prob-
ability of the consequence resulting from the action is lower than practical 
 
Where a person acts in order to achieve a particular purpose, knowing that this cannot be 
done without causing another result, he must be held to intend to cause that other result. 
The other result may be a pre-condition—as where D, in order to injure P, throws a brick 
through the window behind which he knows P to be standing; or it may be a necessary 
concomitant of the first result—as (to use a much quoted example) where D blows up an 
aeroplane in flight in order to recover on the insurance covering its cargo, knowing that the 
crew will inevitably be killed. D intends to break the window and he intends to kill the crew. 
But there is no absolute certainty in human affairs. P might fling up the window while the 
brick is in flight. The crew might make a miraculous escape by parachute. D’s purpose might 
be achieved without causing the second result—but these are only remote possibilities and 
D, if he contemplates them at all (which may be unlikely), must know that they are only 
remote possibilities. The result will occur, and D knows that it will occur, “in the ordinary 
course of events . . . unless something supervenes to prevent it.” It is, and he knows it is, 
“a virtual certainty.” We have adopted the phrase, “in the ordinary course of events” to 
ensure that “intention” covers the case of a person who knows that the achievement of his 
purpose will necessarily cause the result in question, in the absence of some wholly improb-
able supervening event. 
 
2 CRIMINAL LAW: A CRIMINAL CODE FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 192 (Law Com. No. 177, 
1989). Similarly, under section 5.2(3) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 of Australia “[a] person 
has intention with respect to a result if he or she means to bring it about or is aware that it 
will occur in the ordinary course of events.” 
95. This is the case, for example, in the law of South Africa, a hybrid common law/con-
tinental system. See, e.g., Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v. Pistorius 2016 (2) SA 
317 (SCA) (Paralympian Oscar Pistorius guilty of murdering his girlfriend, Reeva 
Steenkamp, on the basis of dolus eventualis). See also Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept 
of Intent, 35 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79, 83, 87–91 (2013) (discussing 
mens rea concepts in various legal traditions and exploring the issue of whether recklessness 
and dolus eventualis are substantially equivalent or the latter is somewhat more demanding 
than the former). Fletcher regards recklessness as equivalent to conscious negligence in 
some civil law systems rather than as equivalent to dolus eventualis. See FLETCHER, supra note 
78, at 446. The problem of distinguishing between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence 
has long preoccupied criminal law scholars in the continental European tradition, but that 
particular qualification issue is not of central importance to us here. See further DUBBER, supra 
note 67, at 61–63. For an extensive comparative examination of mens rea standards, see 
JEROEN BLOMSMA, MENS REA AND DEFENCES IN EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW (2012). 











certainty, although municipal systems differ as to whether mere possibility 
suffices for this species of intent or a particular risk threshold is required.97 
Intent defined as purpose or dolus directus covers those results of an action 
that are conscious objects or goals of the action even in those situations in 
which it is highly unlikely that the action will result in the desired conse-
quence.98 For example, if person A, who has no prior arms training, picks 
up a rifle and shoots at person B five hundred meters away, he may be aware 
that it is extremely unlikely that the action of taking a shot will result in B’s 
death but still intend that B shall die. If by luck B actually is struck by the 
bullet and dies, A would be liable for murder on the basis of his intent as 
purpose/direct intent, even though A foresaw that B would most likely not 
die.99  
However, oblique intent/dolus indirectus and recklessness/dolus eventualis 
focus on foresight and lack the element of goal or desire: the consequence 
of the agent’s action is unwanted but is foreseen, and the agent has recon-
ciled with, or is indifferent to, its occurrence. The difference between oblique 
intent and recklessness is that with regard to the former the occurrence of 
the consequence is practically or virtually certain, while with regard to the 
latter there is only a possibility or risk of its occurrence (with different de-
scriptors used in different jurisdictions).100 Again, in all of these cases the 
agent chooses to act while being aware of the certain, probable, or possible 
harmful consequences of their action.  
The upshot of this analysis is as follows: “intent” and “acting intention-
ally” are legally ambiguous terms that are perceived differently in different 
jurisdictions.101 The key question is whether intent will, as a matter of law, 
capture only those results of an action that were actively wanted, or also 
 
97. See also DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 188–92 (2016); 
Finnin, supra note 76, at 333–36; Ohlin, supra note 95, at 103–6 (exploring different concep-
tions of dolus eventualis). 
98. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 79, at 431; Finnin, supra note 76, at 330–31 (any degree 
of possibility suffices with direct intent). 
99. See, e.g., ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra note 83, at 90; cf. R v. Dadson [1850] 175 Eng. 
Rep. 499 (defendant convicted for intentionally shooting a man who he wrongly believed 
was out of range).  
100. See, e.g., ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra note 83, at 96–98 (discussing the difficulty of 
distinguishing between intention and recklessness below a threshold of a certainty); 
BLOMSMA, supra note 95, at 72–73. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 86, 
§ 8A cmt. (discussing the progression from intent, to recklessness, and then to negligence 
as the foreseen probability of a consequence decreases).  











those that were foreseen with virtual certainty or with something less than 
such certainty, but whose occurrence was acceptable to the agent. All legal 
systems suffer from difficulties in dealing with intent, both doctrinally and 
in practice. 
 
E. Knowing What, Intending What? 
 
We have, up to this point, discussed the mens rea of a person with respect 
to their own actions, their consequences, and any attendant circumstances. 
But our object of inquiry is, of course, the mens rea of complicity. In such 
situations there are (at least) two agents—the principal and the accomplice—
each of whom is engaging in some kind of conduct with some kind of mens 
rea. The conduct of the accomplice is the provision of assistance to the prin-
cipal, which makes it easier for the principal to commit a wrong—for exam-
ple, A sells B a gun that B then uses to kill C. The issue, therefore, is what 
mens rea A needs to have with respect to his action of provision of assis-
tance and its consequences, and with respect to any further action by B. 
As a general matter, domestic legal systems tend to deal with accomplice 
liability far more elaborately in the criminal law context than in the private 
law context.102 This is most likely because true tort complicity scenarios are 
rare and can be captured by broadly defined torts (including inducing 
breaches of contract) or by concepts such as joint tortfeasance.103 One do-
mestic legal system that has grappled with complicity scenarios more directly 
in the tort context is the American one, in the jurisprudence of U.S. federal 
courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act. But there the U.S. courts have 
mostly imported mens rea standards from international criminal law to de-
fine complicity in tort for violations of international law, producing a juris-
prudence that is substantial but complex and confusing, especially to outsid-
ers and particularly when these standards are applied to corporate entities. 104 
 
102. For two substantial recent works on private law accessory liability in common law 
systems, see JOACHIM DIETRICH & PAULINE RIDGE, ACCESSORIES IN PRIVATE LAW (2015); 
PAUL S. DAVIES, ACCESSORY LIABILITY (2015). 
103. See also Hazel Catty, Joint Tortfeasance and Assistance Liability, 19 LEGAL STUDIES 489 
(1999); Henry Cooper, Liability for Assisting Torts, 41 MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
571 (2017); Sarah L. Swan, Aiding and Abetting Matters, 12 JOURNAL OF TORT LAW 255 (2019) 
(again focusing on common law systems).  
104. See also Chimène Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS 
LAW JOURNAL 61 (2008); Oona A. Hathaway et al., Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal 











In trying to conceptualize the fault element of a State complicity rule in 
international law resort to criminal law analogies is thus inevitable. Again, 
this is—with due caution—not inappropriate since the mental attitudes that 
the fault or culpability element tries to capture are those of individuals acting 
on behalf of States.105 I will therefore use the gun-seller example above as a 
useful thought experiment. Note that in this scenario A’s action was know-
ing and volitional and hence intentional under some minimal description—
that is, the proposition that A intended to sell a gun to B is true since A 
knew that he was giving a gun (and not something else, say, a gun-like toy) 
to B, and wanted to engage in this conduct (that is, he was not compelled or 
coerced to do so). 
In that regard, even from this simple complicity scenario, it becomes 
apparent that speaking of “knowledge” or “intent” as the mental elements 
of accomplice liability is reductive and ambiguous. As explained above, both 
knowledge and intent are propositional attitudes—each needs an object or 
referent. 106 In our scenario, the gun seller, A, can have such attitudes towards 
his own conduct (giving the gun to B) and towards B’s conduct (the killing 
of C). These attitudes can be cognitive and volitional, both ranging on a 
spectrum.  
When we are speaking of the mens rea of complicity, we are therefore 
speaking about the interplay of four different factors: (1) A’s cognitive as-
sessment of whether B is committing or intends and is able to commit a 
wrongful act, such as killing C, an assessment ranging from practical certainty 
that he does not through various levels of risk or likelihood that he does up 
to a practical certainty that he does; (2) A’s volitional or conative attitude 
with regard to B’s action, ranging from disapproval through indifference to 
approval; (3) A’s cognitive assessment of whether B intends to use the aid 
that A provides for the wrongful act—for instance, intends to use the gun 
given by A to kill C—again ranging from a practical certainty that B does not 
to a practical certainty that he does; and finally (4), A’s volitional or conative 
attitude with regard to his own action of assisting B, ranging from wanting 
for this action not to facilitate B in the commission of the wrong through 
indifference to wanting it to facilitate B’s commission of the offense. 
Crucially, A’s assessment of B’s intent to kill C and of what B will do 
with the gun is necessarily always an assessment of probability. A cannot read 
B’s mind and so cannot directly know what B intends to do with the gun; 
 
105. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 19. 











instead, A must make inferences from B’s statements and behavior in their 
context.107 Similarly, B’s use of the gun will always temporally follow A’s 
action of providing the gun, and sometimes may come long thereafter.108 
Therefore, it is always possible for A to assess erroneously B’s intent (to the 
effect, e.g., that B never intended to kill C or never intended to use the gun 
to do so) or for B to change his mind (e.g., he intended to use the gun to kill 
C but before following through decides against it). In other words, B is an 
independent moral agent, and A’s beliefs or knowledge about B’s current 
and future intent and behavior are inevitably of a dynamic and probabilistic 
nature. Knowledge, in this context, can only mean foresight.  
This is not to exaggerate the practical difficulty of predicting the behav-
ior of other people—we do so all the time109—but simply to explain the 
inferential and probabilistic nature of the process. In law, we can choose a 
point on the cognitive spectrum to which we wish to attach the legal label of 
actual knowledge—for example, A knows that B will use the gun to kill C if A 
is practically certain that B will do so, thinks it is highly probable that B will 
do so, or thinks it is likely that B will do so. But there is no categorical dif-
ference between that label and the knowledge of the existence of a risk—the 
difference is one of degree, not one of kind. In either case, we are dealing 
with probabilistic foresight. 110 We can know in the orthodox sense of justified 
true belief only what some other person has already done or is currently do-
ing; predicting future behavior is always an assessment of some degree of 
probability. 
That said, my main point is that there is no intrinsic reason why the men-
tal element for complicity-type responsibility has to be at any specific point 
on the cognitive/volitional spectrum above. There are, of course, normative 
arguments as to where the line should be drawn.111 But as a matter of positive 
law, it is ultimately a choice for the legislator(s) or the courts as to where to 
 
107. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 147–48. 
108. See, e.g., ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra note 83, at 205–6. 
109. The difficult question is how exactly we do this. In this regard, see Heller, supra 
note 71 (discussing simulation and projection as the key mechanisms used by jurors when 
assessing the mental states of other persons). 
110. See Stewart, supra note 66, at 192–94; but see JACKSON, supra note 8, at 77–78. 
111. See, e.g., Antony Duff, Intention Revisited, in THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIM-
INAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 148, 172–73 (Dennis J. Baker & Jeremy 
Horder eds., 2013) (arguing in favor of a philosophically justifiable notion of intention as 
direct intent, and specifically that with regard to complicity for some types of offenses indi-












draw the line—often not a wholly determinate line—in weighing the differ-
ent competing normative and policy considerations at play.112 It is simply a 
fact that different systems have drawn this line in different places. It is also 
a fact that, like international law, many systems have experienced periods of 
(at times extreme) uncertainty and fluidity as to what the proper standards 
should be.113 
Several considerations influence where the culpability line for complicity 
should be drawn in criminal law. First, the complicity rule should not be 
overbroad: it should not excessively inhibit otherwise lawful conduct that 
could potentially serve some useful social purpose. This is essentially the 
same concern as the one under Article 16 ASR with regard to inhibiting inter-
State cooperation. Second, whether the accomplice is regarded as being 
equally culpable as the principal (which sometimes goes against our moral 
intuitions, and sometimes not), or is their culpability of a lesser kind. Third, 
relatedly, is complicity regarded as imputational, that is, is the principal’s of-
fence imputed to the accomplice, or is the accomplice being held responsible 
for her own conduct of providing the assistance. Finally, the workability of 
the rule, in other words, how easy it would be to apply in practice, for exam-
ple with regard to questions of proof. 
Again, in different systems these concerns are weighed differently, lead-
ing to different approaches to the nature of complicity generally and its men-
tal element specifically. This is simply because these considerations are such 
that their evaluation is perfectly open to reasonable disagreement. Indeed, 
we can observe this same fragmentation even within the confines of inter-
national criminal law.  
The Nuremberg military tribunals and the modern ad hoc tribunals set-
tled on the accomplice’s knowledge that the aid provided will assist the prin-
cipal’s crime as the relevant mens rea standard. It has been argued that this 
standard reflects customary international law (although the discernment of 
culpability standards for individuals from fragmented State practice is hardly 
 
112. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 46. 
113. Consider, for example, how the UK Supreme Court departed from prior expansive 
understandings of the culpability element in joint enterprise liability in Jogee, supra note 90, a 
change in position that apex courts in other jurisdictions refused to follow, e.g., in Australia. 
See Miller v. The Queen; Smith v. The Queen; Presley v. The Director of Public Prosecu-
tions [2016] HCA 30. For an extensive analysis in the private law context of the different 
strands of jurisprudence on the mental elements for accessory liability in equity, contract, 











an exact science).114 However, overinclusiveness concerns115 motivated the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY) to adopt a divergent position in which it formally reaffirmed 
the knowledge mens rea standard but required the actus reus (and again not 
the mens rea) of aiding and abetting to have been specifically directed to the 
facilitation of the offense116—a position rejected by other tribunals 117 and 
subsequently abandoned by the ICTY itself.118  
The drafters of the Rome Statute of the ICC, on the other hand, opted 
for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the crime as the mens rea of aiding 
and abetting,119 a formulation chosen as a compromise between diverse do-
mestic legal traditions, perhaps also because of concerns that the customary 
knowledge standard would be overinclusive.120 The choice of the term “pur-
pose” rather than intent is particularly interesting in light of the fact that, as 
 
114. For a comprehensive analysis, see Manuel J. Ventura, Aiding and Abetting, in MODES 
OF LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 173 (Jérôme de Hemptinne et al. eds., 
2019). See also Hathaway et al., Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal Law, supra note 104, 
at 1600–17. 
115. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Foreign Assistance Complicity, 54 COLUMBIA JOUR-
NAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 531, 540–42 (2016); JACKSON, supra note 8, at 84. 
116. See Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case. No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 
26–44 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). In their concurring opin-
ion, Judges Meron and Agius would have actually preferred to conceptualize specific direc-
tion as part of mens rea rather than actus reus. Id. at VII (joint separate opinion by Meron, 
J., and Aguis, J.). 
117. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 417–75 (Sept. 
26, 2013). 
118. See Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Case. No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Chamber Judg-
ment, ¶ 1650 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014); Prosecutor v. 
Stanišić and Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 94–108 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 9, 2015). See further Ventura, supra note 114; Leyla 
N. Sadat, Can the ICTY Šainović and Perišić Cases Be Reconciled?, 108 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 475 (2014); Janine Natalya Clark, “Specific Direction” and the Fragmenta-
tion of International Jurisprudence on Aiding and Abetting: Perišić and Beyond, 15 INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 411 (2015); Marko Milanovic, ICTY Appeals Chamber Reverses 
Stanišić and Simatović Acquittal, Orders Retrial, Kills Off Specific Direction (Again!), EJIL:TALK! 
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/icty-appeals-chamber-reverses-stanisic-and-sima-
tovic-acquittal-orders-retrial-kills-off-specific-direction-again/; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 
80–85. 
119. Rome Statute, supra note 93, art. 25(3)(c). 
120. See, e.g., Hathaway et al., Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal Law, supra note 
104, at 1628–29. Elies van Sliedregt & Alexandra Popova, Interpreting “for the Purpose of Facil-












we have seen above, the Statute otherwise uses the latter, which includes an 
oblique, indirect form of intent.121 While commentators have generally seen 
this standard to be higher than the customary knowledge one, they have 
much debated its exact parameters. In particular, a line of scholarship essen-
tially argues that an oblique, indirect intent as to the result of facilitation (that 
is, that the accomplice was practically certain that the aid provided would 
facilitate the principal’s crime) could suffice to meet even this standard. 122 
The ICC is yet to decide conclusively between various competing positions 




To summarize some of the main conclusions so far: 
First, there are numerous defensible ways in which a complicity rule can 
be formulated. How a particular rule will be calibrated will depend foremost 
on a policy choice, the placement of the line that needs to be drawn between 
inhibiting socially harmful interactions and not inhibiting those that might 
be socially beneficial. 
Second, the calibration of a complicity rule will mostly depend on the 
definition of its mental (culpability, fault) element and its causal nexus or 
contribution element (my primary focus in this article is on the mental). Both 
will inevitably be shaped by moral intuitions about the blameworthiness of 
the accomplice’s conduct in specific cases, an approach sometimes leading 
to inconsistent outcomes. 
Third, there is no conceptual difficulty in ascribing fault to States. The 
mental element is that of individuals who are the State’s organs or agents 
making the relevant decisions and engaging in the relevant conduct. There is 
also no great difficulty (although caution is warranted) in borrowing con-
 
121. Rome Statute, supra note 93, art. 30(2)(b). See also KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 165–66, 299–300 (2013). 
122. See James G. Stewart, An Important New Orthodoxy on Complicity in the ICC Statute? 
(Jan. 21, 2015), http://jamesgstewart.com/the-important-new-orthodoxy-on-complicity-
in-the-icc-statute/ (including comments thereto and the other posts in the symposium). 
123. Its most elaborate judgment on this point to date is Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., Case 
No. ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-Red, Public Redacted Version of Judgment pursuant to Article 
74 of the Statute (Oct. 19, 2016). For a discussion of this case, see Manuel J. Ventura, Aiding 
and Abetting and the International Criminal Court’s Bemba et al. Case: The ICC Trial and Appeals 
Chamber Consider Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, 20 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW RE-











cepts and using analogies from criminal law, international or domestic, espe-
cially since comparative private law generally has few developed complicity 
doctrines. 
Fourth, terms such as “knowledge” and “intention” can be ambiguous 
and confusing. Great care is needed in how they are defined and used, espe-
cially because of the variance between legal systems and traditions. 
Fifth, in the complicity context, the accomplice may have any of a variety 
of degrees of knowledge regarding the principal’s ongoing or future wrong-
ful conduct and regarding how the principal would use the assistance that 
the accomplice provides. As to any future conduct of the principal, the 
knowledge of the accomplice is inherently contingent. It is always probabil-
istic foresight to some level of likelihood or certainty. Even for criminal com-
plicity—let alone in the State responsibility context—the accomplice need 
not foresee “the place, time and number of the precise crimes which may be 
committed in consequence of his supportive contributions.”124 Knowing 
about the general type and nature of the offenses suffices. Accomplices may 
also have various degrees of intent with regard to his own actions and with 
regard to the wrongful conduct of principals. 
Sixth, accordingly, a complicity rule can employ many permutations of 
cognitive and volitional fault requirements. It may require purpose/direct 
intent to facilitate.125 It may couple that element with an additional volitional 
requirement that the accomplice share the principal’s purpose—that is, 
hopes that the principal will succeed. It may require intent to facilitate but 
include within that concept not only purpose/direct intent but also 
oblique/indirect intent, even dolus eventualis.126 Or it may formulate fault in 
 
124. Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, ¶ 288 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006). 
125. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 93, art. 25(3)(c); MPC, supra note 69, § 2.06(3). 
126. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 27, https://www.gesetze-im-inter-
net.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0167 (Ger.); Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch 
[StGB] [Criminal Code] Dec. 21, 1937, arts. 12, 25, https://www. legislationline.org/down-
load/id/8991/file/SWITZ_Criminal%20Code_as%20of%202020-07-01.pdf (Switz.); 
Criminal Code, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 85/05, 88/05, 107/05 (as 
amended through Dec. 24, 2012), arts. 25, 35; https://www.legislationline.org/down-
load/id/5480/file/Serbia_CC_am2012_en.pdf; Croatian Criminal Code, 2011, arts. 28, 38, 
https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/7896/file/Croatia_Crimnal_Code_2011_ 
en.pdf. Note that unlike the Swiss, Serbian, and Croatian codes, which expressly include 
oblique intent or dolus eventualis in the definition of intent, the German Criminal Code con-
tains no definition of intent, which is left to jurisprudence and is regarded by German courts 
to include dolus eventualis. See generally Greg Taylor, Concepts of Intention in German Criminal Law, 











purely cognitive terms, as knowledge or degrees of foresight of the princi-
pal’s wrongdoing and how the principal will use the assistance provided.127 
Again, there is simply no inherently right answer for how the culpability ele-
ment of a complicity rule should be formulated.128 It even may be perfectly 
defensible not to differentiate between accomplices and principals in the first 
place, but to have a unified theory of participation in an offense or some 
other wrong.129 
Bearing this in mind, let us now return to the complicity rules in interna-
tional law that can specifically capture intelligence sharing in multinational 
military operations: the generally applicable complicity rule in Article 16 ASR 
and the regime-specific rules of IHL and IHRL. 
 
III. COMPLICITY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO       
INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
 
A. Proper Interpretation to Be Given to Article 16 ASR 
  
1. On the Contradictions in the ILC Articles 
 
The same competing considerations that underlie discussions of mens rea 
for complicity in criminal law are relevant to the mental element of the rule 
codified in Article 16 ASR. People can reasonably disagree as to how these 
considerations should be weighed. The resulting uncertainty is fueled by the 
lack of formal determinacy of the rule in Article 16 since relevant State prac-
tice is scarce, ambiguous, and open to interpretation. Reliance on the work 
product of the ILC is made more difficult by the fact it is internally incon-
sistent—that is, the text of Article 16 is not fully congruent with the ILC’s 
commentary—a difficulty that is compounded by the uneven use of the 
terms “knowledge” and “intent” within the commentary. 
The lack of consensus on how the mental element of Article 16 should 
be interpreted is therefore completely understandable. But before venturing 
 
127. See, e.g., Code Penal [C. pén] [Penal Code] arts. 121–27 (Fr.). See also the position 
under customary international criminal law, supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
128. It is instructive to consider in that regard how Herbert Wechsler, the principal 
drafter of the MPC, favored knowledge as the mens rea for complicity but was overruled 
on that point by other drafters who preferred purpose. See DUBBER, supra note 67, at 92–
93. 
129. This is, for example, the position in Italian criminal law. For an argument that such 
a unitary theory of perpetration should be used in international criminal law, see Stewart, 











into a normative argument as to what the proper interpretation of Article 16 
should be, it is important to explore the ILC’s inconsistencies in more detail. 
In particular, it is necessary to understand that the ILC fails to distinguish 
clearly between knowledge (or foresight) as to the existence of the wrongful 
act by the wrongdoing State and knowledge as to the facilitation of the com-
mission by the assisting State. It also fails to distinguish between the different 
possible notions of intent. 
The ILC commentary contradicts not only the text of the Articles but 
itself as well, and it does so in the first two sentences: 
 
Article 16 deals with the situation where one State provides aid or assis-
tance to another with a view to facilitating the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter. Such situations arise where a State voluntarily as-
sists or aids another State in carrying out conduct which violates the inter-
national obligations of the latter, for example, by knowingly providing an 
essential facility or financing the activity in question.130  
 
The phrase “with a view to facilitating” clearly refers to a species of in-
tent and would most naturally be interpreted as referring to purpose/direct 
intent to facilitate—the outcome of facilitation is the conscious object of the 
assisting State’s conduct. The reference to assistance being provided “volun-
tarily” could be taken as referring only to the action of providing assistance, 
for example, the provision of money or intelligence (which is voluntary and 
not coerced or inadvertent), but not to its result (the facilitation of the wrong-
ful act)—that is, the action is intentional under some minimal description. 
The final reference to assistance being provided “knowingly,” of course, 
lacks any explicit volitional element and is unclear as to what exactly the as-
sisting State must know. 
The ILC then explains that the requirement from the text of Article 16 
that the assisting State needs to know “the circumstances of the internation-
ally wrongful act” is in turn about the “circumstances making the conduct of 
the assisted State internationally wrongful” and about “the circumstances in 
which its aid or assistance is intended to be used” by the assisted State.131 In 
doing so, however, the Commission confuses knowledge of the ongoing or 
future existence of the wrongful act with knowledge of how the assistance 
provided would be used. It is perfectly possible for the assisting State to have 
varying degrees of knowledge with regard to these two matters. For example, 
 
130. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 











the assisting State might be aware only of a substantial risk that the assisted 
State would commit a wrongful act but know with practical certainty that the 
aid provided would be used (or not) to further the wrongful act if the assisted 
State goes through with the act. 
Recall that in this context, knowledge means probabilistic foresight. One 
can know with absolute certainty the circumstances of the wrongful act only 
if it has already occurred (in which case Article 16 does not apply) or is on-
going. But of course, Article 16 is also meant to apply to future wrongful 
conduct that the assisting State would be aiding, which is why the ILC speaks 
of it knowing the assisted State’s intent. This encompasses not only the intent 
to commit (or continue committing) the wrongful act but also its intent to 
use the assistance provided to it for that act. However, it bears noting that 
in this context the assessment of the assisted State’s intent is only part of the 
overall prospective assessment of whether the wrongful act and its facilita-
tion are likely to occur. It is possible, for example, for the assisted State to 
intend to commit the wrongful act but for its occurrence to be objectively 
unlikely because the assisted State lacks the means (technical or other) to 
successfully proceed with its act and implement its intent.  
A major problem with the ILC’s intent requirement as part of the assist-
ing State’s fault is the inconsistent terminology used to describe it.132 On 
three occasions in the commentary the Commission used the “with a view 
to facilitating” formula, which appears to (but need not) evoke purpose.133 
On three further occasions, the Commission referred to an assisting State 
“deliberately” procuring, assisting, or participating in the wrongful act.134 
Also, on two occasions, the ILC used the term “intent,” noting first that a 
“State is not responsible for aid or assistance under article 16 unless the rel-
evant State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the 
occurrence of the wrongful conduct.”135 It then seemingly coupled intent 




132. It is clear that the ILC is referring only to the assisting State’s intent to facilitate 
the wrongful act, not to sharing the wrongdoing State’s intent to commit the wrongful act. 
In other words, A can logically have intent to facilitate B’s wrongful conduct without actu-
ally sharing B’s intent regarding its wrongful conduct or any particular result of that conduct. 
See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 20. 
133. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶¶ 1, 3, 5.  
134. Id. cmt. ¶¶ 6, 7, 10. 











Where the allegation is that the assistance of a State has facilitated human 
rights abuses by another State, the particular circumstances of each case 
must be carefully examined to determine whether the aiding State by its aid 
was aware of and intended to facilitate the commission of the internationally 
wrongful conduct.136 
 
Here the ILC seems to be saying that knowledge and intent are cumula-
tive requirements, which it did not expressly say in any other part of the 
commentary. The interaction between knowledge and intent is a more com-
plex issue, as I will momentarily explain. But I hope to have demonstrated 
by now that the only thing consistent about the commentary to Article 16 is 
its inconsistency. This is also evident from the ILC’s commentary to Article 
41(2), where it explains the absence of any reference to the assisting State’s 
knowledge that it is assisting the maintenance of a situation caused by a se-
rious violation of jus cogens by saying that it saw “no need to mention such a 
requirement in article 41 (2) as it is hardly conceivable that a State would not 
have notice of the commission of a serious breach by another State.”137 
While it is justifiable in principle to have a sliding scale of culpability that 
would depend on the seriousness of the underlying violation (indeed, this is 
precisely the argument that I wish to put forward later on), it makes little 
sense to have strict liability for complicity.138 It is one thing to say that ele-
ments of knowledge and intent can be inferred more easily and even pre-
sumed139 when serious violations of jus cogens are at stake, but dispensing with 
any form of culpability (even negligence, for example) seems excessive. 140 
The assisted State may be capable of concealing a breach of jus cogens. The 
assisting State may well be fully aware of the existence of a serious breach of 
jus cogens but unaware that its assistance would facilitate the maintenance of 
the situation.141 While it remains unclear to what extent Article 41(2) reflects 
customary law (although it is arguably more accepted as such in 2021 than it 
was in 2001),142 the culpability element of this enhanced complicity rule is, I 
would submit, even less clear, except that it is lower than that of Article 16.  
 
136. Id. cmt. ¶ 9 (emphasis added). 
137. Id. art. 41 cmt. ¶ 11. 
138. This leaves aside the problems with the notion of a “serious breach” of jus cogens, 
which implies that there are some breaches of jus cogens that are not “serious,” e.g., isolated 
acts of torture.  
139. See LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 116. 
140. But see AUST, supra note 6, at 421. 
141. See also de Wet, supra note 21, at 308–9. 











That said, it is striking that the commentary to Article 41 appears to see 
the culpability in Article 16 in purely cognitive terms (“notice”) rather than 
volitional ones, as intent. The terminological confusion is good evidence that 
the culpability elements of neither provision were thought through by the 
Commission thoroughly enough. In particular, the ILC never really explains 
what it means by intent,143 a concept that is legally ambiguous without fur-
ther definition. 144 In other words, the proposition that A intends to facilitate 
B’s wrongful act could easily capture purpose/direct intent, oblique or indi-
rect intent, and dolus eventualis. It is also perfectly possible—indeed only nat-
ural—that the various members of the ILC had read the references to intent 
from the perspectives of their respective legal systems and cultures. In short, 
the ultimate problem with the ILC’s work on Article 16 is not the contradic-
tion between the text and the commentary but an overall lack of coherence 
and clarity, which sets the stage for the false dilemma between knowledge 
and intent as the culpability element of the complicity rule. 
 
2. The False Dilemma between Knowledge and Intent 
 
How is this dilemma a false one? Let us consider a simple complicity sce-
nario. State A assists State B by sharing intelligence. B then uses this infor-
mation to interrogate and torture individual X in its custody (assume that the 
causal nexus element is satisfied).145 In trying to understand how the Article 
16 complicity rule would apply to this scenario, we first need to clarify what 
exactly State A (i.e., an official acting on its behalf) knew and intended with 
regard to State B’s wrongful act and with regard to its own action of provid-
ing assistance to B. There are several permutations: 
 
(i) A can know (i.e., be practically certain) that B is torturing X or intends 
to do so in the future and know (i.e., be practically certain) that if it shares 
intelligence with B, B will use the information to torture X, and have the 
 
143. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 18. 
144. In fact, even when writing academically, the ILC’s last Special Rapporteur on State 
responsibility, James Crawford, did not offer any definition of intent but rather used impre-
cise terms such as “actual intent” and “outright intent.” See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 
407–8. 
145. For one such case, in which an Australian national detained and tortured by U.S. 
authorities complained that Australian authorities were complicit in the torture, inter alia 
through the sharing of information, see Habib v. Commonwealth of Australia [2010] 











purpose of facilitating the torture, this being the conscious object of its ac-
tion of providing assistance. 
(ii) A can know (i.e., be practically certain) that B is torturing X or in-
tends to torture X, and not be practically certain that the information it is 
providing B will facilitate the torture of X yet still have the purpose of assist-
ing B in the torture. (For example, A is not sure how useful its intelligence 
actually is or whether B will choose to rely on it.)  
(iii) A might believe that there is only a possibility of some degree (but 
not certainty) that B is torturing or intends to torture X yet nonetheless be 
certain that the information it provides would facilitate the torture if it took 
place and still have the purpose of facilitating the act.  
(iv) A might believe that there is only a possibility of B torturing X and 
a possibility of A’s assistance being used to torture X but nonetheless have 
the purpose of facilitating the torture. (Variants (ii)–(iv) raise the question of 
whether the direct intent/purpose to facilitate compensates for deficits of 
knowledge/foresight.) 
(v) A can know (i.e., be practically certain) that B is torturing X or in-
tends to do so in the future and also know (i.e., be practically certain) that if 
it shares intelligence with B, B will use the information to torture X and yet 
not have the purpose to facilitate torture, though being aware of its virtual 
inevitability and the inevitability of its intelligence sharing facilitating the tor-
ture and reconciling itself with that inevitability by choosing to provide the 
assistance. 
(vi) A might believe that there is only a possibility (but not certainty) that 
B is torturing or intends to torture X, yet nonetheless be certain that the 
information it provides would facilitate the torture if it took place while rec-
onciling itself with this possibility. 
(vii) A can know (i.e., be practically certain) that B is torturing X or in-
tends to torture X, and yet not be practically certain that the information it 
is providing B will facilitate the torture of X though aware of the risk that it 
may do so while reconciling itself with the possibility that the information it 
provided could facilitate the torture. 
(viii) A might believe that there is only a possibility (but not certainty) 
that B is torturing or intends to torture X and only a possibility that the 
information it is providing B will facilitate the torture of X but be aware of 












Again, it is simply unclear where on this spectrum the ILC thought the 
line of culpability under Article 16 should be drawn, except that at a mini-
mum, it would include variant (i) and that in none of these scenarios would 
A need to share B’s own purpose. Note how the knowledge (foresight) of 
the two relevant sets of facts (that B would commit a wrongful act and would 
use the aid A provided to commit it) vary through the scenarios, depending 
on whether A is practically/virtually certain that such facts exist or will exist 
or only appreciates a possibility or risk that they might exist. In terms of 
knowledge, the scenarios could be differentiated even further by degrees of 
possibility, for example, on a scale ranging from merely possible through to 
a real risk and likelihood, up to high likelihood. As for intent, all of the sce-
narios above can be regarded as intentional under some legal understanding 
of intention—the action of providing intelligence is always intentional under 
some description, while in (i)–(iv) A has purpose/direct intent, in (v) indi-
rect/oblique intent, and in (vi)–(viii) dolus eventualis as to the consequence 
(facilitation of torture) of that action.146 
How then should the mental element of Article 16 be interpreted? First, 
as to the knowledge requirement, it should be uncontroversial that this re-
quirement will not be met only when an agent of State A has actual 
knowledge in the orthodox sense of justified true belief that State B is in the 
process of committing an internationally wrongful act but will also be met 
when A is subjectively practically or virtually certain that B is committing 
that act (or intends to commit it in the future). 147 Again, because of the im-
possibility of having actual knowledge about the future actions of another 
person, the only type of knowledge that one can have about such actions is 
a probabilistic one (foresight). Because Article 16 must, if it is to serve any 
useful purpose, cover not only ongoing wrongful acts but also future and 
contingent wrongful acts, the level of knowledge required has to be a realis-
 
146. Scenario (vi) may also be seen as one of conditional indirect intent, rather than 
dolus eventualis. 
147. To be clear, the knowledge in question is that of the circumstances making the act 
of the assisted State wrongful. It does not require that either the assisting State or the assisted 
State subjectively believe that the act is unlawful. Thus, if State A assists State B in the 
objectively unlawful invasion of State C, A would be responsible under Article 16 regardless 
of whether either A or B subjectively assessed that the invasion would be lawful. Error of 
law is no excuse, and this is equally the case in situations in which the law is clear and in 
those in which it is underdetermined and reasonable persons (and States) can disagree about 











tically obtainable, practical one rather than one requiring absolute cer-
tainty.148 The second aspect of the knowledge requirement relates not to A’s 
assessment of B’s intent to commit a wrongful act but rather to its assess-
ment of B’s intent to use the assistance that A will have given it in its com-
mission of the wrongful act. A needs to know not only that B is committing 
or intends to commit a wrongful act but also that B will use A’s assistance 
to facilitate its commission. Again, because this is an assessment by A of a 
future action by B, an independent moral agent, it can only be contingent 
and probabilistic and would be satisfied by a practical, virtual or near-cer-
tainty standard.149 
Second, a more difficult problem is how to distinguish between 
knowledge to the level of practical certainty and knowledge to a very high 
degree of likelihood. The issue is one of labeling or characterization—if we 
are happy to say that A knows that B is torturing or intends to torture X 
because A is 95 percent certain that this is the case, would we be as happy 
to treat as knowledge in the context of Article 16 a 90 or 75 percent level of 
certainty? In other words, if the knowledge in question is inherently proba-
bilistic, as it must be with regard to events and conduct that will occur only 
in the future, it is infeasible to draw bright lines demarcating the levels at 
which probability amounts to knowledge. Such an assessment will always be 
contextual and, in reality, may well be driven by moral intuitions about cul-
pability, owing, for example, to the gravity of the wrongful act that was being 
assisted. This is especially the case if the assessment of what A knew is being 
done ex post facto by an independent actor (e.g., a court) that can draw in-
ferences about practical certainty from high likelihood.150  
Third, an intent requirement would clearly be satisfied if A acted with 
purpose/direct intent—that is, with the conscious object of facilitating the 
 
148. See supra Section II.C. 
149. See also de Wet, supra note 21, at 304–5. 
150. Cf. MPC, supra note 69, § 2.02(7) (“Requirement of Knowledge Satisfied by Knowledge of 
High Probability. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an 
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its exist-
ence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.”) Note, however, that this MPC def-
inition extends only to the knowledge of a fact that constitutes a material element of an 
offense or its attendant circumstances, not to the results of one’s actions, as otherwise the 
MPC’s definition of acting knowingly would collapse into its definition of acting recklessly. 
See Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 YALE LAW 











commission of the wrongful act.151 The key issue here is the relationship 
between intent and knowledge. Recall in that regard how the ILC, in its final 
remark on culpability in the commentary to Article 16, appeared to couple 
the two when it asserted that the assisting State needed to be “aware of and 
intended to facilitate” the wrongful act.152 But this is a misconception. Pur-
pose/direct intent is the most culpable possible mental state.153 There is no 
reason of principle why it would have to be augmented by knowledge to a 
level of certainty for the same element of a wrong (e.g., the prohibited con-
sequence, such as facilitation). 154 An assisting State’s purpose, if present, to 
facilitate the wrongful act would compensate for any deficits in 
knowledge.155  
For instance, if A provided assistance (e.g., intelligence) to B believing 
that it was unlikely that B would torture X or would use the assistance pro-
vided in torturing X, but nonetheless did so with the purpose of helping B 
torture X, which B then actually did, there seems to be no legitimate reason 
why A should not be held responsible under Article 16 for the assistance it 
provided. A is no less blameworthy in this scenario than if it had been prac-
tically certain that the wrong would be committed—it provided assistance 
with the purpose of facilitating the wrongful act, and this purpose was ulti-
mately realized, however unlikely this may have seemed ex ante. This is es-
sentially the same situation as that of our unlikely sniper hypothetical 
above—if A shoots at B from half a mile away with the purpose of killing B, 
knowing that it was extremely unlikely that the bullet will hit him, but in fact 
 
151. Again, under no interpretation of Article 16 would A also need to have the pur-
pose (want, hope, desire) that B actually commit the wrongful act, e.g., to torture X. 
152. See supra note 136. 
153. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 134–35. 
154. Cf. MPC, supra note 69, § 2.02(5) (“When acting knowingly suffices to establish an 
element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely.”). In other words, prov-
ing purpose obviates any need for proving knowledge with regard to that same element of 
the crime. See also DUBBER, supra note 67, at 60 (“Purpose is the ‘highest’ mode of culpabil-
ity—purposeful action is more culpable and punished more severely than any other type of 
action, including knowing action. Yet along the probabilistic axis, knowledge lies far ahead 
of purpose; purpose, when it comes to conduct and result, is defined without respect to 
probability. What matters is whether the actor had the ‘conscious object(ive)’ of acting in a 
certain way or bringing about a certain result. It does not matter how likely it is that he will 
succeed in realizing his conscious object(ive).”). 
155. Consider also the complicity rule in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, which 












the bullet does hit B, we would hold A liable for murder. 156 Similarly, if A 
provides assistance to B with the purpose of facilitating B’s killing C while 
knowing that it was unlikely that the assistance would actually be useful—
for example, A gives B a poorly maintained gun with only one (very old) 
bullet in the chamber—but B manages to kill C with it, we would regard A 
as an accomplice precisely because he acted with purpose/direct intent.  
In short, the culpability requirements would, in my view, be met not only 
in scenario (i) above but also in scenarios (ii)–(iv). If it could be demon-
strated, for example, by reference to internal government memoranda or 
from appropriate inferences, that State A purposely facilitated the wrongful 
act of State B, it should not matter whether A was less than certain that B 
would commit the act or would use the assistance provided to do it, if in fact 
eventually B does commit the wrongful act and does use the assistance pro-
vided to it by A for that purpose. It does not seem sensible to require a 
showing of both purpose and practical certainty as to the consequence of fa-
cilitating a wrongful act.157 Purpose may be said to require some belief that 
the action is in principle capable of causing the result (facilitation of the 
wrong)158 but no more than that.159 For example, if State A appreciates a 
degree of possibility that its ally State B will invade State C, provides B open-
ended permission to use its airspace for an assault on C, and does so with 
the purpose of facilitating B’s conduct if it chooses to go through with its 
plan (“We are with you no matter what”), A will be liable under Article 16 
ASR if B invades C and uses A’s airspace to do so even if A thought ex ante 
that there was a significant possibility that the invasion would not occur (e.g., 
because C would give in to B’s demands). 
Fourth, a different question is whether the intent requirement would also 
be satisfied if A were practically certain that B intended to torture X and 
practically certain that the assistance A provided would facilitate B’s torture 
of X—that is, if A acted with oblique or indirect intent, as in scenario (v) 
above. Again, it is commonplace in numerous legal systems that conse-
quences that result from one’s actions and that were subjectively foreseen 
 
156. See also FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 448–49. 
157. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 87, § 1 cmt., at 7 (“A purpose 
to cause harm makes the harm intentional even if harm is not substantially certain to oc-
cur.”). 
158. See BLOMSMA, supra note 95, at 67–69. 
159. See DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY supra note 60, at 55–
59. But see SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 235–38 (discussing knowledge of the essential 
elements of the crime as a prerequisite for accessory liability, as in Jogee, but failing to distin-











with practical certainty are treated as having been intended, or that such cer-
tainty creates an almost inescapable evidentiary inference that they were in-
tended.160 If A blows up an airplane with the purpose of killing B and there 
are other people on the airplane at the time who A is practically certain will 
die as a result of the explosion, then A indirectly intends to kill those peo-
ple.161 If similarly, A provides B with an explosive while practically certain 
that B will use the explosive to blow up the airplane and is reconciled to this 
course of events, there is no great difficulty in saying that A intended to 
facilitate B’s crime. Again, numerous legal systems that require intent to facil-
itate wrongful conduct as the mens rea of complicity would find that indirect 
or oblique intention satisfies that requirement—that is, they do not limit in-
tent to purpose.162 It is difficult to regard A as substantially less culpable in 
this situation as in the one in which A is acting with purpose/direct intent. 163 
Here A not only knows (foresees) with practical certainty that B will commit 
a wrongful act but also that the assistance it provides will facilitate it and 
 
160. See also ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra note 83, at 92–94 (discussing English case law 
and uncertainty regarding the nature of oblique intent).  
161. See supra Section II.D. 
162. This is, for example, the position under English law. See ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra 
note 83, at 198, 200–203 (oblique intent to assist sufficient; evidentiary inference of intent 
can also be made with regard to the further requirement that the accessory intend that the 
principal commits the crime with the requisite mens rea). See also SIMESTER ET AL., supra 
note 51, at 229–30; supra note 126 and accompanying text; J.C. Smith, Criminal Liability of 
Accessories: Law and Law Reform, 113 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 453, 465 (1997) (“If it were 
to be decided that intention should be required [for complicity], the jury would be told that 
they should not find D guilty of murder unless they were sure that D either wanted P to act 
as, and with the intention which, he did, or knew that it was not merely a “real possibility” 
but virtually certain that he would do so.”). 
163. See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (The majority of the Court, 
per Kagan J., ambiguously using the terminology of intent for the federal aiding and abetting 
statute that could include both acting purposely and acting knowingly in MPC terms—that 
is, both direct and oblique intent. Alito J. noting in his dissent that “[t]he Court refers inter-
changeably to both of these tests and thus leaves our case law in the same, somewhat con-
flicted State that previously existed. But because the difference between acting purposefully 
(when that concept is properly understood) and acting knowingly is slight, this is not a mat-











proceeds regardless.164 Indirect intent should therefore be regarded as one 
of the modes of culpability under Article 16 ASR.165  
Fifth, and finally, it would be going too far to include dolus eventualis—
foresight and conscious acceptance of some lesser degree of risk than cer-
tainty—as satisfying the intent requirement of Article 16.166 This is in part 
because, unlike with oblique intent, common law systems do not traditionally 
regard dolus eventualis as a species of intent. 167 Primarily, however, it is because 
Article 16 is a rule of general scope, applying to all rules of international law 
regardless of their importance or the values they enshrine. The complicity-
in-torture scenario that we have used is therefore somewhat misleading in 
the Article 16 context since this complicity rule would equally apply to (say) 
the intelligence provided by A to B facilitating breaches of obligations under 
international trade or investment law vis-à-vis C or facilitating a cyber oper-
ation potentially violating C’s sovereignty. Moral intuitions about the scope 
of complicity rules do not necessarily operate identically when the violation 
at issue is not something as grave as torture or crimes against humanity. In-
hibiting inter-State cooperation in all situations in which a State is aware of 
(some degree of) risk would most likely be harmful to, rather than beneficial 
for, the general welfare.168 It is therefore perfectly sensible to leave any purely 
risk-based liability to context-specific primary rules, which can better take 
into account the particular needs and values of the branch of international 
law in question and do so through bespoke rules on complicity (a negative 
duty of refraining from providing assistance) and prevention (a positive duty 
to prevent or mitigate harm). Indeed, both in domestic and international law, 
we can observe that the gravity or seriousness of the potential violation and 
its consequences affect framing complicity and prevention rules. In that re-
gard, we will turn shortly to the relevant rules of IHL and IHRL. 
The ICJ’s Bosnian Genocide judgment provides an instructive example. Re-
call how the Court found that the FRY knew of a serious risk that the Bos-
nian Serbs would commit genocide in Srebrenica but was not certain they 
would do so.169 The Court also found that the magnitude of the aid the FRY 
 
164. Cf. DUBBER, supra note 67, at 54 (noting that the MPC drafters considered the 
distinction between acting purposely and acting knowingly as to a consequence (i.e., acting 
with indirect intent) to be of limited significance in the criminal context, a point that can be 
made even more emphatically in the noncriminal context).  
165. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 19–20; de Wet, supra note 21, at 307. 
166. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 20–21. 
167. See Ohlin, supra note 95, at 103–6. 
168. See AUST, supra note 6, at 239–40. 











provided to the Bosnian Serb war effort made it inevitable that this assistance 
would (as in fact it did) facilitate the Srebrenica genocide.170 The FRY’s de-
cision to continue providing the aid despite being subjectively aware that it 
might be used for genocide would have satisfied a dolus eventualis threshold, 
but the Court required more—that the FRY had supplied “aid to the perpe-
trators of the genocide in full awareness that the aid supplied would be used 
to commit genocide.”171 The Court thus found that the culpability element 
for complicity under the Genocide Convention, which it had (but need not 
have) equated with complicity under Article 16 ASR, was not met. Crucially, 
however, reaching this finding was in practice facilitated by the existence of 
an obligation of prevention under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, 
which was purely risk-based and applied to all States regarding any genocide 
in the world, an obligation that Serbia was found to have violated.172 In some 
other context, the complicity analysis might turn out differently in the ab-
sence of such a broad prevention obligation. 
 
3. Willful Blindness, Constructive Knowledge, and Negligence 
 
Let us now turn to the question of whether the Article 16 culpability require-
ment could be satisfied in the absence of direct or indirect intent to facilitate 
the wrongful act. A strand of scholarship argues in favor of importing into 
Article 16 the common law doctrine of willful blindness, which could in 
some rather exceptional cases compensate for the lack of practical cer-
tainty.173 Other scholars argue in favor of an objectivized, constructive 
knowledge standard that would deem the assisting State to have “knowledge 
of the circumstances of the wrongful act” even when it cannot be proven 
that it had the relevant knowledge subjectively if objectively it should have 
been had it acted as some kind of “reasonable” State.174 There are problems 
with both positions. The first is defensible in principle but relies on a concept 
that stems from only one legal tradition and is subject to much confusion 
and dispute even within that tradition. The second effectively reduces the 
 
170. The Court did not, however, carefully distinguish between the certainty of geno-
cide and the certainty of how the aid would be used, nor did it make an express finding of 
the FRY’s knowledge of the latter. See Bosnian Genocide, supra note 7, ¶ 422. 
171. Id. ¶ 423. 
172. See further Marko Milanovic, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up¸18 EURO-
PEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 669, 680–88 (2007). 
173. See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 11, at 14–15; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 53. 
174. See André Nollkaemper et al., Guiding Principles on Shared Responsibility in International 











culpability requirement in Article 16 to negligence when, as explained above, 
even dolus eventualis would be an overbroad fault standard for a complicity 
provision that is general in scope and is meant to apply to all rules of inter-
national law, regardless of their purpose or importance. 
The willful blindness doctrine finds its origins in English case law, later 
traveling across the Atlantic to U.S. state and federal jurisdictions. To sim-
plify a complex story, the doctrine has had three basic forms.175 First, as a 
method of establishing subjective, actual knowledge by inference: the jury is 
instructed that on the evidence before it, it can find that the willfully blind 
defendant must have known the relevant fact. Second, as an imposition of a 
duty on defendants to pursue inquiries and verify the facts before them once 
suspicion arises that the relevant facts might exist: here it is effectively a 
should have known constructive knowledge standard, met by a negligent failure 
to establish the facts fully. Third, it is applied as a requirement of proving 
(by inference if necessary) that the defendant had the purpose of avoiding ac-
quiring information that, had it been acquired, would have constituted actual 
knowledge.176  
The first of these variants of the willful blindness doctrine is unobjec-
tionable but also does not necessitate the label. International courts often 
draw inferences about what a State (i.e., its officials) knew about relevant 
circumstances;177 the classic example is the ICJ finding in the Corfu Channel 
case that Albania “must have known” that a third party had mined its wa-
ters.178 If the evidence so warrants, there is no reason of principle why inter-
national courts (or other bodies) cannot do the same when applying Article 
16 ASR in establishing whether the assisting State knew (was practically cer-
tain) that the wrongdoing State would commit the wrongful act and that the 
assisting State knew (was practically certain) that its assistance would facili-
tate the act.179 The willful blindness label does not add much explanatory 
power to this process. What the fact finders are doing in such instances is 
 
175. See generally Marcus, supra note 150. 
176. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 157–59. 
177. See, e.g., JAMES DEVANEY, FACT-FINDING BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE 72, 170–77, 199–217 (2016); Michael P. Scharf & Margaux Day, The International 
Court of Justice’s Treatment of Circumstantial Evidence and Adverse Inferences Evidence and Adverse 
Inferences, 13 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (2013); C.F. Amerasinghe, 
Presumptions and Inferences in Evidence in International Litigation, 3 LAW & PRACTICE OF INTER-
NATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 395 (2004).  
178. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 19–20 (Apr. 9). 











drawing an inference from the circumstantial evidence available to them, in-
cluding the relevant party’s evasive attitude towards the truth. 180  
The second variant is tantamount to using negligence as the fault element 
of Article 16—the assisting State (objectively) could have known, to a practical 
certainty, what the assisted State would do but (subjectively) did not know this, 
because it failed to take the steps that would have led it to such knowledge. 
Scholars assembled at the University of Amsterdam’s SHARES Project had 
thus proposed that the complicity rule should apply to aid and assistance 
provided “knowingly” and that this criterion would be met by constructive 
knowledge—that is, “when an international person knew or should have 
known the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act.”181 But this 
position was, in fact, expressly considered and not taken up by the ILC dur-
ing the drafting of Article 16.182 In any event, it is not, in my view, norma-
tively desirable. Constructive knowledge presumes a positive duty of the rel-
evant party to make inquiries, to behave according to some objective stand-
ard, such as reasonableness, in verifying the facts.183 While such a duty may 
be appropriate in specific contexts, it is hardly appropriate across the board 
for complicity in all possible violations of international law regardless of their 
role and importance.184 As a policy matter, such a duty would be so burden-
some and overbroad, and inhibit so much potentially beneficial cooperation, 
that acceptance by States is extremely unlikely. On a more formal level, the 
authorities cited in favor of this position by its proponents are hardly im-
pressive—a third party submission in a case before the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights (i.e., not the Commission’s decision itself), 185 and 
the ICJ Corfu Channel case, which the proponents of the constructive 
knowledge standard misconstrue.186 As explained above, the Court in Corfu 
Channel drew an evidentiary inference that Albania must have known—that 
is, did, in fact, know—about the mines. It never applied a constructive 
 
180. For a detailed argument in favor of willful blindness being conceptualized in U.S. 
criminal law solely as a method of proof, see Gilchrist, supra note 64. 
181. Nollkaemper et al., supra note 174, at 42. 
182. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 406; Moynihan, supra note 11, at 12; JACKSON, 
supra note 8, at 161. 
183. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 15–16. See also JACKSON, supra note 8, at 162; de 
Wet, supra note 21, at 302. 
184. For a discussion in the context of European Convention on Human Rights Arti-
cles 2 and 3, see Stoyanova, supra note 40, at 607–8. 
185. See Nollkaemper et al., supra note 174, at 42 nn. 114–15. 











knowledge standard, by which Albania did not subjectively know about the 
mines but objectively should have.187  
Finally, the advocates of the constructive knowledge position fail to ap-
preciate a fundamental point. In many situations, the assisting State could 
not acquire actual knowledge even if it acted reasonably according to some 
objective standard. Practical certainty may not be obtainable even after all 
due, feasible verification. These are cases neither of willful blindness nor of 
negligence in acquiring knowledge but of genuine uncertainty and risk. What 
matters in such cases are rules imposing responsibility on the basis of risk 
and measures mitigating such risk, rules and measures that can only be sec-
tor- or even issue-specific within, say, IHL or IHRL. 
Therefore, the only variant of the willful blindness doctrine that really 
deserves the label and is potentially defensible in the Article 16 context is the 
third one, requiring proof of a purpose to avoid the truth. 188 Again, this is 
not about drawing an inference as in Corfu Channel (although the purpose of 
evasion could be established inferentially) or about holding the State to some 
kind of diligence, reasonableness standard. It is about demonstrating that the 
assisting State’s officials actively took measures designed to shield them-
selves from problematic information, information that would establish with 
certainty that the wrongful act would be committed and that the aid provided 
would facilitate it. In other words, only if the knowledge deficit on the part 
of A (A is not practically certain either that B intends to torture X or that B 
intends to use the assistance provided by A to do so) is because A has de-
liberately avoided acquiring information that would have produced practical 
certainty, then A’s willful blindness would compensate for its lack of 
 
187. See Corfu Channel, supra note 178, at 18–20 (Noting that Albania “constantly kept a 
close watch over the waters;” that “its intention [was] to keep a jealous watch on its territo-
rial waters;” that “the [mining] operation was carried out during the period of close watch 
by the Albanian authorities;” that an indicator of Albania’s knowledge was that it “did not 
notify the presence of mines in its waters, at the moment when it must have known this” 
and that this “attitude does not seem reconcilable with the alleged ignorance of the Albanian 
authorities that the minefield had been laid in Albanian territorial waters. It could be ex-
plained if the Albanian Government, while knowing of the minelaying, desired the circum-
stances of the operation to remain secret.”). This reasoning has nothing to do with negli-
gence or constructive knowledge—the Court simply drew inferences about what Albania 
actually knew from the evidence before it and did so completely appropriately. See also AUST, 
supra note 6, at 245, who refers to the inference-drawing process as a modification of the 
intent standard, when it is in reality simply a method of proof. 
188. For a psychological account of deliberate ignorance as a mental state, see Ralph 
Hertwig & Christoph Engel, Homo Ignorans: Deliberately Choosing Not to Know, 11 PERSPEC-











knowledge. The deficit in the cognitive element would be overcome by the 
existence of an additional volitional element—the purpose of avoiding in-
convenient information since the State is normatively regarded as being 
equally culpable.189 Such a conception of willful blindness is defensible but 
requires proof of a different kind of ulterior purpose, one that elevates the 
accomplice’s overall culpability.190 
Therefore, willful blindness could arguably be used as a general principle 
of law supporting a limited departure from requiring practical certainty in 
cases in which it can be reliably proven that the assisting State deliberately 
chose to ignore available information in order to avoid having actual 
knowledge. The principle simply seeks to close a loophole susceptible to 
abuse. The principle is entirely irrelevant to scenarios (i)–(iv) above; as ex-
plained, if it can be shown that the assisting State acted with the purpose/di-
rect intent of facilitating the wrongful act, any deficits in its knowledge are 
immaterial. Willful blindness is relevant really to scenarios (vi)–(vii) only as 
a method of upgrading them to scenario (v), one of indirect or oblique intent. 
But for willful blindness, a proven purpose of avoiding the truth, State A 
would have been practically certain that B would commit the wrongful act and use 
A’s aid to do so—that is, A would have been acting with indirect intent.  
  
4. Conclusion on Article 16 ASR 
 
To summarize, the culpability requirement of Article 16 ASR should 
properly be interpreted as follows: 
(1) If the assisting State provides to a wrongdoing State assistance that 
materially facilitates the commission of the internationally wrongful act, 
which is then in fact committed, and does so with the purpose/direct intent 
of facilitating that act—that is, it has the facilitation of the wrongful act as a 
conscious object of its action—it will be responsible under Article 16 even 
if prior to providing the assistance it thought that the commission of the 
wrongful act and its facilitation by the assistance provided were merely pos-
sible, rather than certain. The purpose/direct intent to facilitate will com-
pensate for deficits in knowledge. 
 
189. See also de Wet, supra note 21, at 302–3. It is also possible to argue for a willful-
blindness doctrine that encompasses dolus eventualis or recklessness as to the facts (as op-
posed to purpose on one extreme and mere negligence on the other). See Alexander F. Sarch, 
Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW 97 (2017). 











(2) If, on the other hand, the assisting State acts without such purpose, 
it will still be responsible under Article 16 if it was practically certain that the 
wrongdoing State would commit the wrongful act, practically certain that its 
own action of providing the assistance would facilitate its commission and 
chose to provide the assistance despite this practical certainty. In such cases, 
the assisting State is acting with indirect or oblique intent.  
(3) If, in the absence of a purpose to facilitate the wrongful act, the as-
sisting State is less than practically certain either that the wrongdoing State 
intends to commit a wrongful act, or that the provision of assistance would 
facilitate the act, it will be responsible under Article 16 only if the deficits in 
knowledge are caused by its own willful blindness—that is, if it purposely 
avoided relevant information that would have dispelled any real uncertainty, 
so that it would have acted with indirect intent. 
(4) In all other situations, the assisting State will not be responsible un-
der Article 16 but may be responsible under other primary rules of interna-
tional law.  
To be clear, the argument presented here does not reduce the culpability 
requirement of Article 16 to knowledge, actual or constructive, of the cir-
cumstances of the wrongful act. I am not arguing that a State will be respon-
sible for providing assistance whenever it knows (is practically certain) of the 
existence or future existence of these circumstances. The State must also 
intend to facilitate the wrongful act, as the ILC asserts in the commentary. 
But this intent is construed either as the purpose to facilitate in the sense of 
a conscious object to do so or as foresight to the level of practical certainty 
that the assistance provided will facilitate the wrongful act, coupled with a 
decision to proceed with the assistance nonetheless, consciously accepting 
that the assistance provided will facilitate the wrongful act (indirect or 
oblique intent). Again, the assisting State need not share the assisted State’s 
intent, however defined. 
This conception of the fault requirement is coherent and workable, and 
it does not excessively inhibit inter-State cooperation.191 In particular, there 
is nothing wrong with the culpability requirement having multiple, alterna-
tive forms of fault, nor does the inclusion of indirect or oblique intent in the 
 
191. Cf. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 409 (Noting that the primary reason behind the 
intent requirement in Article 16 is to obtain support from States, defining its scope “in a 
manner acceptable generally to governments. It was sensible not to advance a relatively 











culpability requirement lead to overly burdensome, unreasonable out-
comes.192 It will be relatively rare for State A to have been practically certain 
that State B intended to commit a wrongful act and also practically certain that 
B would use assistance A provided to commit that act. Even with the further 
inclusion of situations of willful blindness but for which practical certainty 
would have existed, the scope of inhibited State cooperation remains limited. 
Moreover, because under Article 16 the assisting State is being held respon-
sible for its own conduct of assisting a wrongful act and not for the wrongful 
act itself—that is, this mode of complicity is not imputational—there is jus-
tification for a degree of culpability lower than purpose/direct intent.193 Fi-
nally, a mental requirement that would include both direct and indirect in-
tent, as well as elements of willful blindness, would be more practicable and 
operational, especially in situations of external assessment (e.g., judicial re-
view or parliamentary scrutiny ), and it would allow us to move beyond the 
dilemma between intent and knowledge.  
That said, the culpability requirement as defined above does not capture 
situations of assistance in which there is only a risk (up to some high thresh-
old of probability) that the assisted State will commit a wrongful act or use 
the assistance given to it to commit the act. Nor does it capture situations in 
which the assisting State was negligent in acquiring and assessing information 
that could have, and should have, led it to practical certainty. The imposition 
of such a broad culpability requirement, essentially motivated by concerns 
that proving any intent element would be unworkable,194 can be appropriate 
only in context-specific settings, not for all possible violations of interna-
tional law. Moreover, the difficulty of establishing intent, direct or indirect, 
should not be exaggerated; domestic and international courts do so rou-
tinely.195 Nor must intent be proven according to some criminal law beyond 
 
192. For example, the draft Criminal Code for England and Wales in section 27(1)(a) 
provides that intention is required for culpability in accessory liability, but the commentary 
to the Code makes clear that intention can be either direct or indirect: “D will intend his act 
to assist E if he does the act in order to assist E or if he knows that its effect in the ordinary 
course of events will be to assist him (and similarly with encouragement). A motive to assist 
or encourage the principal is not necessary.” 2 CRIMINAL LAW: A CRIMINAL CODE FOR 
ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 94, ¶ 9.25, at 207. 
193. Cf. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 87–88 (discussing the imputational nature of com-
plicity in international criminal law, by contrast to the law of State responsibility). 
194. See Nollkaemper et al., supra note 174, at 43. 











a reasonable doubt standard of proof—international courts generally apply 
flexible evidentiary rules and draw inferences when appropriate.196 
Finally, I should clarify that the argument presented above is normative 
and conceptual. It does not purport to be discovering custom. State practice 
and opinio juris, which are often context-specific, simply lack the required de-
gree of granularity, at least for the time being, to draw firm conclusions about 
the content of the customary rule. The best one can say is that the propo-
nents of broader forms of culpability have a greater burden of proving that 
the rule includes such an element than those who argue for narrower posi-
tions, already logically included within the broader ones and therefore by 
definition more likely to garner acceptance from a larger number of States. 
That said, the authority of the interpretation of the culpability requirement 
of Article 16 presented above will depend, as will any such interpretation, on 
how it is received by those applying the rule. 
Let us now turn to two bodies of international law that do (or may) con-
tain primary, context-specific complicity rules that are tailored to the specific 
values and interests that they seek to protect, and which will apply in multi-
national military operations—IHL and IHRL. Three important preliminary 
points should be kept in mind. First, to the extent that they apply in the inter-
State context, such regime-specific rules have the character of lex specialis to 
the general, residual rule in Article 16 ASR, something for which the ILC 
Articles expressly allow.197 Second, unlike the purely inter-State rule in Arti-
cle 16 ASR, these special complicity rules can cover interactions between 
States and non-State actors, such as organized armed groups.198 Third, there 
is absolutely no necessity of logic or practicality that these specific rules have 






196. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 21–22. 
197. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 55. See also de Wet, supra note 21, at 290. 
198. For an argument that there is a rule of general applicability on State complicity in 
the wrongful acts of non-State actors, see Richard Mackenzie-Gray Scott, State Responsibility 
for Complicity in the Internationally Wrongful Acts of Non-State Armed Groups, 24 JOURNAL OF 
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 373 (2019). 
199. See also Duff, Intention Revisited, supra note 111, at 172–74 (arguing for a variable 











B. Complicity under International Humanitarian Law 
 
1. A Negative Duty under Treaty and Customary IHL 
 
While IHL does not specifically regulate the collection or sharing of intelli-
gence as such, it does impose obligations on States regarding their relation-
ships with third parties. Under Common Article 1 (CA1) of the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions, all “High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and 
to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”200 In the 
words of the authoritative Pictet Commentary, this overarching obligation 
 
applies to the respect of each individual State for the Convention, but that 
is not all: in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, each of the 
other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) should endeavour to 
bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention. The proper 
working of the system of protection provided by the Convention demands 
in fact that the States which are parties to it should not be content merely 
to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power 
to ensure that it is respected universally.201 
 
A substantially similar duty exists under customary IHL. Thus, Rule 139 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) customary IHL 
study provides that “[e]ach party to the conflict must respect and ensure re-
spect for international humanitarian law by its armed forces and other per-
sons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its direction or 
control,”202 while under Rule 144 “States may not encourage violations of 
international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. They must 
exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law.”203 
The overarching conventional and customary obligation to “respect and 
ensure respect” for IHL has been much debated. It is generally regarded as 
having both a positive and a negative component (as do IHRL obligations 
addressed below). The scope of the former is more controversial than that 
 
200. See, e.g., Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III].  
201. COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 18 
(Jean Pictet ed., 1960). 
202. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 139 (Jean-Marie Hencka-
erts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY]. 











of the latter, provoking division among both scholars and States.204 The basic 
tenet of the expansionist camp, whose most notable proponent is the ICRC, 
is that States have a positive duty to exert influence on third parties engaging 
in an armed conflict to stop their violations of IHL—for example, the 
United States or the United Kingdom would have a positive obligation to 
exert influence on Saudi Arabia to prevent Saudi violations of IHL in its 
conflict in Yemen.205 On the other hand, the more restrictive camp argues 
that broad interpretations of the positive obligation under CA1 are not 
grounded in its drafting history or in State practice.206 
For our purposes, however, this debate is largely beside the point. We 
are concerned not with the positive obligation of States to influence other 
actors but with the negative obligation incumbent on States not to assist other 
actors in their violations of IHL. This obligation is categorically different 
from any positive duty to exercise influence because it simply requires re-
straint on behalf of the (potentially) assisting State—for example, the United 
States or the United Kingdom not selling weapons to or sharing intelligence 
with Saudi Arabia if these would be used for violations of IHL.207 While 
there may be some debate on whether this obligation should be grounded in 
the “respect” or the “ensure respect” language of CA1 or the corresponding 
 
204. For an overview, see Brian Finucane, Partners and Legal Pitfalls, 92 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES 407, 417–19 (2016). 
205. See, e.g., Robin Geiß, The Obligation to Respect and Ensure Respect for the Conventions, in 
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 109 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta 
& Marco Sassòli eds., 2016); Oona A. Hathaway et al., Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 
1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors, 96 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 539, 569–77 (2017); 
Marten Zwanenburg, The “External Element” of the Obligation to Ensure Respect for the Geneva 
Conventions: A Matter of Treaty Interpretation, 97 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 621 (2021).  
206. See, e.g., Frits Kalshoven, The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circum-
stances: From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit, 2 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 3 (1999); Carlo Focarelli, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?, 
21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt & Sean 
Watts, Common Article 1 and the Duty to “Ensure Respect,” 96 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 
674 (2020). 
207. Even Frits Kalshoven, who wrote the classic skeptical account of the expansive 
interpretation of the “ensure respect” language in Common Article 1, had fewer misgivings 
about negative duties of restraint. See Kalshoven, supra note 206, at 56 (1999) (“[T]here is a 
considerable distance between the negative duty to refrain from encouraging people on your 
side to disregard the law, and a positive duty to induce people on the other side of the fence 











customary rule,208 there is little debate that this obligation actually exists. 209 
According to an instrument endorsed by the European Union Council: 
 
Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is generally interpreted as 
conferring a responsibility on third party States not involved in an armed 
conflict to not encourage a party to an armed conflict to violate interna-
tional humanitarian law, nor to take action that would assist in such viola-
tions . . . .210  
 
The broad language of CA1 and the object and purpose of the Geneva Con-
ventions can easily accommodate a negative duty not to encourage or assist. 
Although it has not been extensively discussed, it also seems reasonably clear 
that the negative duty has not provoked the kind of opposition on the part 
of some States that the wide-ranging positive duty to prevent has.211 
 
208. The ICRC’s view, for example, is that the negative duty stems from the “ensure 
respect” limb of CA1. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION 
OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 
¶¶ 153–61 (2016) [hereinafter COMMENTARY OF 2016]. See also Nottingham Workshop Re-
port, supra note 10, at 16. 
209. See Geiß, supra note 205, at 130. 
210. See General Secretariat of the European Council, User’s Guide to Council Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 56 (2019), https://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/media/40659/st12189-en19.pdf (hereinafter EU User’s Guide) (de-
fining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equip-
ment).  
211. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 26–27; AUST, supra note 6, at 388; Nottingham 
Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 12–14. Helmut Aust, Complicity in Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, in INDUCING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW 442 (Heike Krieger, ed., 2015); Marco Sassòli, State Responsibility for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, 84 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 401, 412–
13 (2002); Knut Dörmann & Jose Serralvo, Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the 
Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian Law Violations, 96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF 
THE RED CROSS 707, 726–27 (2014); Tom Ruys & Luca Ferro, The Enemy of My Enemy: Dutch 
Non-lethal Assistance for “Moderate” Syrian Rebels and the Multilevel Violation of International Law, 
50 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (2019); Cornelius Wiesener, 
Taking One for the Team: Legal Consequences of Misconduct by Partners, 3 SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL 
OF MILITARY STUDIES 45, 48 (2020); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 3, at 34; John 
Hursh, International Humanitarian Law Violations, Legal Responsibility, and US Military Support to 
the Saudi Coalition in Yemen: A Cautionary Tale, 7 JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND IN-












2. The ICJ’s Encounter with Complicity in Nicaragua 
  
In short, treaty and customary IHL contain a primary negative obligation of 
States not to encourage or assist third parties in their violations of IHL.212 
This primary, IHL-specific complicity rule exists in parallel with the second-
ary, generally applicable complicity rule in Article 16 ASR. Also, unlike the 
latter, it clearly applies to State assistance being provided to non-State armed 
groups. As the ICJ held in Nicaragua: 
 
[T]here is an obligation on the United States Government, in the terms of 
Article I of the Geneva Conventions, to “respect” the Conventions and 
even “to ensure respect” for them “in all circumstances,” since such an 
obligation does not derive only from the Conventions themselves, but 
from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions 
merely give specific expression. The United States is thus under an obliga-
tion not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in 
violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.213 
 
The existence of the IHL-specific negative complicity rule may not be in 
doubt, but its exact parameters are, for example, with regard to any mental 
element in respect of the assisting State. This element, again, need not align 
 
at 208. But see Verity Robson, The Common Approach to Article 1: The Scope of Each State’s Obli-
gation to Ensure Respect for the Geneva Conventions, 25 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY 
LAW 101, 111 (2020) (arguing that Article 16 ASR is the only relevant complicity rule—that 
is, that no such rule exists under IHL).  
212. See COMMENTARY OF 2016, supra note 208, ¶ 158 (“Pursuant to common Article 
1, the High Contracting Parties have certain negative obligations, which means they must 
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violations of the Conventions. It would be contradictory if common Article 1 obliged the 
High Contracting Parties to ‘respect and to ensure respect’ by their own armed forces while 
allowing them to contribute to violations by other Parties to a conflict.”). See also id. ¶¶ 158–
63; Geiß, supra note 205, at 130–31.  
213. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 220 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. See also id. ¶ 255 (“[G]eneral 
principles of humanitarian law include a particular prohibition, accepted by States, and ex-
tending to activities which occur in the context of armed conflicts, whether international in 
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with the requirements of Article 16 ASR. For instance, it is entirely possible 
for CA1 to require a lower level of fault than Article 16.214  
The text of IHL treaties provides no guidance on the elements of the 
IHL-specific complicity rule. In Nicaragua, the Court’s examination of U.S. 
complicity in violations of IHL by the “contras” was confined solely to the 
U.S. production of a manual on psychological operations, which the Court 
framed in terms of U.S. encouragement or incitement of the violations.215 This 
language is particularly interesting because States are generally not seen to 
bear responsibility simply for encouraging or inciting violations by others. 216 
The Court said nothing about the degree of culpability required for encour-
aging violations of IHL. It did, however, find the United States responsible 
for encouragement by providing the manual, while noting that it was “mate-
rial to consider whether that encouragement was offered to persons in cir-
cumstances where the commission of such acts was likely or foreseeable.” 217 
This appears to be a reference to purely objective likelihood or foreseeability 
rather than subjective foresight on the part of U.S. authorities. But it is un-
clear whether the Court simply regarded this objective element as cumulative 
with an implied subjective element. To put it mildly, it is unlikely that the 
Court thought that any provision of assistance that was objectively likely to 
lead causally to further IHL violations would count as “encouragement.” 
It is difficult to draw any reliable conclusions from Nicaragua as to what 
the Court would have thought on the fault element of the IHL complicity 
rule for providing to a non-State actor (or a State) assistance that does not 
qualify as encouragement or incitement. In particular, Nicaragua did not ask 
the Court to rule on whether the U.S. provision of weapons, money, and 
logistical assistance (which included the sharing of some intelligence)218 to 
the contras violated IHL because it facilitated the contras’ violations of 
IHL.219 Its submissions (and the Court’s analysis) framed these acts of assis-
tance as violations of the prohibitions on the use of force and intervention.220 
The only IHL-specific complicity finding was that regarding the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) manual on psychological operations. 
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3. Fault Standards in the Arms Trade Treaty 
 
To my knowledge, the only treaty in which States expressly set out culpability 
standards regarding obligations similar, but not equivalent, to the IHL-spe-
cific complicity rule is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),221 which does so in 
two different provisions. First, Article 6 ATT categorically prohibits arms 
exports in certain circumstances; in particular, Article 6(4) provides that a 
State party  
 
shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms . . . if it has 
knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used 
in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian 
objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes (emphasis 
added).  
 
Article 7 then further provides that in situations in which a transfer is not 
categorically prohibited by Article 6, the State shall “assess the potential” 
that, if transferred, the arms “could be used” to commit or facilitate serious 
violations of IHL or human rights. If, after making this assessment and 
adopting any available mitigating measures, the State party determines there 
is an “overriding risk” of such consequences occurring, it shall not authorize 
the export.222 
The key difference between these ATT rules and the IHL-specific com-
plicity rule is that the ATT prohibitions are entirely inchoate. They do not 
require that the harmful consequences of the arms transfer actually occur. 
Rather, a State that authorizes an export of weapons contrary to Articles 6 
or 7 ATT violates the treaty by the mere act of export, even if no violations 
of IHL are ultimately facilitated by it. 223 The IHL complicity rule, by contrast, 
does require the prohibited consequence to occur—that is, the responsibility 
of the accomplice cannot arise without the principal committing the wrong, 
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and without the accomplice’s conduct actually facilitating the wrong, to some 
degree of causal contribution.224  
But even if the ATT rules are different from those of IHL, they are suf-
ficiently similar in their basic purpose for the ATT to serve as an instructive 
example, especially in light of its drafting history. A draft text of Article 6, 
originally proposed by the United States, prohibited transfers only when 
these would be done “for the purpose of facilitating” international crimes, 
borrowing the complicity mens rea language from Article 25(3)(c) of the 
Rome Statute.225 This purpose formulation was met with pushback from 
other States, who considered it to be too narrow,226 and was replaced with a 
knowledge requirement that was left undefined.227 As in the ASR context, 
the Article 6 ATT knowledge requirement must be dual—the transferring 
State must know (i.e., be practically certain) that the recipient State is com-
mitting or will commit international crimes, and it must know (i.e., be prac-
tically certain) that the recipient State would use the arms provided to commit 
these crimes.228 Again, as in the ASR context, this “knowledge” is inherently 
a probabilistic assessment of contingent events in the future, if at a high level 
of certainty. 
The probabilistic nature of the assessment is even more apparent in Ar-
ticle 7 ATT, which speaks of the “potential” that the arms “could be used to 
commit or facilitate” a serious violation of IHL, then refers to measures that 
might “mitigate risks” and to refuse to proceed with the export in case there 
remains an “overriding risk” despite such measures. The provision is broader 
than Article 6 in multiple ways: for instance, it is not confined to international 
crimes but encompasses all serious violations of IHL and IHRL; its causality 
requirements are arguably lower; and it refers not to knowledge (i.e., practical 
certainty) that transferred arms would be used for the proscribed harms but to 
the risk that they could be so used.229 However, it bears reiterating yet again 
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that the difference between practical or near certainty and mere potential or 
risk is one of degree, not of kind.  
 
4. Minimum Standards for IHL-specific Complicity 
 
The culpability element of the IHL complicity rule remains substantially un-
certain. The same can be said of the causal contribution element. There is 
simply no binding authority as to what their contents are or should be. Stand-
ards employed elsewhere, such as in the ATT context, cannot simply be 
transplanted wholesale, however instructive they are. An attempt to arrive at 
such standards from State practice is, in my view, bound to fail since that 
practice simply lacks the necessary coherence and granularity. The argument 
I propose is, therefore, like most of this article, conceptual and normative. 
What can be said with certainty is that the applicability of the IHL-spe-
cific complicity rule, which is rooted in CA1 and custom, does not depend 
on whether the assisting State is a party to an armed conflict or on the clas-
sification of that conflict as an international armed conflict (IAC) or non-
international armed conflict (NIAC). 230 States parties to the Geneva Con-
ventions must respect them and ensure respect for them “in all circum-
stances.” There is no reason of principle why the complicity rule, which de-
mands abstention only from the assisting State, should apply differently de-
pending on its involvement in the conflict or the nature of that conflict. 231 
Indeed, we have seen in Nicaragua how the ICJ had no issue with applying 
its encouragement analysis to the U.S. supply of the manual to the contras, 
who were involved in a NIAC against the Nicaraguan government. Of 
course, the somewhat different content of IHL in IACs and NIACs might 
lead to relatively rare occasions in which the same kind of assistance would 
be wrongful in IACs but lawful in NIACs, but this turns on the wrongfulness 
of the principal’s conduct, not on differing applicability of the IHL complic-
ity rule.232 
We can also say with certainty that, whatever the exact parameters of the 
IHL-specific complicity rule, it has added value when compared to Article 
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16 ASR, at least in covering State assistance to non-State armed groups. 233 
Article 16 does not by its own terms apply to non-State actors, and there 
appears to be little evidence of such a secondary rule of general applicability 
that would be divorced from the relevant primary rules, unless Article 16 was 
regarded simply as one instantiation of a broader, general principle of law.234 
We can also say that the CA1 complicity rule is broader than Article 16 in 
that it covers not only assistance but also “mere” encouragement.235 
But what should the culpability element of the IHL-specific complicity 
rule look like?  
First, at a minimum, the culpability element of IHL complicity should 
include all the modes of fault in the general customary rule in Article 16 ASR. 
If States were prepared to accept those culpability standards for complicity 
in all existing rules of international law, regardless of the importance of the 
interests they protect, then surely the same standards would constitute the 
limit above which no IHL-specific complicity rule could go. In other words, 
because its primary purpose is to prevent particularly grave harms against 
individuals (and States), it is justified for IHL to impose lower, less stringent 
culpability requirements that would inhibit more potentially harmful interac-
tions between and among States and non-State armed groups.236 But it could 
certainly not impose higher, more stringent culpability requirements than Ar-
ticle 16 ASR, especially because the IHL-specific complicity rule does not 
impose consequences any more burdensome for the complicit State than 
does Article 16.237 
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This point was broadly accepted at the Nottingham workshop on intel-
ligence sharing. In particular, even experts vocal in their advocacy of a pur-
pose/direct intent standard under Article 16 ASR were comfortable applying 
a standard lower than purpose under CA1 and customary IHL.238 This only 
makes sense from a policy perspective—the importance of the interests pro-
tected by IHL can warrant a departure from default, generally applicable 
standards, and one such departure could be in less demanding culpability 
requirements. An IHL-specific rule to that effect would not excessively in-
hibit potentially beneficial cooperation in the way the same rule would do if 
it applied to all possible violations of international law. 
Thus, at a minimum, the IHL complicity rule would cover State assis-
tance to other States or non-State actors if such assistance was done: 
(1) With the purpose/direct intent to facilitate a violation of IHL, re-
gardless of whether the assisting State knew (was practically certain) that the 
violation would occur or that its aid would, in fact, facilitate it. Again, deficits 
in knowledge are compensated for by the existence of purpose as the most 
culpable form of fault. 239 
(2) With the oblique/indirect intent to facilitate a violation of IHL—
that is, if the assisting State was practically certain that a violation of IHL 
was occurring or would occur, was practically certain that its assistance 
would facilitate the violation and had reconciled itself to this virtual inevita-
bility.240  
(3) With willful blindness, in the sense that the assisting State would 
have been acting with oblique intent but for its purpose to avoid acquiring 
information that would have led it to practical certainty.241 
Second, above that minimum the fault element of the IHL complicity 
rule ultimately might best be conceptualized as a sliding scale, depending on 
the importance of the IHL rule that is implicated. Put differently, CA1 and 
its customary equivalent can employ a culpability requirement that varies 
with the severity or seriousness of the principal’s IHL violation. Thus, for 
example, the Article 16 ASR standards might be perfectly appropriate for 
complicity in violations of “vanilla” rules of IHL, such as the Article 38 Ge-
neva Convention III rule that the detaining power shall provide prisoners of 
war with opportunities for taking physical exercise, including sports and 
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games,242 or the Article 71 rule that prisoners of war must be allowed to send 
and receive correspondence.243 But less demanding requirements might be 
appropriate for complicity in serious violations of IHL, for instance, those that 
constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, deliberate attacks on 
civilians, or subjection of civilians to torture or inhuman treatment.244 It is in 
principle perfectly sensible to vary the content of complicity rules depending 
on the importance of the underlying interests, as we could see, for example, 
from the various gradations of liability in Articles 6 and 7 ATT or indeed 
from the ILC’s (imperfect) implementation of the idea in Article 41(2) 
ASR.245 This is as true internally, within regime-specific complicity rules as 
in IHL, as it is for complicity for violations of different rules of unequal 
importance within the same regime. The absence of any hard text specifically 
regulating culpability in most specific regimes and the ensuing interpretative 
discretion formally enable such a variable conception of fault. 
This leads us to what is, in my view, the main outstanding issue—should 
there be a risk-based culpability rule for complicity in serious violations of 
IHL? 
  
5. Risk-based Culpability for IHL-Specific Complicity 
 
Let us assume a situation in which State A provides assistance (e.g., intelli-
gence) to State or non-State actor B without the direct or indirect intent that 
B use this assistance to commit a serious violation of IHL (e.g., attack civil-
ians). A is only aware of a risk, to some degree of probability, that B would 
commit the violation and use the assistance A provides to do so. If, in this 
scenario, A provides the assistance to B despite the risk and B, in fact, pro-
ceeds to use that assistance to commit a serious violation of IHL, should A 
be responsible for complicity in B’s wrongful act under the IHL-specific 
complicity rule? 
We should carefully distinguish this scenario from other possible forms 
of culpability. This would not be responsibility for the inchoate act of creating 
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risk or exposing the possible victim to risk, responsibility of the kind that 
exists under Article 7 ATT, where the violation is consummated simply by 
exporting arms despite an overriding risk. Nor is it responsibility like that 
under the non-refoulement rule in IHRL and refugee law, whereby a State 
can violate the right to life or the prohibition of torture or inhuman treat-
ment simply by deporting or extraditing a person to another State, despite a 
real risk that they would be ill-treated there, even if the ill-treatment never 
actually occurs.246 In the scenario above A is not responsible for complicity 
simply by providing aid to B despite the risk of harm; it can be responsible 
only if B actually commits the wrongful act and the aid A had provided caus-
ally contributed to that act. 247 In the absence of such causal contribution A 
can only be responsible for violating some other, positive duty of prevention 
(e.g., ensuring respect for IHL), but not for complicity proper. 
Nor is the scenario above one of so-called constructive knowledge. That is 
a situation in which a person (or State) did not subjectively know to practical 
certainty something that could have been known to such certainty; the fact was 
knowable in principle and should have been known to such certainty, so that the 
person (or State) is culpable, to some standard such as negligence, for not 
knowing. In other words, had one acted with care and done all that a rea-
sonable person could be expected to do in such circumstances to verify all 
relevant information, one would have arrived at practical certainty. As pre-
viously explained, the notion of constructive knowledge implies a positive 
obligation to make such inquiries.248 
But our scenario is different. It is one where even the most diligent of 
States could not have (probabilistically) known to near certainty what the 
recipient of the aid would do. This is, in short, a “pure” situation of risk—
even after making all possible inquiries, the assisting State knows that there 
is some possibility that the assisted party would commit a serious violation 
of IHL and would use the aid provided to do so, but it cannot be certain 
whether or not this will be the case.249 
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This is, in practice, by far the most common scenario of States providing 
assistance to third parties, including in military operations. Assisting States 
are rarely practically certain what the recipients of their aid will do with it, 
but they frequently discern a degree of risk that their aid will be misused. As 
a normative matter, the first question is whether responsibility for complicity 
is desirable when the assisting State is not practically certain—and cannot be 
certain—about what the assisted party will do, but nonetheless appreciates 
some degree of risk and consciously disregards that risk by continuing to 
provide the assistance.  
In the ATT context, States have already answered that question essen-
tially in the affirmative for serious violations of IHL and IHRL, even if the 
responsibility is inchoate and not one of complicity proper. That treaty, how-
ever, is not necessarily reflective of customary law and is confined to the 
transfer of weapons—a type of assistance that is manifestly capable of caus-
ally contributing to grave violations of international law. That said, numerous 
other treaties and instruments regarding arms transfers use risk-based for-
mulations to prohibit certain transfers.250 If the causal contribution to the 
wrong of other forms of assistance, such as intelligence sharing, is as sub-
stantial as that of weapons and the seriousness of the underlying wrong (e.g., 
a deliberate attack against civilians) remains the same, it is difficult to see why 
they should be treated differently. It is not the type of assistance but the 
importance of the interests and values implicated by the underlying violation 
that justifies resort to a risk-based form of culpability.251 
If this mode of culpability is desirable in principle, the even more diffi-
cult question would be how the relevant risk threshold should be defined. 
On one end of the spectrum we could require a very high likelihood of the 
harm occurring, but such a threshold would be impossible to differentiate 
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from actual knowledge—that is, practical, virtual near certainty.252 On the 
other end of the spectrum we could require merely the possibility of the harm 
occurring, but such a low threshold would be overinclusive and would in-
hibit far too much potentially beneficial cooperation. There is always a pos-
sibility that almost any kind of aid will be misused.  
Occupying the middle ground would be formulations requiring the 
State’s awareness of a real, significant, or substantial risk, such as, for exam-
ple, those used in the IHRL non-refoulement context.253 Such formulations 
imply that the risk is neither low nor negligible, without implying that the 
violation is more likely to occur than not. Alternatively, the rule could ex-
plicitly require the level of risk to be likely or probable, i.e., that the assisting 
State would be culpable had it assessed it as more likely than not that the 
assistance it provided would be used for a serious violation of IHL, and the 
assistance later was in fact so used. 
The current state of the law is such that it is difficult to know exactly 
where the risk threshold lies; this certainly cannot be discerned with mathe-
matical precision. However, what can be said is that comparative practice in 
both criminal and tort law is replete with examples of risk-based modes of 
culpability, such as recklessness, dolus eventualis, gross negligence, or con-
scious (advertent) negligence.254 The boundaries between these forms of 
fault are porous, but the forms all have subjective awareness of some degree 
of risk in common.255 And in various international legal contexts, States have 
been comfortable with the regulation of their conduct on the basis of antic-
ipated risk, as for instance, with the precautionary principle in international 
environmental law.256 
It is therefore difficult to see how, precisely, States could reasonably ob-
ject to the notion that A would be acting contrarily to its obligation to respect 
and ensure respect for IHL if, knowing it to be likely that the assistance it 
provided to B, including weapons, money, or intelligence, would be used to 
commit war crimes or other serious violations of IHL, it chose to provide 
the assistance anyway, and B, in fact, committed the wrongful act, the aid 
provided contributing materially. This would probably be the case even if 
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the risk threshold were somewhat lower than likelihood if it was (say) clear, 
real, or substantial. The ICRC is thus of the view that irrespective of any 
obligations under the ATT or other arms transfer instruments, all States have 
a CA1 “negative obligation [that] would require a State to assess whether the 
recipient is likely to use the weapons to commit IHL violations and, if there 
is a substantial or clear risk of this happening, to refrain from transferring 
the weapons.”257 And as explained above, there is no reason of principle why 
this rule would be confined to weapons transfers—other forms of assistance 
that can substantially causally contribute to the wrongful act, such as the 
sharing of intelligence, must be equally covered. Nor is there any reason of 
principle why this complicity rule would apply any differently to assistance 
provided by States to non-State actors.258 
In conclusion, the CA1 and customary duty to refrain from assisting 
third parties in committing serious violations of IHL can also reasonably 
encompass those situations in which the assisting State is aware only of a risk 
that its aid would be used to facilitate the violation but nonetheless chooses 
to provide it. 259 The State providing assistance despite the risk would not be 
acting unlawfully at that precise moment; its provision of assistance would 
only become unlawful if it was later in fact used to commit, and made a 
substantial contribution to, a serious violation of IHL. By providing the aid 
despite the risk, the assisting State would be exposing itself to legal risk. It 
would be taking a gamble that its aid would not, in the end, be misused, and 
it would be liable, to the extent of its own causal contribution to the harm, 
if it judged poorly. And it would in any event be making its decisions dynam-
ically, in light of the possibly changing circumstances and information avail-
able to it. 
 




Let us turn now to IHRL, whose applicability to multinational military op-
erations and intelligence sharing within such operations raises numerous is-
sues. First, as with IHL, IHRL obligations can stem from both customary 
and conventional international law. But the source of obligation matters 
more for IHRL than for IHL for a number of reasons. On the one hand, 
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customary IHRL is vaguer in content than customary IHL—and there is no 
IHRL equivalent of the ICRC’s customary IHL study.260 On the other hand, 
human rights treaties possess dedicated independent enforcement mecha-
nisms that are lacking for customary IHRL and for both customary and con-
ventional IHL. The subject-matter jurisdiction of these mechanisms (such as 
the European Court of Human Rights) is normally limited to their founding 
treaty.261 An applicant cannot use (say) the individual complaints mechanism 
of the European Court by alleging a violation of some treaty other than the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Today all States are parties to at least some human rights treaties. The 
treaties that are most relevant for the question of intelligence sharing in mul-
tinational military operations are those on civil and political rights, which 
have some significant gaps in ratifications. For example, to engage with 
China on these issues regarding purported violations of freedom of expres-
sion or privacy, one would have to rely on customary IHRL, since China is 
not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (IC-
CPR),262 the UN treaty that protects these rights. Both customary and con-
ventional IHRL could be enforced before domestic courts, depending on 
domestic (constitutional) rules on the incorporation of international law into 
the municipal legal order. Dedicated enforcement mechanisms, whether in-
ternational or domestic, inevitably make IHRL more appealing than IHL to 
activists and potential litigants and equally inevitably lead to court cases or 
other kinds of procedures in which questions of intelligence sharing will be 
scrutinized. This is an emerging trend that will likely only grow. 
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2016), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/44445/AEL_2016_03.pdf. 
261. The one major exception is the African Court, whose jurisdiction extends to all 
human rights instruments accepted by a State party. See Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights art. 3, June 10, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/AFCHPR/PROT (III). Human 
rights bodies can, of course, take into account other legal rules in interpreting their own 
respective treaties.  












Second, IHRL, like IHL, imposes both negative and positive obligations 
on States. States must not only respect IHRL themselves but must also ex-
ercise due diligence to prevent and suppress violations by third parties within 
their jurisdiction.263 However, the key question of principle for our purposes 
is whether the negative duty to respect human rights also includes an IHRL-
specific obligation not to be complicit in human rights violations by third 
parties. As with IHL, the answer to that question appears to be in the affirm-
ative, but the jurisprudence of human rights bodies on this issue is embry-
onic. And if the obligation exists, the even more difficult question, afflicted 
by indeterminacy, is that of its content, specifically as to its culpability ele-
ment. 
Third, even if the IHRL-specific complicity rule exists, as it does in my 
view, it is controversial to what extent that rule would operate extraterritori-
ally—that is, to State assistance to actors committing violations outside its 
borders.264 The extraterritoriality problem is likely the greatest impediment 
to the wider application of the IHRL complicity rule for the time being. 
Fourth is the important systemic question of the relationship between 
IHL and IHRL. Here too the overall trend has also been towards an increas-
ing acceptance that IHRL applies in armed conflict, but numerous contro-
versies remain, for example, about the utility, coherence, and meaning of the 
lex specialis principle.265 That said, the most important question is not whether 
 
263. See generally Dinah Shelton & Ariel Gould, Positive and Negative Obligations, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 562 (Dinah Shelton ed., 
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264. See generally EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
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IHRL applies to military operations but how it applies, and specifically how 
the normative demands of human rights can be reconciled with practical op-
erational requirements and realities on the ground.266 At the very minimum, 
we could say that human rights bodies would likely find violations of IHRL 
due to intelligence sharing if these violations would simultaneously also be 
violations of IHL (e.g., torture or directing attacks against civilians). More 
difficult would be those cases in which the demands of IHL and IHRL po-
tentially conflict, such as the targeting and detention of combatants, on 
which IHL rules are more permissive than those of IHRL (for example, IHL 
would permit the killing of combatants even if it was possible to capture 
them instead and they posed no immediate threat, whereas IHRL would nor-
mally require the exhaustion of non-lethal options). However, the latter cases 
will be far less common than the former, and I will not examine this issue 
further here. 
In short, while the jurisprudence on the applicability of human rights 
treaties extraterritorially and in times of armed conflict is very much in flux, 
it seems unlikely that the increasing trend towards applying human rights law 
to such situations will reverse itself. Human rights case law specifically ad-
dressing extraterritorial intelligence sharing is also embryonic.267 However, 
State responsibility for intelligence sharing and related matters, such as elec-
tronic surveillance, has increasingly been raised in human rights terms. Intel-
ligence operations generally have been subjected to increased public scrutiny 
since the Snowden revelations of the electronic surveillance capabilities of 
agencies such as the U.S. National Security Agency and UK Government 
Communications Headquarters. This has in turn provoked litigation domes-
tically and internationally, as well as such important activity within the UN 
system as the adoption by the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights 
Council of a number of resolutions on the right to privacy in the digital 
age.268  
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Some States in multinational military operations, such as the United 
States and Australia, may, as a matter of fact, be subject to less exacting scru-
tiny of their compliance with relevant human rights treaties than others, such 
as Belgium, France, or the United Kingdom, which have accepted the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Even so, be-
cause of the close relationships inherent in cooperation in multinational op-
erations, it is inevitable that the increased level of scrutiny by the European 
Court will also have effects even on non-European partner States. 269 The 
same will increasingly be true for other human rights systems, such as the 
Inter-American one. Questions of intelligence sharing in multinational mili-
tary operations will undoubtedly be litigated more frequently before both 
domestic courts and international institutions applying human rights law, 
generating significant legal risks for States.270  
In the remainder of this Section, I will, therefore, first look at whether 
an IHRL complicity rule exists and then examine its culpability element. Fi-
nally, I will discuss the extraterritoriality issue in more detail. These are, in 
my view, the key pivots on which the practical relevance of this rule will turn. 
 
2. Is There an IHRL-Specific Complicity Rule? 
 
The question of the existence of an IHRL-specific complicity rule is very 
similar to that of the IHL rule examined above. As with IHL, an IHRL com-
plicity rule is not explicit in the text of any treaty but could, in principle, apply 
not only in the inter-State context but also to State assistance to non-State 
actors.271 As with IHL, the architecture of IHRL recognizes both negative 
and positive obligations of States, viz., the duties to respect, protect, and 
fulfill human rights. Unlike the IHL duty to “ensure respect,” however, the 
IHRL duty of protection is both broad and incontestable; indeed, it has gen-
erated so much jurisprudence that there is less need for a negative complicity 
rule.272 Also, unlike IHL, which for the most part possesses unity at least as 
 
269. See Letts, supra note 1, at 14. 
270. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 39. 
271. Various examples in emerging jurisprudence are discussed below. Note that an 
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there is no need for a parallelism of obligations requirement of the kind found in Article 16 
ASR, whose purpose is to safeguard State sovereignty and the pacta tertiis rule. See further 
Andreas Th Müller, Human Rights Obligations of Armed Groups, in THE “LEGAL PLURIVERSE,” 
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a matter of customary law, IHRL is a fragmented regime, with different trea-
ties with different sets of parties and different authoritative interpreters, and 
its customary substrate is less clear. It is thus to an extent a misnomer to 
speak of an IHRL-specific complicity rule—variants of such a rule can be 
specific to and differ in their elements between treaties such as the ICCPR, 
the ECHR, the American Convention on Human Rights, the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT), and so forth. That said, the “respect,” “ensure,” “se-
cure,” or “protect” language of all these treaties is broad enough to be easily 
interpreted as including a negative duty of States not to be complicit in human 
rights violations by third parties.273 
A State violates the negative duty to respect human rights if an action 
infringing on human rights is attributable to it. A State violates the positive 
duty to protect on the basis of an (attributable) omission—that is, a failure 
of the State’s organs or agents to exercise due diligence and take all reason-
ably feasible measures to prevent or stop an infringement on human rights 
by another State or by a non-State actor. The vast majority of human rights 
violations litigated before international human rights bodies are of the nega-
tive duty to respect.274 However, human rights bodies have developed a long-
standing, sophisticated jurisprudence on the substantive positive duty to pro-
tect (or ensure) human rights, pioneered by the Inter-American and Euro-
pean Courts.275 That case law contains rules on, for example, the thresholds 
of knowledge of the risk of harm that trigger a protective duty, rules that 
have been applied broadly, from risks to the lives of specific persons to per-
vasive environmental harms.276 
But the sheer breadth of these positive obligations has meant that human 
rights bodies have generally not found it necessary or useful to articulate 
 
273. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 8, at 198 (no reason why Article 1 ECHR “cannot be 
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theories of complicity. This is compounded by the tendency of some of these 
bodies—primarily the European Court—to elide the distinction between 
negative and positive obligations when dealing with situations in which im-
mediate human rights violations prima facie appear to be committed by non-
State actors.277 For example, to this day it remains unclear whether the Eu-
ropean Court’s case law on northern Cyprus directly holds Turkey responsi-
ble for the conduct of the separatist pro-Turkish authorities, that is whether 
a negative violation of the duty to respect is being attributed to Turkey or 
whether Turkey is being held responsible for failing to secure human rights 
and prevent violations by the separatist entity. The same goes, for instance, 
for the relationship between Russia and the Transnistrian separatists in Mol-
dova and Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatists in Georgia.278 
In short, human rights bodies have yet to produce a line of cases that 
unambiguously adopt a complicity theory stemming from the negative duty 
to respect human rights as the responsibility frame distinct from both the 
direct attribution of the human rights violation and the responsibility for 
failing to prevent it. 279 But that jurisprudence appears to be emerging. For 
instance, in its General Comment No. 36 the Human Rights Committee held 
that States “have obligations under international law not to aid or assist ac-
tivities undertaken by other States and non-State actors that violate the right 
to life.”280 But even though this looks like the articulation of an ICCPR com-
plicity rule, the Committee, in fact, said nothing about the fault and causality 
elements of this rule, while the footnote at the end of that sentence refers 
readers to Article 16 ASR and the ICJ’s examination of complicity in the 
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Bosnian Genocide case.281 To my knowledge, no individual case of the Com-
mittee deals with complicity directly.282 
On the other hand, in the European Court, a developing line of cases 
deals with States assisting violations by other States or by non-State actors 
with “acquiescence or connivance.” This line of cases originated in the 
Court’s 2001 judgment in the inter-State case of Cyprus v. Turkey, in which it 
held that “the acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting 
State in the acts of private individuals which violate the Convention rights 
of other individuals within its jurisdiction may engage that State’s responsi-
bility under the Convention.”283 That case and its progeny used the “acqui-
escence or connivance” language in describing the relationship between a 
State and a prima facie non-State actor directly committing the human rights 
violation at issue.284 But in the 2012 Grand Chamber El-Masri judgment and 
four subsequent Chamber judgments, the Court used that same language in 
describing the behavior of Macedonia, Poland, Lithuania, and Romania in 
providing assistance to U.S. rendition and torture of suspected terrorists dur-
ing the “war on terror.”285 As a doctrinal matter, these judgments are hardly 
a model of clarity; the Court seems to be vacillating between attributing the 
conduct of U.S. agents to the assisting States, finding them at fault for failing 
to prevent the wrongful conduct of third parties, and grounding responsibil-
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ity in complicity. Indeed it is probably complicity that provides the best con-
ceptual frame here, as is most evident from the four Chamber judgments, 
which expressly speak of Poland’s, Lithuania’s, and Romania’s responsibility 
for complicity and for enabling the wrongful conduct of U.S. authorities.286 The 
European Court thus seems to be applying an emerging ECHR-specific 
complicity doctrine that covers State assistance to both State and non-State 
actors committing human rights violations, even if the exact parameters of 
that doctrine remain unclear.287 
The complicity jurisprudence of other human rights bodies is even less 
clear. For example, an older Human Rights Committee case appeared to use 
State acquiescence as an attribution rule rather than as a separate type of 
complicity-based responsibility.288 The Inter-American Commission’s and 
Court’s jurisprudence similarly seem to be vacillating between conceptualiz-
ing State support to the wrongful conduct of third parties as a failure to pre-
vent violations289 and as a basis for attribution.290 The same goes for the 
African Commission.291 Generally speaking, it is only those treaties dealing 
with human rights violations that constitute international crimes, such as tor-
 
286. Al Nashiri v. Poland, supra note 285, operative paras. 5–6; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. 
Poland, supra note 285, operative paras. 5–6; Al Nashiri v. Romania, supra note 285, operative 
paras. 5–6; Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, supra note 285, operative paras. 6–7. 
287. For an extended analysis, see Milanovic, State Acquiescence or Connivance, supra note 
284. See also Nina Jørgensen, Complicity in Torture in a Time of Terror: Interpreting the European 
Court of Human Rights Extraordinary Rendition Cases, 16 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 11 (2017). 
288. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1416/2005, Mohammed 
Alzery v. Sweden, ¶ 11.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Nov. 10, 2006). 
289. See Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 275, ¶ 173. 
290. See Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, Judgment, ¶¶ 120–23 (Sept. 15, 2005). See further JACKSON, 
supra note 8, at 190–99; LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 328. 
291. See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, General Comment No. 
3 on The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life, (Article 4), ¶ 
9 (2015), https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=10 [hereinafter African Com-
mission, General Comment No. 3] (“A State can be held responsible for killings by non-
State actors if it approves, supports or acquiesces in those acts or if it fails to exercise due diligence 












ture and enforced disappearance, that specifically mention (individual) com-
plicity,292 but the relevant treaty bodies have not articulated clear doctrines 
of State complicity.293 
However, all human rights bodies have produced voluminous and sub-
stantially similar jurisprudence on the IHRL non-refoulement principle, par-
ticularly in the context of the right to life and the prohibition of torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment. 294 As explained above, liability in such cases 
accrues merely from the State transferring an individual to some other State 
or entity despite a real risk of harm, even if the harm ultimately does not 
materialize.295 The IHRL non-refoulement rule is thus inchoate and not one 
of complicity as such, but it is nonetheless relevant. If States are prepared to 
accept that exposing individuals to the risk of serious harm can in and of 
itself violate human rights even if the risk does not materialize, then a fortiori 
they would accept that providing to a third-party assistance that causally con-
tributes to harms also violates human rights.  
To conclude, an IHRL-specific (or treaty-specific) complicity rule is sup-
ported by emerging (if insufficiently clear) case law.296 That human rights 
bodies have not yet systematically articulated and applied such a doctrine is 
best explained by the breadth of the positive duty of prevention, which is 
long established in their jurisprudence.297 But no reason of principle would 
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militate against it. On the contrary, such a rule could lead to greater descrip-
tive and conceptual accuracy and hence to greater certainty and predictabil-
ity. It could enhance human rights bodies’ ability to apportion blameworthi-
ness, providing them with the language to express variability in the stigma 
attached to human rights violations as a midway point on a spectrum that 
ranges from the “mere” failure to diligently protect an individual to the direct 
attribution of the violation to the State.298 It could also feed more rigorously 
into their decision-making on the apportionment of damages and other 
forms of reparation. Finally, and crucially for our purposes, the extraterrito-
rial scope of application of an IHRL-specific complicity rule (on which more 
below) that requires States only to refrain from assisting third parties com-
mitting human rights violations could be different—and broader—than that 
of the otherwise far more onerous positive obligation to prevent such viola-
tions. 
 
3. Culpability in IHRL Complicity 
 
Once IHRL complicity rule or rules become established, the question would 
immediately arise of how to define the constituent elements of such rules, in 
particular the culpability element. Here the analysis can reasonably follow 
that of the IHL-specific complicity rule.299 First, at a minimum, the culpabil-
ity element must include all of the modes of fault in the generally applicable 
Article 16 ASR rule: purpose/direct intent, oblique or indirect intent, and 
situations of willful blindness but for which the State would be acting with 
oblique intent. An IHRL culpability rule cannot be stricter than the generally 
applicable one.  
Second, that default culpability element should extend to complicity in 
all possible human rights violations, regardless of the nature of the right af-
fected or the magnitude of the violation. 
Third, complicity in serious human rights violations, the level of serious-
ness depending on either the nature of the right protected or possibly the 
systematic character of the violation, could warrant a lower, risk-based form 
of fault. 300 We have seen how the IHRL non-refoulement rule already pro-
vides for such a risk-based form of fault but only for exposures to a real risk 
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of grave harm to the person. This is a good example of how risk-based re-
sponsibility goes hand in hand with the severity of the underlying violation. 
That rule has only exceptionally been applied outside the contexts of the 
right to life and the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 
When it has been so applied, the human rights bodies doing so have generally 
elevated the threshold of violation, for example, requiring risk of a flagrant 
violation of the right to a fair trial. 301 
Culpability on a sliding scale for complicity in IHRL violations that 
would depend on their severity or systematic character would thus be con-
sistent with prior jurisprudence and would strike a reasonable balance be-
tween preventing harm and the risk of inhibiting beneficial cooperation be-
tween States (and non-State actors).302 Therefore, a State would be liable if 
it actively assisted a violation of the right to life, the right to health, or the 
prohibition of ill-treatment by another State or a non-State actor if the as-
sisting State knew303 of a real risk that such a violation would happen and 
that its assistance would be used in it and the violation does, in fact, happen 
and the assistance does contribute to it. 304 A State would similarly be liable 
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if it assisted the systematic violation of other rights, such as the freedom of 
expression or privacy.305 
 
4. Extraterritorial IHRL Complicity 
 
As things stand, the principal problem regarding the practical utility of an 
IHRL complicity rule is not its lack of determinacy but its extraterritorial 
scope. Scenarios in which a State provides assistance to State or non-State 
actors operating on its own territory, as in the Strasbourg extraordinary ren-
dition and CIA black site cases examined above, are relatively straightfor-
ward—the issue is how to label them (as complicity or as a breach of due 
diligence) and with what consequences for reparation, not whether a viola-
tion would exist. The genuinely difficult scenarios are those in which a State 
facilitates the commission of a human rights violation outside its own terri-
tory. Consider, for example, the facts of the Belhaj case. In 2004, the UK 
secret services shared intelligence about Mr. Belhaj with the CIA and Libya, 
information that led to his arrest by Malaysian officials in Kuala Lumpur, 
transfer to and arrest by Thai authorities in Bangkok, and subsequent rendi-
tion by U.S. authorities to Libya, where he and his pregnant wife were de-
tained and tortured.306 The violations of their human rights were committed 
in an extended causal chain in which at least five separate States participated. 
Some of that participation (e.g., arbitrary arrest and detention) would sepa-
rately constitute human rights violations.  
But other contributions, such as the UK act of sharing intelligence, can 
only be conceptualized as complicity. After prolonged domestic litigation,307 
the UK government settled out of court with Mr. Belhaj and his wife and 
 
305. Again, as with IHL, I do not wish to engage further in developing a precise defi-
nition of serious violations of IHRL. A single act of torture or unlawful killing would con-
stitute such a violation, whereas a single violation of privacy would not; however, a system-
atic violation of privacy (e.g., through a mass surveillance program without any safeguards) 
could be classified as serious. For a much more extended discussion of the notion, see supra 
note 244; CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶¶ 7.50–82. 
306. See Ian Cobain & Owen Bowcott, Settlement in Abdel Hakim Belhaj Rendition Case to 
Be Announced, THE GUARDIAN (May 9, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2018/may/09/settlement-in-abdul-hakim-belhaj-rendition-case-to-be-announced. 
307. For two of the cases in this multifaceted set of proceedings that had actually 
reached the UK Supreme Court, see Belhaj & Another v. Straw & Others [2017] UKSC 3 and 












apologized for its participation in the wrongs they suffered. 308 In doing so, 
however, the UK government admitted no legal liability and framed its (not 
necessarily unlawful) wrongdoing merely as a failure adequately to mitigate 
risk: “The UK Government’s actions contributed to your detention, rendi-
tion and suffering. The UK Government shared information about you with 
its international partners. We should have done more to reduce the risk that 
you would be mistreated. We accept this was a failing on our part.”309 
This (one imagines heavily lawyered) statement appears to be using the 
language of complicity with a risk-based mode of fault but again admits no 
legal liability. In particular, the UK government did not admit that relevant 
human rights treaties, such as the CAT and the ECHR, even applied extra-
territorially to someone in Mr. Belhaj’s situation—that is, that they cover a 
situation of State complicity through the sharing of intelligence when the 
person at risk of harm is located outside the State’s territory. 310  
The extraterritoriality issue is absolutely pivotal for addressing complicity 
scenarios in multinational military operations. At least from the perspective 
of powerful, interventionist States, the majority of operations in which States 
may share intelligence with State and non-State partners will take place out-
side their borders. Human rights bodies are yet to deal expressly in their case 
law with such extraterritorial complicity scenarios.311 Note in that regard that 
 
308. See 640 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2018) col. 926 (UK), https://hansard.parlia-
ment.uk/commons/2018-05-10/debates/B9AD50CD-9D54-41DA-A18B-1526E7658593 
/BelhajAndBoudcharLitigationUpdate (statement of UK Attorney General, Jeremy Wright; 
the government agreed to pay Mr. Belhaj’s wife £500,000 in compensation; Belhaj himself 
requested no compensation). 
309. Id. 
310. A similar example is the United Kingdom’s involvement in the extraordinary ren-
dition of Binyam Mohamed, which allegedly included the sharing of intelligence and the 
feeding of questions to the officials of States using torture or other forms of ill-treatment. 
See further Binyam Mohamed, THE RENDITION PROJECT, https://www.therenditionpro-
ject.org.uk/prisoners/binyam-mohamed.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2021). See also Binyam 
Mohamed v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2010] EWCA (Civ) 65 (Court of Appeal deci-
sion allowing the publication of intelligence material shared by the United States with the 
United Kingdom confirming that Mohamed was ill-treated).  
311. There is to my knowledge only one isolated exception, an obscure admissibility 
decision of the now-defunct European Commission on Human Rights in Tugar v. Italy, 
which dealt with an Italian sale of land mines to Iraq, and which the Commission found to 
be inadmissible as the arms sale was causally too far removed from the injury to the appli-
cants. Tugar v. Italy, App. No. 22869/93, Eur. Comm. H.R. Dec. (1995), http://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2342. The decision has not been cited in any subsequent judg-












the non-refoulement cases are not genuinely extraterritorial (nor, again, are 
they strictly about a form of complicity). The individual being transferred is 
actually located within the territory of the transferring State—it is the risk to 
the individual that is extraterritorial, but the violation is the act of transfer. 312 
The issue, therefore, is how the principles developed in the jurisprudence so 
far can be applied to scenarios of extraterritorial complicity.  
The extant extraterritoriality jurisprudence of human rights bodies has 
coalesced around two basic tests that revolve around the interpretation of 
the concept of State jurisdiction in human rights treaties. The treaties are 
regarded as applying outside a State’s territory when, first, the State exercises 
effective overall control over a portion of the territory of some other State, 
and second, its agents exercise authority, power, or control over an individ-
ual.313 In the context of military operations, in particular, case law is clear 
that any individual detained by a State outside its territory will be protected 
by IHRL, but it is less clear when it comes to purely kinetic operations with-
out territorial control (e.g., aerial bombardment or drone strikes). The overall 
trend in the case law has been towards a more expansive and factual ap-
proach, but the jurisprudence (especially that of the European Court) re-
mains internally inconsistent and riven with arbitrary distinctions. The ex-
pansive trend has also encountered some resistance among States, especially 
powerful, interventionist States.314 
Under current case law, State assistance to State or non-State actors who 
are operating in a territory controlled by that State, even if it is not the lawful 
sovereign of that territory, would clearly be covered by the spatial conception 
of jurisdiction. Thus, for example, if Russia, with the requisite degree of cul-
pability, provided money, weapons, or intelligence to separatists in Abkhazia 
 
the High Court of England and Wales holding that the transfer of a lethal drug from the 
United Kingdom to the United States, where it would be used for the execution of an indi-
vidual sentenced to death, does not trigger the applicability of the ECHR. R (Zagorski and 
Baze) v. Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and Another [2010] EWHC 
(Admin) 3110 [57]. 
312. See Bankovic and Others v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 68. There are, 
however, genuine cases of extraterritorial non-refoulement, for example when the individual 
is located in an embassy, military prison abroad, or a vessel on the high seas of the returning 
State. See, e.g., Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 61; Hirsi Jamaa v. 
Italy, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97. 
313. See generally Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99; 
sources cited in supra note 264. 
314. See further Marko Milanovic, Surveillance and Cyber Operations, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS (Mark Gibney et al. eds., 











and South Ossetia on the territory of Georgia that causally contributed to 
human rights violations by these actors, the ECHR would apply if Russia 
controlled that territory. 315 Or, if during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, U.S. or UK authorities provided assistance to non-State actors operat-
ing in areas under their control, which was then used to violate human rights, 
the relevant human rights treaties would have applied. 
But in most complicity scenarios, as in the Belhaj example above, the as-
sisting State will not control the territory where the victims of human rights 
violations are located. In such a situation, complicity could be examined un-
der the personal model of jurisdiction—would the act of State assistance be 
regarded as authority, power, or control over the victim? The problem with 
that construction is that it is the direct perpetrator of the human rights vio-
lation that is exercising authority, power, or control over the victim, even if 
such concepts are interpreted broadly.316 And under the most restrictive ju-
risprudence on the personal model, that of the European Court, even drop-
ping a bomb on someone would not constitute an act of control; a fortiori, 
neither could assisting a third party that then drops the bomb.317  
But the European Court’s restrictive position is not necessarily the cor-
rect one even for ECHR purposes; it may change in the future, and it has 
not been emulated by other human rights bodies. An alternative position, 
one that I have long advocated, is that the personal model inevitably col-
lapses into the propositions that any State act that substantively violates hu-
man rights is an exercise of authority, power, or control over the victim and 
that negative obligations of restraint—including the duty to refrain from as-
sisting others committing violations—should apply without any territorial 
 
315. See Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), App. Nos. 20958/14 & 38334/18 (2014) (EC-
tHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-207622 (holding that Russia was in control of 
Crimea and that therefore the ECHR applied in the area). 
316. See also JACKSON, supra note 279, at 821; Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 
10, at 24. 
317. See Bankovic; supra note 312; Georgia v. Russia No. 2, App. No. 38263/08 (2021) 
(ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-207757 (holding that ECHR does not ap-
ply to kinetic operations in the course of the active hostilities phase of an international 
armed conflict). For further discussion, see Marko Milanovic, Georgia v. Russia No. 2: The 
European Court’s Resurrection of Bankovic in the Contexts of Chaos, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 25, 2021), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/georgia-v-russia-no-2-the-european-courts-resurrection-of-banko 
vic-in-the-contexts-of-chaos/. See also Human Rights Watch Inc & Ors v. The Secretary of 
State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Ors, [2016] UKIPTrib 15-165-CH (UK 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal holding that the ECHR does not apply to UK surveillance 











restriction.318 An instructive example in that regard is the recent judgment of 
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in which it held that the pri-
vacy guarantees of the German Basic Law apply to any surveillance activities 
by German security services abroad because the organs of the German State 
are comprehensively bound to respect fundamental rights.319 That rationale 
would be equally valid for an extraterritorial complicity scenario, even with 
due caution that the Court’s decision was based on a domestic instrument 
that contains no jurisdiction clause. 
A further alternative is the functional model of jurisdiction, which con-
ceptualizes it as control not over the victim but over the victim’s ability to 
enjoy their human rights.320 The most prominent proponent of this doctrine 
is the Human Rights Committee,321 although a variant thereof has also been 
endorsed by the Committee on the Rights of the Child.322 The Human Rights 
Committee thus held that under the ICCPR: 
 
a State party has an obligation to respect and ensure the rights under article 
6 of all persons who are within its territory and all persons subject to its 
jurisdiction, that is, all persons over whose enjoyment of the right to life it 
exercises power or effective control. This includes persons located outside 
any territory effectively controlled by the State whose right to life is none-
theless affected by its military or other activities in a direct and reasonably 
foreseeable manner. States also have obligations under international law 
 
318. See MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREA-
TIES supra note 264, at 124–26, 209–22. 
319. Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) [Federal Constitutional Court] May 19, 2020, 
1 BvR 2835/17, ¶ 87, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entschei-
dungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200519_1bvr283517en.htm (official English translation) [here-
inafter 1 BvR 2835/17] (“The fundamental rights of the Basic Law are binding upon the 
Federal Intelligence Service and the legislator that sets out its powers, irrespective of 
whether the Federal Intelligence Service is operating within Germany or abroad. The pro-
tection afforded by Art. 10(1) and Art. 5(1) second sentence GG also applies to telecom-
munications surveillance of foreigners in other countries.”).  
320. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 25. 
321. See General Comment No. 36, supra note 275, ¶ 63; U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee, Communication No. 3042/2017, A.S. and Others v. Italy, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/130/ 
DR/3042/2017 (Jan. 27, 2021) (Italy bound to rescue shipwrecked migrants in the Medi-
terranean).  
322. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communications Nos. 79/2019, 109/2019, 
L.H. et al v. France, U.N. Doc CRC/C/85/D/79/2019–CRC/C/85/D/109/2019 (Nov. 












not to aid or assist activities undertaken by other States and non-State ac-
tors that violate the right to life.323  
 
Note how the Committee immediately follows its holding on extraterritori-
ality with its position on complicity. We can therefore reasonably assume 
that the Committee thought that State assistance to a third party that directly 
and reasonably foreseeably contributes to the third party’s violation of the 
right to life would be within the extraterritorial scope of the Covenant—in 
essence, that the assisting State also has power or control over the victim’s 
enjoyment of the right to life, a power that it can exercise by refraining from 
providing the assistance. There is, in short, very little daylight between this 
theory and the one I advocated above, that negative duties of restraint should 
apply without restriction. Some of the Committee’s prior case law seems to 
support that construction.324 
To conclude, the extraterritoriality jurisprudence of human rights bodies 
is constantly evolving, and is doing so in a more expansive direction. For 
example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recently ruled that 
persons affected by emissions of transboundary environmental harms would 
be within the jurisdiction of the State from which the emissions came.325 
This trend has met with pushback from some States, and the European 
Court remains an outlier with its more restrictive jurisprudence, especially in 
situations of international armed conflict.326 It seems reasonably clear that 
extraterritorial complicity scenarios would require at least some departure 
 
323. General Comment No. 36, supra note 275, ¶ 63. 
324. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1539/2006, Munaf v. 
Romania, ¶ 14.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/DR/1539/2006 (July 13, 2009) (A State party 
“may be responsible for extra-territorial violations of the Covenant, if it is a link in the causal 
chain that would make possible violations in another jurisdiction. Thus, the risk of an extra-
territorial violation must be a necessary and foreseeable consequence and must be judged 
on the knowledge the State party had at the time.”). See also Juan E. Méndez, Interim Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/70/303 (August 7, 2015) (“States’ negative obligations 
under the Convention [Against Torture] are not per se spatially limited or territorially de-
fined”).  
325. See The Environment and Human Rights (Articles 4(1) and 5(1) in Relation to 
Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-
23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser A) No. 23 (Nov. 17, 2017). 
326. See Georgia v. Russia No. 2, supra note 317. For more expansive approaches, see, e.g., 
General Comment No. 36, supra note 275; African Commission, General Comment No. 3, 











from the European Court’s current jurisprudence, but that is perfectly pos-
sible—and again, other human rights bodies have never embraced Stras-
bourg’s restrictiveness.327  
If, in short, a human rights body was faced with a scenario in which State 
A provided assistance to State or non-State actor B, knowing that this assis-
tance would facilitate serious human rights violations and this in fact hap-
pens, it seems to me substantially more likely than not that the extraterrito-
riality issue would be resolved in a more expansive direction—at least even-
tually.328 Imagine, for instance, a case in which it could be established that a 
State supplied hacking tools or other assistance to a non-State hacker group 
that then used these tools to launch a cyber attack against a hospital in an-
other country. Or, consider the currently pending inter-State case between 
the Netherlands and Ukraine against Russia before the European Court re-
garding the downing of the MH17 airliner over Ukraine; the Court may well 
choose to examine the case from the standpoint of Russia’s complicity in 
providing the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine with an antiaircraft missile sys-
tem.329 And even under its current restrictive approach, the Court has found 
the positive procedural obligation to investigate to be triggered extraterrito-
rially even if the underlying violation was not regarded as within the State’s 
jurisdiction, a position that the Court could easily adapt by analogy to an 
extraterritorial complicity scenario.330 
 
D. Risk, Mitigation, and Balancing  
 
The generally applicable complicity rule in Article 16 ASR and the IHL- and 
IHRL-specific complicity rules all raise two further important questions. 
 
327. See also JACKSON, supra note 279, at 822–28. 
328. But see Yael Ronen, International Human Rights Law and Extraterritorial Hostilities, in 
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329. Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, App. Nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 & 
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330. In other words, the Court could say that even if the ECHR did not apply to a 
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apply to the State’s duty to investigate whether it was so complicit. See Georgia v. Russia No. 
2, supra note 317, ¶¶ 331–32; Hanan v. Germany, App. No. 4871/16, ¶¶ 134–45 (2021) 
(ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-208279. See further Marko Milanovic, Extra-
territorial Investigations in Hanan v. Germany: Extraterritorial Assassinations in New Interstate Claim 













First, what precisely is the nature and role of the various measures of miti-
gation that an assisting State might take to reduce the risk that the assistance 
it provides to its partners, such as intelligence, would be misused to commit 
a wrongful act? Second, can the risk of harm caused by the assistance be 
balanced against the benefits of providing the assistance or against the harm 
potentially caused by interrupting it? 
Turning first to mitigation measures, it is important to note that these 
can take many different forms. The nature of these measures will depend 
greatly on whether the assistance is being provided in the context of an iso-
lated, “one-off” situation or is part of a more durable relationship of part-
nership and cooperation. Diplomatic assurances by the recipient,331 coupled 
with caveats and conditions from the sender of information, as well as con-
fidential bilateral communications to exert pressure and employ monitoring 
mechanisms, are standard practice.332 Also common, especially as part of 
continuing and wide-ranging cooperation arrangements, are capacity-build-
ing measures such as the provision of training by the assisting State, includ-
ing training for compliance with applicable international law.333 The U.S. and 
UK armed forces, for example, have provided such training to Saudi Arabia 
in order to promote its compliance with international humanitarian law dur-
ing the conflict in Yemen.334 But the indispensable first mitigation measure 
actually seems to be for the assisting State to adequately train its own officials 
 
331. See, e.g., Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8139/09, ¶ 189 
(2012) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-108629 (assurances must be specific 
rather than general and vague; must be given by a person vested with sufficient authority; 
must take into account the issuing State’s record of compliance; should be mechanisms of 
verification). 
332. See further NZOIGIS REPORT, supra note 303, ¶¶ 223–39; Howard, supra note 1, at 
46–47. 
333. See further CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶¶ 7.88–7.89; Moynihan, supra 
note 11, at 41–44; Finucane, supra note 204, at 425–30; Wiesener, supra note 211, at 49–50. 
334. See Saudi Arabia: Overseas Aid, Ministerial Answer to a Written Question in Par-
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(intelligence, military or civilian, at all levels) who are making relevant deci-
sions regarding the appreciation of both legal and factual risks.335 Note, how-
ever, that some forms of mitigation, such as the direct involvement in the 
partner’s targeting decisions for the ostensible purpose of reducing civilian 
casualties, may actually escalate into forms of assistance to the partner’s 
wrongful acts or even amount to the joint commission of such acts.336 
With all of these mitigation measures, which again are frequently em-
ployed, the key question will always be effectiveness—do they actually work 
in practice, in their specific contexts?337 This is a question of fact. There are 
many instances in which such measures appear to have been far from effec-
tive—none more so than continuing apparent violations of IHL by Saudi-
led coalition forces in Yemen,338 undoubtedly assisted as they are by various 
forms of aid by third States, including the United States and the United King-
dom, violations that the mitigation measures these States have implemented 
 
335. See NZOIGIS REPORT, supra note 303, ¶ 85 (“[I]t is necessary and appropriate for 
civilians to understand the military processes accompanying their work and its legal frame-
work, together with their responsibilities within it. Without this knowledge they are at a 
disadvantage in terms of understanding and evaluating the processes they were part of. It is 
difficult to question something that you do not adequately understand. The omission of 
adequate and consistent New Zealand LOAC [Law of Armed Conflict] training and/or legal 
briefings constituted a significant gap in the preparation of those deployed to Afghanistan, 
and those seconded to partner agencies in support of their military efforts in Afghanistan.”). 
See also id. ¶¶ 110, 333. 
336. See Finucane, supra note 204, at 430; Wiesener, supra note 211, at 50. See also LA-
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Saudi Arabia Dedicated to Yemen Planning, REUTERS, Aug. 19, 2016, https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-saudiarabia-idUSKCN10U1TL (“At no point did 
U.S. military personnel provide direct or implicit approval of target selection or prosecu-
tion”); Answer to a Question in Parliament by The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence 
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2019-
03-07/229818 (“The RAF [Royal Air Force] personnel in the Saudi Air Operations Centre 
are liaison officers, not ‘targeteers.’ They play no part in the targeting processes of the Saudi 
Arabian Armed Forces.”). See also Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 10. 
337. For an extensive discussion of several case studies in that regard, see Erica L. 
Gaston, Regulating Irregular Actors: Can Due Diligence Checks Mitigate the Risks of Working with 
Non-State and Substate Forces? (Working Paper 608, 2021), https://cdn.odi.org/media/docu-
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338. See, e.g., Report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on 
Yemen, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014, 











have not stopped.339 But more important than the factual question of effec-
tiveness for my analysis here is the legal question of how such measures 
should be conceptualized. 
The answer to that question is reasonably clear. Mitigation measures are 
relevant for the application of the fault and contribution elements of a com-
plicity rule. As for the latter, the effect of mitigation measures could be such 
that the assistance provided does not, in fact, substantially or materially con-
tribute to the commission of the wrongful act. If mitigation is effective in 
this sense, the wrongful act may still happen, but it will not be facilitated by 
the aid provided, and the assisting State will therefore avoid responsibility. 
But such cases will probably be rare, and the analysis will be fact-dependent. 
It is primarily with regard to culpability that mitigation measures play a cen-
tral role; this role will depend on how, precisely, the fault element is defined. 
First, if the fault element is one of purpose/direct intent to facilitate, 
mitigation measures undertaken by an assisting State may provide evidence 
to some kind of external ex post facto reviewer, such as a court,340 that the 
assisting State did not purposely facilitate the wrong. This determination will 
necessarily require an examination of whether the mitigation measures were 
simply a sham that the assisting State engaged in to disguise its ulterior pur-
pose. The eventual ineffectiveness of these measures does not, however, ipso 
facto prove that they were such. 
Second, if the culpability element is one of oblique/indirect intent, which 
requires practical certainty that the assisted party will commit a wrongful act 
and will use the assistance provided to do so, mitigation measures can lower 
the probabilistic assessment of the future conduct of the assisted party below 
 
339. For an extensive discussion, see Hursh, supra note 211; ÉRIC DAVID ET AL., OPIN-
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mens-deadly-war; Lewis, supra note 334, at 13–14 (Saudi coalition’s risk of civilian casualties 
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bling Message on Arms Sales, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.justsecu-
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a practical certainty threshold. Internally, from the perspective of the rele-
vant decision makers within the assisting State, they could assess that with 
adequate mitigation, there would no longer be practical certainty that the 
assisted State or non-State actor would engage in the wrongful conduct and 
misuse the aid provided.341 Similarly, from the external perspective of re-
viewing how the assisting State made its decisions, the reviewing person or 
body can determine that the mitigation measures sufficiently lowered the 
probability of the wrongful conduct occurring and its facilitation by the aid 
provided, such that the assisting State did not subjectively act with practical 
certainty. This determination will require an assessment of how effective the 
mitigation measures were in practice, especially in the context of a continuing 
relationship. However, the mere implementation of mitigation measures is 
in itself sufficient evidence that the State actually did subjectively appreciate 
a risk of violations by its partner to some degree of possibility.342  
Third, if the culpability element is one of willful blindness but for which 
oblique intent would have existed, the question to be decided would be 
whether the assisting State acted with the purpose of avoiding relevant in-
formation. Genuine mitigation measures could then be evidence that it did 
not act with such purpose.  
Fourth, if the fault element is one of appreciation of risk below the level 
of practical certainty, however precisely defined, then (as with indirect intent 
above) mitigation measures could lower the subjective probabilistic assess-
ment of the future conduct of the assisted party below the prescribed thresh-
old of risk.343 In other words, if the threshold was one of likelihood, mitiga-
tion might mean that the wrong was perceived by the assisting State as no 
longer likely; if it was one of a real or substantial risk, mitigation might mean 
that the risk of the wrong occurring was no longer real or substantial. Again, 
the key question would be one of the effectiveness of the measures imple-
mented in reducing the risk, as subjectively perceived by the officials of the 
assisting State. If, because of mitigation, the risk (at the level prescribed) is 
no longer there, the State can continue providing its assistance. If, however, 
 
341. See also Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 19. 
342. See Hursh, supra note 211, at 144–45. 
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mitigation measures are unable to lower the appreciated risk below the pro-
scribed threshold, the State must discontinue the assistance, such as the pro-
vision of intelligence.344 
In sum, mitigation is tied inextricably with the fault element of the com-
plicity rule, and its exact effects will also depend on whether the potential 
fault of the assisting State is being assessed ex ante, before it provides its 
assistance, or ex post, after it has already provided the assistance that did, in 
fact, facilitate the wrongful act of its partner. 345 In the context of a continuing 
relationship both kinds of assessments will be made repeatedly, for each new 
instance of facilitation.  
A different question, however, is whether the practical certainty or a risk 
below certainty that the aid will facilitate a wrongful act can, once established, 
be balanced against other considerations—that is, against the possible harms 
that could arise from the suspension of assistance or the possible benefits 
that the State could obtain from continuing the assistance. Put differently, 
the question would be whether continuing with the assistance despite the 
certainty or risk of harm that mitigation measures are unable to adequately 
lower could ever be justified, for example, on the basis that the assisting State 
would earn money from arms sales or would enhance the overall security 
and welfare of its people by assisting its partner.  
This type of justifiability problem is frequent, explicitly or implicitly, in 
comparative practice when dealing with such modes of culpability as reck-
lessness or dolus eventualis. The Model Penal Code, for example, defines reck-
lessness as the conscious disregard of “a substantial and unjustifiable risk . . 
. that involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”346 This clearly calls 
for some kind of value judgment as to whether the risk taking was objectively 
justifiable or reasonable347 (a task that in common law systems will generally 
be performed by lay juries) and, in turn, leads to all sorts of fundamental 
moral problems. Consider, for example, the actions of a surgeon who is per-
forming an operation to separate a pair of conjoined twins. If the operation 
is not performed, both twins will certainly die. If it is performed, only one 
 
344. See also de Wet, supra note 21, at 311–12. 
345. See further infra Part IV. 
346. MPC, supra note 69, § 2.02(2)(c). 
347. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 148 (“[In the recklessness context the] ques-
tion of what is reasonable is an objective question, and it is not an issue of whether the 
defendant thought the risk was reasonable[;] . . . defendants cannot be permitted to judge 











has a chance of survival; the other will certainly die. Is the surgeon intending 
(in a legal sense) to kill the latter sibling by performing the operation because 
she is practically certain that this twin will die and reconciles herself to this 
inevitability in order to save the other? Is her action intentional but nonethe-
less justified by circumstances of necessity?—and so forth. 348 Or, in a differ-
ent scenario in which the surgeon is operating with the knowledge that there 
is a very high risk that the person would die during surgery because of bleed-
ing, but also that there is no other way of saving their life beyond the short 
term, is the surgeon consciously disregarding a substantial risk that the pa-
tient would die—that is, is she acting recklessly in potentially depriving the 
patient of the remaining days, weeks, or months of life?349 The same scenar-
ios could also be postulated from a complicity perspective—for example, 
that of a nurse assisting the surgeon. 
In the philosophical literature, such hard cases expose the fault lines be-
tween different approaches to ethics. A consequentialist approach (e.g., util-
itarianism) will look at the morality of the action on the basis of the conse-
quences it produces—for example, whether more lives will be saved in the 
process, or suffering minimized. A deontological approach will look at 
whether harms are intended either as ends in themselves or as means to an 
end or are mere side effects and may employ such notions as the doctrine of 
double effect.350 The moral intuitions of ordinary people will be all over the 
place with regard to the different permutations of the hard cases, which the 
philosophical literature continues to examine to this day. 
In the criminal law context, such cases are normally dealt with either by 
objective assessments of whether risk taking was unreasonable (i.e., during 
the assessment of the existence of the elements of the offense) or through 
 
348. See, e.g., A (Children) [2000] EWCA (Civ) 254. For a short account of the case, in 
which two of the appellate judges relied on necessity and one judge on arguments about 
intention in authorizing the procedure, see Catherine Baksi, Landmarks in Law: The Moral 
Dilemma of Separating Conjoined Twins, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/law/2021/feb/01/landmarks-in-law-the-moral-dilemma-of-separating-conjoined 
-twins. The judge presiding over the case said that it was the “most difficult decision I had 
to make in my 24 years on the bench.” Id. See further Henry Brooke, Address at the Seventh 
Worldwide Judiciary Conference, Washington, D.C.: A Life and Death Issue in English Law 
(Oct. 12, 2015), https://sirhenrybrooke.me/2015/10/12/my-talk-about-the-conjoined-
twins-case/ (written by one of the other judges in the Court of Appeal). 
349. See DUBBER, supra note 67, at 60. See also SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 144, 
149. 
350. See further Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/ar-











the prism of justifications and excuses.351 To take a good example that has 
not aged terribly well: 
 
Weigend raises the question whether a person, who has a cold, repeatedly 
sneezes in a bus, being aware there may be a 95% chance of infecting an-
other passenger with the flu virus, is reckless as to the bodily injury. As 
Spencer pointed out, “it is not reckless for a person who is suffering from 
an illness that is curable and minor, like a cold, or ordinary flu, or even 
mumps or measles, to run the risk of transmitting it to others if it would 
seriously disrupt the affairs of himself or other people to avoid it.”352 
  
What a difference a pandemic makes! In a new social context, with a 
more serious and disruptive disease, what objectively looked like trivial harms 
to others balanced out by substantial disruption to the infected individual 
could today very well be regarded as reckless behavior. But the point I hope 
is clear—some forms of risk taking will be regarded as reasonable and justi-
fiable, depending on a normative assessment balancing competing harms 
and interests. A surgeon attempting to save somebody’s life despite a risk of 
bleeding would not generally be regarded as reckless. A driver on the high-
way exceeding the speed limit in order to rush a person in distress to the 
hospital might also not be regarded as acting recklessly, and so on.353 Even 
in conditions of normalcy, people are not considered to be acting recklessly 
when they drive their car, even though we all appreciate that there is always 
a measure of risk in driving a car; the social utility of car-driving is regarded 
as justifying the risk.354 
In international law, we may also address such cases either through ex-
plicit or implicit balancing rules within particular sub-regimes or through the 
generally applicable circumstances precluding wrongfulness in the law of 
State responsibility. Thus, for example, in IHL we accept that civilians may 
be justifiably killed if the principles of distinction, precautions, and propor-
tionality are complied with.355 In IHRL, we may also permit certain deaths 
of innocents as unwanted side effects in operations to save many more lives, 
 
351. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 683–93; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 49. 
352. BLOMSMA, supra note 95, at 138 (citing Weigend and Spencer).  
353. See id. at 138–39. 
354. This assessment is contingent—the societal assessment of the utility of the practice 
may well evolve. If, for example, computer-driven cars in time become demonstrably safer 
than human-driven ones, a driver taking control over the vehicle may eventually be regarded 
as reckless. 











for instance, those of hostages held by terrorists, but again only if all feasible 
measures are taken to minimize the loss of human life (including among the 
terrorists). 356 Even in the context of absolute rules, such as the prohibition 
of torture, implicit balancing may be at play at the stage of defining the cat-
egorically prohibited conduct—we would therefore say that a police officer 
shooting a detainee in the leg during an interrogation would be committing 
torture, but would not think the same if the officer shot the detainee to pre-
vent him from escaping arrest. 
For our purposes, the question is whether some form of balancing is 
admissible if a State provides assistance to its partner while appreciating cer-
tainty or some level of probability that the assistance will be used to commit 
a wrong but is acting in order to prevent some other harm from materializ-
ing. Think, for example, of U.S. and UK authorities sharing intelligence with 
militias in Iraq and Syria engaged in combat against the Islamic State while 
being either practically certain or appreciating a substantial risk that this in-
telligence would be used to capture and torture detained ISIS fighters.357 The 
United States and the United Kingdom are acting not with the purpose of 
facilitating the torture but of defeating ISIS and thus protecting the lives of 
their soldiers and their allies, their own peoples, and the peoples of Iraq and 
Syria. If the United States and the United Kingdom continue sharing the 
intelligence, it is possible, likely, or inevitable that some captives will be tor-
tured and that the intelligence will facilitate the torture. If they stop sharing 
the intelligence, it is possible or likely that the war effort against ISIS will be 
less effective and that more innocents may die as a result. Or, to go back to 
the Saudi intervention in Yemen, the United States and the United Kingdom 
could argue that their provision of weapons and intelligence to the Saudis 
reduced the number of violations that would have happened in any event, 
 
356. Cf. Finogenov and others v. Russia, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 365 (Dealing with the 
siege of a Moscow theater in which hundreds were taken hostage by terrorists. The Euro-
pean Court ruling that there was no violation of the right to life on account of Russian 
security forces pumping the theater with an anesthetic gas, resulting in the deaths of many 
hostages, but that there was a violation due to inadequate medical relief efforts.); Tagayeva 
& Others v. Russia, App. No. 26562/0 (2017) (EctHR), http://hudoc.echr.coeint/ 
eng?i=001-172660 (Russia responsible for poorly planned rescue operation during the 
Beslan school siege, which, for example, included the use of flamethrowers by the security 
forces, resulting in the deaths of hostages).  
357. See, e.g., Margaret Coker, U.S. Takes a Risk: Old Iraqi Enemies Are Now Allies, NEW 
YORK TIMES (May 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/mid-
dleeast/iraq-iran-election-enemies.html (reporting on U.S. sharing of intelligence with Iraqi 











and that the suspension of assistance could lead to more and not less harm 
to the Yemeni civilian population.  
When confronting such a scenario, the one thing we can confidently say 
is that neither IHL nor IHRL allow for purely utilitarian balancing across the 
board, even if they allow for balancing within the confines of specific rules. 
Allowing States to rely on some kind of “lesser evil” reasoning in all contexts 
would be a recipe for chaos, legal and moral. For example, even if we ac-
cepted the premise that in a given conflict respecting the targeting rules of 
IHL would prolong a war and cost more lives in the long run, we would still 
insist that the rules of IHL be respected. That said, there is very little existing 
authority on whether the various complicity rules of international law, gen-
eral or specific, should internalize some method of balancing.  
The European Court confronted this question in the somewhat analo-
gous non-refoulement context, and its answer was negative—once a real risk 
of torture or other ill-treatment of a transferee to some other State is estab-
lished, the transfer is categorically prohibited. Countervailing considerations, 
such as that the transferee might be a dangerous terrorist and that by not 
proceeding with the transfer the State increases the risk of harm to its own 
population, have been disregarded as legally (and morally) irrelevant.358 In 
short, when faced with the risk of serious harm to the life or bodily integrity 
of a person, the Court adopted a categorical, deontologically grounded pro-
hibition against the exposure to such risk. By contrast, when faced with that 
same basic issue, the Supreme Court of Canada, expressly using the language 
of balancing, held that under Canadian constitutional law the State could 
deport an individual despite a serious risk of torture, but only in (undefined) 
exceptional circumstances, bearing in mind that the prohibition of deporta-
tion was only virtually categoric.359 Indeed, in refugee law, where the non-
refoulement principle was first developed, the duty not to deport to harm is 
expressly qualified.360  
 
358. See Chahal v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, ¶¶ 79–81 (1996) (ECtHR), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58004; Saadi v. Italy, 2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007, ¶¶ 
137–41. See further Daniel Moeckli, Saadi v. Italy: The Rules of the Game Have Not Changed, 8 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 534 (2008).  
359. See Suresh v. Canada, 2002 SCC 1, ¶¶ 77–78. The Court so ruled despite conclud-
ing that international law would not permit deportation in such circumstances. Id. ¶¶ 71–75. 
360. See Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, providing that the benefit of non-
refoulement may not “be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for re-












Another useful example is Article 7 ATT, whose use of the notion of an 
“overriding risk” of harm arguably implies balancing.361 The meaning of that 
provision appears to be that a State can proceed with an arms transfer if, 
after an incommensurable calculus of some kind, the State finds that the 
possible positive consequences for peace and security outweigh the possible 
negative ones. Yet, although the choice of the term “overriding risk” was 
deliberate, some States have interpreted it as not implying balancing at all but 
solely as a synonym for a criterion of non-negligible possibilities, such as 
substantial risk.362 Note, however, that even if the balancing conception of 
Article 7 is regarded as correct, the inchoate wrong at issue is the authoriza-
tion of the arms transfer as such. In our complicity scenarios by contrast, 
responsibility arises only if the aid provided actually contributed to a serious 
violation of IHL or IHRL that was in fact committed. That is, the harmful 
consequences of the aid materialized and are serious.  
The balancing question is not obvious. Here we might again resort to a 
sliding-scale type of rule, depending on both the nature of the fault element 
and the importance of the interests at stake. If the fault element is one of 
purpose and a State is found to have acted with the purpose of facilitating 
the violation of any rule of international law, it would go against the very 
logic of a rule-based order to allow for some kind of balancing in complicity 
if such balancing is irrelevant for the actual commission of the wrong.363  
If, however, the assisting State’s fault is indirect intent (including situa-
tions of willful blindness) or based on a subjective or objective appreciation 
of risk, the balancing problem is more complicated. Conceivably, for exam-
ple, a State could be practically certain that the assistance it provided would 
assist the partner in a violation of the human right to privacy of specific 
individuals yet provide the assistance for the purpose of protecting the lives 
of others. The diversity of possible interests affected is such that it would, in 
my view, be difficult to accommodate any balancing within complicity rules 
as such. Rather, the assisting State could potentially rely on a form of justifi-
cation internal to a specific regime, such as IHL or IHRL, with regard, for 
example, to necessary and proportionate interferences with privacy. Or, the 
 
victed by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the com-
munity of that country.” Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(2), July 28, 
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. 
361. See CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶¶ 7.17, 7.20, 7.90–95. 
362. Id. ¶¶ 7.92–94. See also David et al., supra note 339, at 89–90 (using an exclusively 
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State could invoke a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, such as dis-
tress364 or necessity365 under general international law, subject to the very 
strict conditions of these rules,366 and subject to the State’s potential liability 
for violating some other applicable duty, such as a positive obligation of pre-
vention. 
If we are dealing with purely risk-based forms of fault, the assisting State 
can find itself in the position of gambling on which of two equally unappe-
tizing outcomes will occur. Its assistance may or may not facilitate the 
wrongful act, and its suspension of assistance may or may not lead to other 
bad consequences down the line. As argued above, in my view, a risk-based 
form of fault is most appropriate for serious violations of IHL and IHRL.367 
The moral gravity of these violations is such that either a balancing argument 
should be categorically impermissible, as in the IHRL non-refoulement con-
text, or the burden of making such an argument should be exceptionally 
high. Exposing the population of some other country to the risk of war 
crimes certainly cannot be justified simply because the assisting State wanted 
to make money by selling weapons.368 The more difficult example would, of 
 
364. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 24 (only way of saving life of persons in the care of 
the State, admissible only if the wrongful act does not create a comparable or greater peril).  
365. See id. art. 25 (safeguarding an essential interest of the State invoking necessity 
from a grave and imminent peril, without harming other such interests, inadmissible for 
rules that already incorporate necessity criteria of their own, as with military necessity in 
IHL). See id. art. 25 cmt. ¶ 20.  
366. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 274–324. Note that Article 25(2)(a) ASR 
does not permit resort to necessity when such reliance is implicitly or explicitly excluded by 
the international obligation in question, as is the case with many rules of IHL. Similarly, 
Article 26 ASR does not allow for the invocation of circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
regarding breaches of jus cogens. The International Law Commission reiterated this position 
in its 2019 Draft Conclusions on peremptory norms (jus cogens), which it adopted on first 
reading. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Seventy-first Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/74/10, at 145, conclusion 18 (2019). See further Helmut Aust, Legal Consequences 
of Serious Breaches of Peremptory Norms in the Law of State Responsibility: Observations in the Light of 
the Recent Work of the International Law Commission, in PEREMPTORY NORMS OF GENERAL IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (JUS COGENS) 227 (Dire Tladi ed., 2021). This however does not solve 
the balancing problem for our purposes even for complicity in serious violations of IHL 
and IHRL. That the prohibition of some conduct, such as torture, is jus cogens, does not 
necessarily entail that the prohibition on State complicity in that conduct, however defined 
and under whatever general or special rule, is also jus cogens—it may but need not be.  
367. See supra Sections III.B.5, III.C.3. 
368. Cf. Council Common Position (EC) No. 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008, 












course, be the one in which the assisting State is providing its assistance, such 
as intelligence, with the aim of saving the lives of others.369  
To conclude, while assisting States may find themselves choosing be-
tween “lesser evils” in their relationships with their partners, including with 
regard to the provision of intelligence, it is difficult to accommodate such 
concerns by introducing a balancing element directly into complicity rules. 
(To be clear, this discussion assumes that the assisting State has taken what-
ever mitigation measures were at its disposal, but that these measures are 
assessed as ineffective so that the fault element of the complicity rule cannot 
be negated on the basis of lowered probability—the issue is rather whether 
the State can balance the irreducible real risk of harm that it appreciates from 
continuing the assistance against the harm it appreciates from stopping the 
assistance.) The potential for States to rely on a balancing exception abu-
sively would entirely swallow up the rule. Such considerations may, however, 
be exceptionally accommodated by the justificatory logic of regime-specific 
rules or by generally accepted circumstances precluding wrongfulness.370 
Even if a balancing argument regarding assistance to serious violations of 
IHL and IHRL were not categorically inadmissible, the space for making 
 
may also take into account the effect of proposed [arms] exports on their economic, social, 
commercial and industrial interests, these factors shall not affect the application of the above 
criteria [regarding a clear risk of serious violations of IHL and IHRL].”). 
369. Cf. Elgizouli v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 10 
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imminent crime.” See also id. ¶ 233 (per Lord Hodge):  
 
It is not difficult to envisage circumstances in which the Secretary of State might want to 
provide intelligence to the government of another country to avert serious loss of life in a 
planned terrorist attack and that intelligence might expose a person in the custody of the 
foreign state to criminal charges which may carry the death penalty. The United Kingdom’s 
international obligation to protect the right to life under article 2 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, which section 1 of the 1998 Act introduced into our domestic laws, 
would, it appears to me, require the Secretary of State to balance the necessity of providing 
information to save lives against the possibility of facilitating the imposition of the death 
penalty on that person. 
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such an argument would appear to be small. In particular, the assisting State 
could never offset a causally proximate risk of the assistance facilitating a 
serious violation of IHL or IHRL by invoking a causally distant and inher-
ently more speculative assessment that maintaining cooperation would save 
more lives in the long run. Nor could balancing ever be acceptable if the 
assisting State did not first employ all feasible mitigation measures that could 





The generally applicable complicity rule in Article 16 ASR has by now 
achieved acceptance from States, despite its lack of determinacy. I have ar-
gued here that debates about its fault element have too often been stuck in 
a false dilemma of intent versus knowledge. I have also argued that culpabil-
ity in complicity should better be thought of as a set of different options 
than as a singular requirement. First, an assisting State would be sufficiently 
culpable if it acted with the purpose/direct intent of facilitating the wrongful 
act of another State despite any deficits in knowledge—that is, even if it 
thought that the wrongful act was unlikely to be committed or that its aid 
would not be used to commit it. Second, an assisting State would be suffi-
ciently culpable if it acted with oblique/indirect intent—that is, if it was prac-
tically certain that the assisted State would commit the wrongful act and 
would use the aid provided to do so and chose to provide the assistance 
nonetheless. Third, an assisting State would also be culpable if it acted with 
willful blindness, with the purpose of avoiding acquiring information but for 
which it would have been acting with oblique intent.  
This tripartite fault element is workable, normatively coherent, and does 
not pose a risk of excessively inhibiting potentially beneficial inter-State co-
operation. The culpability element of Article 16 ASR also provides a norma-
tive baseline for other, primary rules prohibiting complicity, which would be 
specific and tailored to sub-regimes of international law, such as IHL and 
IHRL, the two regimes most relevant to issues of intelligence sharing in mul-
tinational military operations. In principle, the culpability elements of other 
complicity rules that protect particularly compelling interests can only be 
identical to or lower, but not higher, than that of Article 16. 
The constituent elements of regime-specific complicity rules will always 
depend on the architecture of State obligations within that regime, in partic-











existence of negative duties that impose inchoate liability for exposing third 
parties to the risk of harm or of wide-ranging positive duties of prevention 
will lessen the need for regime-specific complicity rules or for their variation 
from Article 16 ASR. For example, in the Bosnian Genocide case the ICJ simply 
imported the requirements of Article 16 into the Genocide Convention–spe-
cific complicity rule. It had little need to do otherwise since it interpreted the 
positive duty to prevent genocide in an exceptionally broad way and found 
Serbia liable for failing to comply with that duty.  
But even in such regimes, as in human rights law, regime-specific com-
plicity rules can be useful. First, they can be helpful for the purposes of fair 
labeling and the assigning of blameworthiness—a State that was complicit in 
genocide is more culpable than one that has merely failed to prevent it, a 
distinction that may also have consequences for the scope of its responsibil-
ity, as to, for example, reparations.371 This is evident, for example, from the 
European Court’s “acquiescence or connivance” cases, especially those on 
extraordinary rendition.372 Second, unlike the generally applicable rule in Ar-
ticle 16, regime-specific rules can cover State assistance to non-State actors, 
such as armed groups or corporations. Third, regime-specific complicity 
rules can have a wider scope of application than even regime-specific posi-
tive obligations. For example, the negative duty to refrain from assisting vi-
olations of IHRL is more likely than the positive duty of prevention to be 
regarded as applying extraterritorially.373 Fourth, negative obligations of re-
straint under regime-specific complicity rules may be less contested than 
more onerous positive duties with regard to the conduct of third parties; this 
is the case with IHL, where States are much more likely to accept the prop-
osition that they are restrained from assisting other actors from committing 
serious violations of IHL than that they are bound to prevent such actors 
from committing such violations regardless of their own involvement.374 
Finally, special complicity rules can use broader, risk-based forms of cul-
pability when very important interests are affected, in particular regarding 
 
371. Thus, for example, in Bosnian Genocide the Court held that its own finding that 
Serbia violated the positive duty to prevent genocide constituted sufficient satisfaction for 
Bosnia and that no further reparation was due. That certainly would not have been the case 
had the Court found Serbia to have been complicit in the Srebrenica genocide. See further 
Milanovic, State Responsibility for Genocide, supra note 172. 
372. See supra Section III.C.2. 
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the basic protections due to the human person. In cases of assistance to se-
rious violations of IHL and IHRL, it is appropriate to resort to modes of 
liability akin to dolus eventualis or recklessness, where a State is aware of a risk 
that the assisted party would commit such violations that the assistance 
would facilitate but consciously disregards the risk and chooses to provide 
the assistance nonetheless. The risk threshold could be calibrated differ-
ently—for example, one of likelihood, or a substantial risk, or a real risk—
depending on the context and the interests at stake. In the human rights 
context in particular, it is perfectly possible for different human rights bodies 
to come up with different risk thresholds. But the precise formulation of the 
risk threshold is, I would submit, less important in practice than is the ac-
ceptance of the general idea. Responsibility grounded in conscious risk tak-
ing, pursuant, say, to a culpability standard such as recklessness, is so com-
monplace in municipal legal systems in both civil and criminal contexts that 
it is difficult to see what a principled objection to it for complicity in serious 
violations of IHL and IHRL would normatively be. States already accept a 
cognate of such responsibility in the ATT context, for example. To reiterate, 
the assisting State is responsible in this risk-taking scenario only if the risk 
actually materializes—that is, the assisted party actually commits the wrong-
ful act and uses the aid provided to do so. 
It would be more problematic, however, to base a State’s responsibility 
for complicity in its negligence in acquiring or analyzing relevant information—
that is, in some kind of “should have known,” constructive knowledge stand-
ard. Such a standard could, in principle, apply not just to constructive 
knowledge to the level of practical certainty—the State could have had actual 
knowledge but did not because it failed to make the necessary inquiries. It 
could apply to some level of risk—the State did not know but should have 
known that there was a likelihood/a substantial risk/a real risk of the harm-
ful result occurring; that is, the risk was not foreseen but was foreseeable. As 
explained above, the problem with this approach is that it assumes a duty of 
diligence in acquiring and processing information. Such a duty simply cannot 
apply across the board to all possible violations of international law, although 
it may be appropriate in specific settings.375 Even there, however, it may be 
more appropriate for positive duties of prevention than for negative rules on 
complicity, because the latter connote a higher degree of blameworthiness. 
For example, in the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ absolved Serbia of respon-
sibility for the Srebrenica genocide on the basis that it was not conclusively 
 











established that Serbian authorities “supplied aid to the perpetrators of the 
genocide in full awareness that the aid supplied would be used to commit 
genocide.”376 By contrast, it found Serbia responsible for failing to comply 
with the positive obligation to prevent genocide, which arose once Serbia 
“was aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger that 
acts of genocide would be committed,”377 the ICJ employing both a risk-
based form of culpability and a constructive knowledge standard as to that 
risk. On the facts, however, the Court found that Serbia did subjectively 
know about the serious risk. It did not rely on the constructive knowledge 
prong of the test—that is, Serbia’s possible negligence in appreciating the 
existence of a serious risk.378 Even so, a more relaxed constructive 
knowledge standard may be appropriate precisely because a State that has 
failed to prevent genocide is to be regarded as less blameworthy than a State 
actively complicit in it.379 
Both IHL and IHRL can comfortably be interpreted as containing re-
gime-specific complicity rules, with risk-based forms of fault for complicity 
in serious violations. Thus, for example, Serbia may not have been complicit 
in genocide by providing assistance (including money, weapons, and intelli-
gence) to the Bosnian Serbs, but it was complicit in serious violations of IHL 
and IHRL (and not just in Srebrenica) because it was fully aware of the pat-
tern of previous violations and thus of the serious risk (or even certainty) 
that the Bosnian Serbs would use the aid provided to commit such violations 
and nonetheless chose to continue providing it. In short, by contributing to 
these violations while consciously disregarding the risk, Serbia failed to com-
ply with its duty to respect and ensure respect for IHL and its duty to respect 
IHRL—the greater strictness of the culpability element of the complicity rule 
in the Genocide Convention could arguably be justified by fair-labelling con-
cerns, due to the greater comparative gravity of the underlying violation and 
its criminal character. Also, while the extraterritoriality problem specific to 
 
376. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 7, ¶ 423. This was at least partly due to the fact that the 
decision to carry out the genocide was made shortly before it was actually implemented.  
377. Id. ¶ 432. The Court speaks of the “serious risk” that genocide will be committed. 
Id. ¶ 431. 
378. Id. ¶¶ 436–38. 
379. Cf. LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 233–34 (arguing that this position is paradoxical 
because it entails that the duty not to be complicit in genocide is less important than the 
duty to prevent it). But this is not the case. It is because the complicit State will be regarded 
as more blameworthy and the reputational and legal consequences of its responsibility will 











IHRL380 somewhat decreases the practical import of complicity under IHRL 
for assisting States,381 the long-term trend is towards a broad approach to 
extraterritoriality. States will find themselves increasingly exposed to legal 
risk and litigation before domestic and international courts on this basis. 382 
That said, due to the strictness of Article 16 ASR there is a real risk of an 
accountability gap if the IHRL-specific complicity rule or rules do not ulti-
mately consolidate in the manner which I have suggested. One remedy for 
that gap would be to lower the fault requirements of Article 16 itself, but, as 
I have argued, the normatively more desirable position is to utilize regime-
specific rules with risk-based forms of fault. 
As explained above, responsibility for complicity will be excluded if, 
through effective mitigation measures, the assisting State reduces below the 
prescribed risk threshold the possibility of its assistance facilitating the vio-
lation.383 But the fault of the assisting State remains a subjective one. That 
mitigation measures ultimately did not prove to be effective does not ipso 
facto mean that the assisting State did not honestly think that they would be. 
However, the objective unreasonableness of any such belief in light of the 
prevailing facts may enable the inference that the belief was not in fact held 
honestly, or put differently, that the mitigation measures were a sham. 
Finally, it remains unclear whether, the prescribed risk threshold having 
been crossed and remaining unaffected by any mitigation measures, the state 
can ever be justified in taking that risk of rendering assistance in order to 
prevent some other risk of harm from materializing. Can, in other words, 
the assisting State ever be absolved from disregarding a risk (even a certainty) 
of harm and contributing to a violation of IHL and IHRL because it assessed 
that discontinuing the assistance would create a risk of harm to its own pop-
ulation or some other comparable interest? As explained, such balancing 
would likely either be categorically excluded or exceptionally difficult to 
make out when risks of serious violations of IHL or IHRL are at play.384  
 
380. See supra Section III.C.4. 
381. See, e.g., Elgizouli v. Home Secretary, supra note 369 (various opinions noting that, as 
Strasbourg jurisprudence currently stands, the ECHR does not cover the extraterritorial fa-
cilitation of the death penalty through the sharing of information). 
382. For an instructive analysis on this point with regard to domestic litigation on Ger-
many’s possible complicity in allegedly unlawful U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, see Leander 
Beinlich, Drones, Discretion, and the Duty to Protect the Right to Life: Germany and Its Role in the 
United States’ Drone Programme before the Higher Administrative Court of Münster, 62 GERMAN 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 557 (2021). 












IV. A QUESTION OF PERSPECTIVE 
  
A. Ex Ante and Ex Post, Internal and External 
 
Before looking more closely at various scenarios of intelligence sharing in 
multinational military operations, it is important to discuss the question of 
perspective in making assessments about an assisting State’s culpability. As 
we have seen, State responsibility will largely depend on how the fault ele-
ment of general or specific complicity rules is construed and applied. How-
ever, the assessment of what the assisting State knew or intended can happen 
at different points in time, for different purposes, and by different actors—
and this matters greatly. 
First, it is the assisting State itself that must assess what it exactly 
“knows” at the time it is deciding to provide or continue providing assis-
tance, such as the sharing of intelligence. The abstraction of the State cannot, 
of course, know anything; rather, the assisting State’s relevant organs and 
agents, those individuals who are, in fact, tasked with making this decision, 
need to make an assessment of the information at their disposal.385 The pre-
cise circle of individuals making such a decision and the process whereby 
they do so will vary from State to State.386 That circle may be wide and the 
process formalized and bureaucratic, with input from legal advisers at vari-
 
385. See supra Section II.B. 











ous points, or the decision making may be opaque, not rule-bound, and con-
centrated in only a few people.387 For example, U.S. and Russian govern-
ments and intelligence agencies will not make their decisions in remotely the 
same ways.388  
That said, it is these individuals who first need to assess, from an ex ante 
perspective, whether it is practically certain that their partner would commit 
a wrongful act and would use the aid provided to do so or whether there is 
simply some level of risk of this occurring. Such judgments will benefit from 
direct access to all the information the assisting State has at its disposal, in-
cluding its confidential intelligence. They will also include assessments about 
 
387. Perhaps the best-known process formalized by statute for vetting foreign security 
partners for risk of serious human rights violations is the one set by the “Leahy law” in the 
United States. See, e.g., Gaston, supra note 337, at 7–9. For an example of a State policy 
document, grounded in legal obligations, dealing specifically with the sharing and receipt of 
intelligence with partners in situations of risk of serious harm to detained individuals and 
setting out various procedural and substantive requirements in that regard, e.g., by requiring 
escalation of decisions to ministerial level when a serious risk emerges, see HM Govern-
ment, The Principles Relating to the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas and the Passing 
and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees (July 2019), https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/publications/uk-involvement-with-detainees-in-overseas-counter-terrorism-opera-
tions [hereinafter UK Principles]. A previous iteration of that document, the Consolidated 
Guidance, similarly applied to intelligence and military officers engaging in relevant activity. 
The UK Investigatory Powers Commissioner (a former judge) concluded in his 2019 review 
that the UK services generally acted in compliance with the Consolidated Guidance. See 
Annual Report of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner 2019, ¶¶ 8.59–62; 9.42–53; 
10.54–55 (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.ipco.org.uk/publications/annual-reports/. For a 
critical overview of the complicity of UK agencies in torture and other forms of ill-treatment 
in the “war on terror,” including an assessment of their practice in applying the Consolidated 
Guidance, see Ruth Blakeley & Sam Raphael, Accountability, Denial and the Future-Proofing of 
British Torture, 96 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 691 (2020). For an authoritative (but incom-
plete) account of British complicity, see INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, DE-
TAINEE MISTREATMENT AND RENDITION: 2001–2010, 2018, HC 1113 (UK). For another 
example, see Canada’s Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act S.C. 
2019, c. 13, s. 49.1. The ministerial directions issued thereunder are focused on processes to 
be followed in situations in which the sharing or receipt of intelligence would result in a 
substantial risk of the mistreatment of an individual. See further National Security and Intel-
ligence Review Agency, NSIRA Review 2020-03, Review of Departmental Implementation 
of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2019 (Dec. 16, 
2020), https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/NSIRA_Review_2020-03. 
pdf. 
388. For an overview of U.S. processes regarding decisions to share intelligence in sup-











the legal risk the assisting State would be exposed to if it provided the assis-
tance.  
In this ex ante perspective, purpose-based forms of culpability, including 
willful blindness, are essentially irrelevant. No sane State official will openly 
admit to acting with an improper purpose, certainly not while a decision is 
being made.389 Conceivably a legal adviser or some kind of independent 
commissioner might conclude that a minister or a lower-ranking executive 
official is acting with such a purpose, but this is highly unlikely.390 And in 
those States whose officials directly intend to facilitate violations of interna-
tional law or are willfully blind to them, it is implausible in the extreme to 
think that purpose-based culpability tests would be of any practical relevance 
from their own internal perspective. 
When it comes to knowledge to the level of practical certainty or some 
level of possibility or risk, from an ex ante perspective this will always, as 
explained above, be a probabilistic assessment, based, for example, on the 
sharing State’s own intelligence.391 In particular, there is little practical differ-
ence (and no categorical one) between a State’s officials thinking that a future 
event or the future behavior of a third party is nearly certain or only highly 
likely. An instructive example in this regard is how U.S. intelligence doctrine 
instructs analysts to “indicate and explain the basis for the uncertainties as-
sociated with major analytic judgments, specifically the likelihood of occur-
rence of an event or development, and the analyst’s confidence in the basis 
 
389. As an example, the UK Principles, supra note 387, refer only to the relevant official’s 
knowledge, belief, or appreciation of risk of harm. The possibility that a UK official is acting 
with a purpose to facilitate the harm is never mentioned. 
390. See also CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶ 6.13 (discussing ATT drafting 
history and noting that the representatives of Mexico and the ICRC remarked that the use 
of a purpose standard in an early draft of Article 6 ATT would render that provision prac-
tically inoperable; this standard was subsequently replaced with a knowledge one). 
391. See supra Section II.C. See also R (Campaign Against the Arms Trade) v. Secretary 
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1020 [94] (UK government 
arguing in judicial review proceedings challenging export of weapons to Saudi Arabia that 
the “exercise [of assessing what the partner would do with the aid given] is predictive and 
involves the evaluation of risk and as to the future conduct of Saudi Arabia in a fluid and 












for this judgment”392 and to use the following scale to express degrees of 









likely very likely almost  
certain(ly) 











nearly   
certain 
01–05% 05–20% 20–45% 45–55% 55–80% 80–95% 95–99% 
 
The appreciation of likelihood can be distinguished from the analysts’ 
confidence that the assessment is correct,394 which is based on the quality of 
the information available and may range from high, to moderate, to low.395 
Clearly, in many situations, even in States with very sophisticated gov-
ernmental and intelligence apparatuses, the relevant officials will not be mak-
ing their decisions using a probabilistic scale, such as the one above, let alone 
a numerical one. In any event, their reasoning will be prone to all sorts of 
biases; in particular, the consumers of intelligence products at the political 
 
392. Office of the Director of National Security, Intelligence Community Directive 
203, at 3 (Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20An-
alytic%20Standards.pdf. 
393. Id.  
394. “To avoid confusion, products that express an analyst’s confidence in an assess-
ment or judgment using a ‘confidence level’ (e.g., ‘high confidence’) must not combine a 
confidence level and a degree of likelihood, which refers to an event or development, in the 
same sentence.” Id. There are however numerous instances in actual practice in which de-
grees of confidence and likelihood are used interchangeably despite this admonition and the 
relationship between likelihood and confidence is left unexplained. In particular,  
 
[n]one of the extant standards correctly explain that confidence is a second-order judgement 
that is in fact related to probability judgements. That is, given a stated confidence level (e.g., 
95% certainty), the less confident an analyst is in his or her estimate, the wider the confi-
dence interval should be. For example, if two analysts estimate that there is a 75% chance 
that x will occur in the next 3 months, the analyst who bounds her 95% confidence interval 
with the values [55%, 95%] is clearly less confident than the analyst who bounds the 95% 
confidence interval with the values [65%, 85%]. 
 
ASSESSMENT AND COMMUNICATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT 
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level will often misunderstand the analyst’s assessment of uncertainty.396 
That said, my main point, I think, stands: if the officials of a State, acting in 
good faith, appreciate ex ante that it is highly probable that their partner 
would misuse the intelligence provided to commit a wrongful act, for prac-
tical purposes their assessment is not categorically different from one of near 
or virtual certainty.  
The position is, however, different when we go substantially down the 
probabilistic scale. Especially in those situations in which a serious violation 
of IHL or IHRL may be at play and in which, accordingly, a risk-based form 
of culpability may apply, the assisting State’s officials acting ex ante will es-
sentially be gambling on whether to take a calculated risk and provide the 
assistance. That decision may be constrained by formal internal processes, 
such as a requirement to obtain legal advice or refer decisions upwards in 
the hierarchy. They will similarly have to assess probabilistically whether any 
mitigation efforts would actually be effective in reducing the risk of harm 
and then decide on which such measures to implement. Recall, however, that 
the assisting State will be responsible for complicity only if after the assis-
tance, such as intelligence, is provided the harm and facilitation actually oc-
cur.397 
Second, the assessment of what the relevant officials of the assisting 
State knew or intended can be done ex post after the provision of assistance 
occurred. It can be done by some actor other than those organs of the as-
sisting State who decided to provide assistance—perhaps a domestic or in-
ternational court, a UN expert, a political body, a parliamentary committee, 
an inspector-general, a public inquiry, or authorities of some other State. 
Such external assessors or reviewers will have the benefit of hindsight—they 
 
396. The recent literature in psychology and decision science strongly suggests that 
verbal estimates of uncertainty are much less effective in conveying the relevant degree of 
uncertainty than are numerical probabilities. On this point and biased cognition in intelli-
gence analysis more generally, see Mandeep K. Dhami et al., Improving Intelligence Analysis with 
Decision Science, 10 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 753 (2015); David R. Man-
del, Accuracy of Intelligence Forecasts From the Intelligence Consumer’s Perspective, 2 POLICY INSIGHTS 
FROM THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 111 (2015); Mandeep K. Dhami, Towards an 
Evidence-Based Approach to Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence Analysis, 33 INTELLIGENCE 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 257 (2017); Ian K. Belton & Mandeep K. Dhami, Cognitive Biases 
and Debiasing in Intelligence Analysis, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
548 (Riccardo Viale ed., 2020). See also PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORE-
CASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION (2015) (detailing the findings of the 
Good Judgment Project, which, inter alia, compared the reliability of amateur forecasters 
who were selected for lower levels of cognitive bias with that of intelligence analysts).  











will be able to know for a fact whether the violation occurred, to what extent 
the assistance contributed to it, and to what extent mitigation efforts were 
effective. They will also have to make inferences about what the officials of 
the assisting State knew or intended.398 But even though they would have the 
benefit of hindsight, some ex post external assessors may be hampered in their 
ability to fully establish the facts because, say, they do not have access to 
relevant evidence. It is unlikely, for instance, that the assisting State would 
provide its internal intelligence products to an international human rights 
body. In short, an ex post reviewing authority can, perhaps somewhat para-
doxically, simultaneously know both more and less than the persons who 
made the decision to assist knew ex ante.  
Contrary to arguments sometimes made in the literature against intent 
or purpose-based culpability tests,399 it will be reasonably practical for an ex 
post external assessor to find that an assisting State acted with the purpose/di-
rect intent to facilitate a wrongful act. After all, in municipal administrative 
law, domestic courts can find without any “smoking gun” type of evidence 
that State officials acted with an improper purpose, even if they do so rela-
tively infrequently.400 In human rights law, human rights bodies have also 
increasingly found that States that have restricted human rights for ostensi-
bly legitimate aims, such as the prevention of crime, have in reality acted with 
ulterior purposes, such as the suppression of dissent.401 Domestic and inter-
national courts both routinely establish the intent of individuals in the crim-
inal context.402 Even in that context, it is perfectly standard to use a finding 
that a person knew to practical certainty or to a very high degree of likelihood 
that the assistance they provided would be used to commit a crime to draw 
an inference that the person acted with purpose to facilitate the crime.403  
 
398. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 16. For an example, see NZOIGIS REPORT, supra 
note 303, ¶¶ 116–21. 
399. See, e.g., Corten, supra note 30; LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 338. 
400. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH & WILLIAM WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 352–
56 (11th ed. 2014). 
401. See, e.g., Navalnyy v. Russia, App. No. 29580/12, ¶¶ 174–75 (2018) (ECtHR), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-187605 (restrictions on the rights of Russian dissi-
dent Aleksey Navalny imposed for the ulterior purpose of suppressing political pluralism); 
Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (No. 2), App. No. 14305/17, ¶¶ 436–37 (2020) (ECtHR), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-207173 (Court using concordant inferences to estab-
lish that the detention of Turkish opposition leader pursued the ulterior purpose of stifling 
pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate).  
402. See AUST, supra note 6, at 242–44. 












The key point here is that in the vast majority of situations of State com-
plicity an assisting State’s purpose to facilitate does not have to be established 
to anything approaching a criminal law, “beyond a reasonable doubt” stand-
ard of proof. 404 Similarly, for findings of purpose, as with any finding of fact, 
a court or any other external assessor can rely on circumstantial evidence, 
resort to reasonable inferences, or even reverse the burden of proof. 405 Nor 
does a court necessarily need to identify by name the specific state officials 
whose ulterior purpose it has established (although it may choose to do 
so).406 When, for example, the European Court found that Russia was acting 
with an ulterior purpose of suppressing political pluralism when it subjected 
Aleksey Navalny to criminal prosecution, it did not specifically identify Vla-
dimir Putin or the relevant executive, prosecutorial, and judicial officials in-
volved in Navalny’s case as possessing such purpose.407 Thus, while purpose-
based culpability standards are of little practical relevance from the ex ante 
perspective, the same simply cannot be said for the ex post one. 
When it comes to knowledge-based forms of fault, the task of any exter-
nal ex post reviewing entity is always to determine what the assisting State 
subjectively believed at the relevant time; the temptation to interpret the facts 
with the benefit of hindsight is, of course, a great one but must be resisted.408  
A particularly complex problem—and not an uncommon one—arises 
from the fact that different State officials may be in the possession of infor-
mation relevant to the State’s ex ante assessment of risk of harm resulting 
from the sharing of intelligence, but these officials might themselves not suf-
ficiently exchange information among themselves. The picture of the real 
level of risk would therefore be incomplete, simply because no individual 
State official would know everything that they needed to know to make the 
assessment properly. For example, the CIA and the State Department might 
not provide all of the relevant information at their disposal to the Depart-
ment of Defense; a risk assessment by the DoD may then come to the mis-
taken conclusion that there was no certainty or substantial risk that an as-
sisted partner would commit a wrongful act, and proceed to authorize the 
 
404. See also CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶ 6.183. On the European Court’s 
flexible approach to evidence for establishing State fault in due diligence obligations, see 
Stoyanova, supra note 40, at 611–12. 
405. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 408; Finucane, supra note 204, at 417; LANOVOY, 
supra note 11, at 239–40. See also SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 147–48. 
406. See Section II.B supra. 
407. See supra note 401. 
408. For the same point regarding indirect intent as a subjective mode of fault in crim-











sharing of intelligence with that partner. In such a scenario no single U.S. 
official subjectively made the assessment that the risk existed, and then con-
sciously disregarded that risk. The State as a singular entity did possess all 
the necessary information, but the individual making the specific decision to 
assist a partner did not.  
One approach to this problem would be to aggregate all of the relevant 
pieces of information at the disposal of the State’s various officials and to 
attribute to the State as a whole the requisite degree of knowledge. This is, 
in fact, the approach taken by some jurisdictions in the analogous context of 
corporate liability—a good example would be the U.S. “collective 
knowledge” doctrine.409 But this approach reduces the exercise of assessing 
the risk of what a partner would do to the mere addition of isolated items of 
information, when in fact that exercise—even at a purely individual level—
requires this information to be processed and analyzed so that a judgment 
can be made and a risk subjectively be perceived. Employing such a doctrine 
in effect downgrades the fault requirement to negligence—the State did not 
know, but should have known, of the certainty or risk of harm, since none 
of its officials subjectively perceived the requisite degree of risk.410 As ex-
plained above, such objective fault standards are better suited to positive 
duties of prevention than to negative duties of restraint in a complicity 
framework.411   
 The most difficult cases will always be those that are based on an assess-
ment of risk. This will especially be the case when the assisting State’s ex ante 
assessment of risk was also based on the anticipated effectiveness of risk-
reducing mitigation measures. Considerations of institutional competence 
may, in such cases, warrant some level of deference to the judgments made 
by the initial decision maker, but such deference cannot be unlimited. And 
even if the external assessor’s task of establishing whether the assisting State 
 
409. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific 
duties and operations into smaller components, that the aggregate of those components 
constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation, and that it is irrelevant 
whether employees administering one component of an operation know the specific activi-
ties of employees administering another aspect of the operation). English law does not use 
a similar doctrine and corporate fault is more circumscribed. See CELIA WELLS, CORPORA-
TIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 132–36 (2001). 
410. For a particularly sophisticated discussion in the context of corporate liability, see 
Mihailis Diamantis, Functional Corporate Knowledge, 61 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW 319 
(2019). 











was culpable when it provided the assistance requires the assessor to deter-
mine what the assisting State’s official subjectively believed ex ante, both the 
ex ante and the ex post assessments can be made using rational, objective cri-
teria. 
 
B. Assessing Risk 
 
What then are the factors that the officials of the assisting State should rely 
on ex ante to determine whether their partner will commit a wrongful act and 
would use the aid provided to do so, and on which any external assessor can 
also rely to determine ex post what the assisting State knew or intended? Two 
contextual elements are crucial: first, the issue of whether the assistance be-
ing provided, such as the sharing of intelligence, is a one-off event or part of 
a continuing cooperative relationship; and second, whether the future viola-
tion of international law that the partner might commit is itself a one-off, 
isolated event or part of a pattern of similar violations.412 If there is a durable 
cooperative relationship the assisting State is more likely to be able to assess 
reliably what its partner will do. And a pattern of prior behavior in similar 
circumstances is likely the best possible evidence of what the partner will do 
in the future.413 The same goes for the effectiveness of any proposed mitiga-
tion measures—for example, diplomatic assurances that get breached time 
and again cannot be relied upon as effective forms of mitigation.414 In any 
event, the officials of the assisting State making their decisions ex ante will do 
so dynamically, taking into account the evolving circumstances and changes 
in the information available to them.415 
 
412. See EU User’s Guide, supra note 210, ¶ 2.13, at 55 (“Isolated incidents of interna-
tional humanitarian law violations are not necessarily indicative of the recipient country’s 
attitude towards international humanitarian law and may not by themselves be considered 
to constitute a basis for denying an arms transfer. Where a certain pattern of violations can 
be discerned or the recipient country has not taken appropriate steps to punish violations, 
this should give cause for serious concern.”). 
413. See COMMENTARY OF 2016, supra note 208, ¶ 161 (“In the event of multinational 
operations, common Article 1 thus requires High Contracting Parties to opt out of a specific 
operation if there is an expectation, based on facts or knowledge of past patterns, that it 
would violate the Conventions, as this would constitute aiding or assisting violations.”). 
414. See also Blakeley & Raphael, supra note 387, at 705–76 (discussing ineffective as-
surances). 











Here we can again usefully draw on the examples of risk-based culpabil-
ity in the contexts of arms transfers and IHRL non-refoulement jurispru-
dence.416 The ICRC, for example, notes that the three most important indi-
cators for assessing whether the recipient will use transferred weapons to 
commit serious violations of IHL and IHRL are (1) the recipient’s past and 
present record of respect for IHL and IHRL, including any efforts they have 
taken to suppress violations that have occurred; (2) their intentions as ex-
pressed through formal commitments, including the provision of appropri-
ate training; (3) their capacity to ensure that the assistance provided is used 
properly, including the existence of accountable authority structures.417  
A particularly instructive example is the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
of England and Wales in Campaign Against the Arms Trade, 418 which dealt with 
the UK government’s continuing grant of licenses for weapons export to 
Saudi Arabia despite claims that these weapons were used to commit serious 
violations of IHL, viz., those of the principle of distinction, in the conflict in 
Yemen. These were judicial review proceedings, which under the public law 
principles of England and Wales require the courts to determine whether the 
relevant UK minister acted irrationally in determining that there was no “clear 
risk” that Saudi Arabia would commit serious violations of IHL in Yemen. 419 
In other words, this was a very deferential type of external ex post review of 
whether the initial ex ante assessment was correctly made. Yet, even so, the 
Court of Appeal found that the minister did act irrationally because he de-
liberately chose not to determine whether Saudi Arabia had violated IHL in 
the past in relation to any specific incident of concern: 
 
The question whether there was an historic pattern of breaches of IHL on 
the part of the Coalition, and Saudi Arabia in particular, was a question 
 
416. See further CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶¶ 6.94–99. 
417. ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS—A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 250, at 14–21. See 
also EU User’s Guide, supra note 209, ¶ 2.13, at 55 (“Clear risk. A thorough assessment of 
the risk that the proposed export of military technology or equipment will be used in the 
commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law should include an in-
quiry into the recipient’s past and present record of respect for international humanitarian 
law, the recipient’s intentions as expressed through formal commitments and the recipient’s 
capacity to ensure that the equipment or technology transferred is used in a manner con-
sistent with international humanitarian law and is not diverted or transferred to other desti-
nations where it might be used for serious violations of this law.”). 
418. R (Campaign Against the Arms Trade) v. Secretary of State for Business, Innova-
tion and Skills [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1020. 











which required to be faced. Even if it could not be answered with reason-
able confidence in respect of every incident of concern . . . it is clear to us 
that it could properly be answered in respect of many such incidents, in-
cluding most, if not all, of those which have featured prominently in argu-
ment. At least the attempt had to be made.420 
 
Similarly, the Court rightly noted that the partner’s pattern of behavior was 
a key factor for assessing the effectiveness of any risk-reducing measures of 
mitigation: 
 
[P]erhaps the most important reason for making such assessments is that, 
without them, how was the Secretary of State to reach a rational conclusion 
as to the effect of the training, support and other inputs by the UK, or the 
effect of any high level assurances by the Saudi authorities? If the result of 
historic assessments was that violations were continuing despite all such 
efforts, then that would unavoidably become a major consideration in 
looking at the “real risk” in the future. It would be likely to help determine 
whether Saudi Arabia had a genuine intent and, importantly, the capacity 
to live up to the commitments made.421 
 
After the Court’s judgment, the UK government conducted a new assess-
ment and (dubiously) concluded that any past Saudi violations of IHL in 
Yemen were isolated incidents and that “Saudi Arabia has a genuine intent 
and the capacity to comply with IHL.”422  
Whether it is, in fact, true that there is no “clear risk” of serious violations 
of IHL from weapons transfers to Saudi Arabia is beside the point for our 
present purposes.423 Rather, the key point is that there is no reason of prin-
ciple why the sharing of intelligence should be treated any differently than 
transfers of arms or technologies, such as cyber tools, when it comes to the 
making of assessments of whether the assistance provided may be used to 
commit a wrongful act. The formal rule may be different—the prohibition 
 
420. Id. [138]. 
421. Id. [144]. 
422. See Secretary of State for International Trade, Trade Update, House of Commons 
(July 7, 2020), https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/20 
20-07-07/HCWS339. 
423. The new decision has also been challenged in judicial review. See Arms Sales to War 
in Yemen Back in Court, CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARMS TRADE (Apr. 22, 2021), 
https://caat.org.uk/news/arms-sales-to-war-in-yemen-back-in-court/; UK Arms Exports 












of complicity in CA1 rather than the ATT regime or a domestic equivalent—
but the nature of the decision-making process is the same. In particular, pat-
terns of prior behavior are the best predictor of how the assisted party will 
behave in the future (although, of course, there will be exceptions, for exam-
ple, if there is a change of leadership in the assisted State or entity). Similarly, 
patterns of mitigation measures failing to work are the best indicator that any 
further such measures will also be ineffective. 
In one sense, however, the sharing of intelligence is somewhat different 
from other forms of assistance. If the intelligence is genuinely so relevant 
that it can, in fact, substantially contribute to the commission of a wrongful 
act, it is almost inevitable that it will be so used—think, for example, of in-
formation shared for targeting purposes in a military operation. Once the 
recipients acquire the information, they cannot unlearn it. And if they are 
intent on committing a wrongful act, such as torture, the intelligence will 
invariably get used if relevant.424 In that sense, the ex ante risk assessment 
becomes simpler—the inquiry is going to be focused primarily on whether 
the partner intends to commit a wrong and less on whether the partner is 
likely to use the information given since the latter may be a foregone con-
clusion if the answer to the former question is positive. This also makes mit-
igation measures that are primarily focused on the intelligence itself less likely 
to work, although some safeguards may be possible (e.g., conditioning the 
transfer of information on its compartmentalization, restriction to only spe-
cific, more trustworthy, officials of the partner State or entity, or implement-
ing technological safeguards).  
 
V. TWO SCENARIOS OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING IN                             
MILITARY OPERATIONS 
  
A. Intelligence Sharing That Assists a Wrongful Act 
 
Let us now discuss the two basic scenarios of complicity on the basis of 
intelligence sharing in multinational military operations: first, intelligence 
sharing that assists an internationally wrongful act; second, the sharing and 
receiving of intelligence that was obtained unlawfully. I will start with the 
former, which has also percolated through much of the preceding discussion. 
In this scenario, during a military operation State A is sharing intelligence 
with State or non-State actor B, which then facilitates B’s commission of an 
 











internationally wrongful act. That wrongful act can be a serious violation of 
IHL or IHRL, such as torture, or a less serious violation of either regime. Or 
it can violate some other rule of international law, such as the sovereignty of 
a third State, the law of the sea, or diplomatic law. The generally applicable 
complicity rule in Article 16 ASR would cover all such instances. Regime-
specific complicity rules, such as those of IHL and IHRL, would only apply 
to State assistance to the violation of rules particular to these regimes, such 
as the prohibition of torture, the right to life, or the principle of distinction.  
It is clear that, in the right circumstances, the sharing of intelligence, 
within or without a multinational military operation, can transgress the gen-
eral and specific complicity rules in international law.425 For example, among 
the participants of the Nottingham workshop there was widespread agree-
ment that the sharing of intelligence can significantly or substantially con-
tribute to a wrongful act by a third party.426 In a scenario in which A provides 
intelligence to B that is then used to torture X, the fulfillment of the causal 
nexus requirement will depend on the nature of the information provided. 
For instance, if A gave B the information that X suffers from an irrational 
fear of insects and that information then leads B to put X in a cramped 
wooden box with a choice selection thereof,427 the nexus requirement would 
be met—the torture would not have been applied in that particular way ab-
sent the shared intelligence. The same position would apply if A gave B in-
formation about X’s family so as to enable B’s agents to threaten X with 
violence to them, or if A gave B information about X’s whereabouts that 
allowed B to detain him or her in the first place. While there will invariably 
be cases that pose difficulties in assessing the causal contribution of a partic-
ular item of intelligence to the wrongful act, most cases will not be particu-
larly hard.  
The real difficulty, as explained, lies with the culpability elements of Ar-
ticle 16 ASR and any regime-specific complicity rules. Here there was signif-
icant disagreement among the experts assembled at the Nottingham intelli-
gence sharing workshop. Much of that discussion vacillated between intent 
and knowledge as the two competing models for the assisting State’s fault. 428 
 
425. See AUST, supra note 6, at 198. 
426. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 10, 16. 
427. See Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, supra note 285, ¶¶ 52, 57 (detailing interroga-
tion techniques approved by the U.S. Department of Justice). 











But as I have argued in this article, that dilemma is largely a false one. Inter-
national law rules on complicity allow for a variable geometry of forms of 
fault, which may also depend on the severity of the underlying violation.429  
Thus, under Article 16 ASR, an assisting State will be responsible for 
sharing intelligence with another State that facilitated the wrongful act of the 
latter if the assisting State (i.e., its organs or agents) did so: 
(1) with the purpose/direct intent of facilitating the wrongful act, that is 
in a situation in which the facilitation of the wrongful act was the conscious 
object of the assisting State’s conduct, regardless of any deficits in the assist-
ing State’s knowledge; 
(2) with the oblique/indirect intent of facilitating the wrongful act, that 
is while being practically certain that the assisted State will commit the 
wrongful act and practically certain that it will use the intelligence provided 
to do so, and consciously choosing to provide the intelligence despite this 
practical certainty; 
(3) with willful blindness, that is, with the purpose of avoiding acquiring 
information but for which the assisting State would have acted with indirect 
intent. 
The culpability element of Article 16 would apply to intelligence sharing 
that contributes to any violation of international law, regardless of the subject 
matter, so long as the same rule binds the two States. This culpability element 
also forms the minimum baseline for regime-specific complicity rules, the 
fault requirements of which can only be looser, more expansive than those 
of Article 16.  
As explained, the IHL- and IHRL-specific complicity rules have the 
added benefit of applying to State assistance, including the sharing of intelli-
gence, to non-State actors. For serious violations of IHL and IHRL, they ar-
guably have the further benefit of employing risk-based forms of fault. That 
is, the State sharing intelligence would be liable under these complicity rules 
if it was aware of a degree of risk that its assistance would be used to facilitate 
a serious violation, such as torture, but consciously disregarded that risk and 
proceeded to provide the assistance nonetheless.430 The risk threshold would 
certainly be satisfied if it was more likely than not that the assisted partner 
would commit the wrong and would use the aid provided to do so. It would 
probably also be satisfied if the risk was below likelihood but was nonethe-
less serious, substantial, real, or clear. For assistance to nonserious violations 
 
429. See supra Sections III.A.4, III.B.5, III.C.3. 











of IHL and IHRL, the regime-specific complicity rules would employ the 
Article 16 ASR forms of fault only, but again with the added benefit of ap-
plying to State aid to non-State actors as well. 
The scenario of intelligence sharing to assist a wrongful act has two basic 
sub-variants. In the first, the simpler and more focused one, a specific item 
of intelligence is shared that assists a specific wrongful act. This can either 
be an isolated occurrence or a whole series or pattern of such acts, normally 
as part of a durable cooperative relationship. In the second variant, intelli-
gence sharing is part of systematic aid and assistance to a war effort more 
generally, but under the shadow of a risk that the aid provided would facili-
tate serious violations of IHL and IHRL—think of, for example, the aid that 
Serbia provided to the Bosnian Serbs during the conflict in Bosnia, or the 
aid that the United States provided to the contras in Nicaragua and to various 
Iraqi and Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS. 
In both of these variants, intelligence sharing as part of a wider, more 
durable cooperative relationship will enable the assisting State to form more 
reliable predictions about what its partner would do and implement wider-
ranging mitigation measures and assess their effectiveness. As explained 
above, if these measures bring down appreciable risk below the proscribed 
threshold, the assisting State may continue providing the assistance.431  
The emergence of a clear pattern of ongoing violations by the assisted 
partner will both elevate the assisting State’s appreciation of the risk of future 
violations and constitute evidence that the mitigation measures are ineffec-
tive. Thus, for example, the Intelligence and Security Committee of the Brit-
ish Parliament found that between 2001 and 2010 there were “232 cases rec-
orded where it appears that UK personnel continued to supply questions or 
intelligence to liaison services after they knew or suspected (or, in [the Com-
mittee’s] view, should have suspected) that a detainee had been or was being 
mistreated.”432 The Committee also found that UK intelligence agencies 
“also suggested, planned or agreed to rendition operations proposed by oth-
ers in 28 cases [and that there were] a further 22 cases where SIS or MI5 
provided intelligence to enable a rendition operation to take place.”433 In 
each of these cases specific intelligence facilitated a specific wrongful act. 
While it is possible that when individual decisions were being made, espe-
cially in the early stages of the “war on terror,” British officials did not know 
to practical certainty or appreciated a degree of risk that the intelligence 
 
431. See supra Section III.D. 












would facilitate a wrongful act by third parties, such as the United States, or 
hoped that mitigation measures would reduce that risk, that notion becomes 
impossible to sustain after a pattern of behavior emerges over time.434 
In the second variant, if the assisting State is aware to practical certainty 
(for violations of all rules of international law) or to some lower degree of 
proscribed risk (for serious violations of IHL and IHRL) that its assistance, 
including intelligence, would be used to commit internationally wrongful 
acts, it cannot escape responsibility by saying that it was intending to assist 
the war effort more generally and not any specific violations of international 
law that took place within that war effort.435 The two are practically insepa-
rable,436 at the very least in those cases in which there is an evident pattern 
of violations by the recipient partner, as, for example, with regard to ethnic 
cleansing by the Bosnian Serb military during the Bosnian conflict, the tor-
ture and inhuman treatment of high-value terrorist detainees by U.S. forces 
 
434. Id. at 4 (Committee finding that “the combination of high-level briefing from the 
CIA in September 2001, the individual cases of mistreatment and rendition being reported 
by deployed officers to senior managers in January 2002, and the media reporting of torture, 
mistreatment and rendition in January/February 2002, make it difficult to comprehend how 
those at the top of the office did not recognise in this period the pattern of mistreatment by 
the US. . . . This could indicate that the Agencies were deliberately turning a blind eye so as 
not to damage the relationship and risk the flow of intelligence. . . . That being said, we have 
found no ‘smoking gun’ in the primary material to indicate that the Agencies deliberately 
overlooked reports of mistreatment and rendition by the US as a matter of institutional 
policy.”). 
435. Depending on the circumstances, assistance to the war effort could also violate 
other rules of international law, such as the prohibition of intervention, a point that I will 
not deal with here. 
436. Cf. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 7, ¶ 422, where the ICJ held that  
 
the quite substantial aid of a political, military and financial nature provided by the FRY to 
the Republika Srpska and the VRS, beginning long before the tragic events of Srebrenica, 
continued during those events. There is thus little doubt that the atrocities in Srebrenica 
were committed, at least in part, with the resources which the perpetrators of those acts 
possessed as a result of the general policy of aid and assistance pursued towards them by 
the FRY. 
 
However, Serbia was found not to be responsible for complicity of genocide because it had 
not been not aware that genocide would be committed. The Court did not have jurisdiction 
over Serbia’s complicity in any other violation of international law, including the CA1 duty 
to respect IHL or the appurtenant duty not to provide assistance to serious violations 
thereof. In other words, it is perfectly possible for Serbia not to have been complicit in 
genocide on the basis of Genocide Convention–specific complicity rules but to have been 
complicit in serious violations of IHL committed by the Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenica and 











in the war on terror, or Russia’s assistance to the Assad regime in Syria. 437 
The only way to keep complicity rules from capturing a generalized assis-
tance scenario is to confine them strictly to purpose-based forms of fault. 438 
But, as explained above, this is inappropriate even for the baseline rule in 
Article 16 ASR, let alone for regime-specific rules of IHL and IHRL.439 This, 
of course, assumes that the general assistance to the war effort materially 
facilitated the specific wrongful acts in question—that is, that the causal 
nexus element was satisfied.440 But so long as it did, States cannot simply say 
that they were intending to help their partner win the conflict and not to assist 
them in violating international law. Such an approach would, for example, 
excuse Russia of all liability for assisting the numerous atrocities committed 
by the Assad regime against its own people in Syria, if purpose/direct intent 
to facilitate the atrocities could not be inferred.441 
The real difficulty with the assistance to the wider-war-effort scenario is 
that such assistance normally produces substantial appreciable benefits for 
the assisting State (and possibly third parties) in terms of advancing its for-
eign policy, economic, and national security agendas. This can create stark 
dilemmas. Providing intelligence and other assistance to (say) Iraqi and 
Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS had the immediate benefit of helping 
to dismantle a terrorist regime that has inflicted untold suffering on the peo-
ples of Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Yet, the recipients of such assistance may 
well have committed serious violations of IHL and IHRL to which the as-
sistance causally contributed, such as the torture or other mistreatment of 
 
437. The key factor here would be the application of the causal nexus or contribution 
element of a complicity rule to specific facts, not that of the mental element. Compare in 
that regard in the criminal context Greenawalt, supra note 115, at 594. 
438. Even there, purpose to facilitate could be inferred by some external fact-finder, 
based on the pattern of violations. 
439. See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text (regarding the specific direction 
tangent in the ICTY complicity jurisprudence, which was also motivated by overinclusive-
ness concerns). See also JACKSON, supra note 8, at 84 (“[W]hat’s lying behind these cases is 
the question of how legal doctrines of complicity, premised to some degree on individual-
ized connections between accomplice and principal, can deal with large-scale provisions of 
aid to groups or collections of actors carrying out a mix of lawful and unlawful activities.”). 
440. One situation in which generalized assistance would probably not satisfy the nexus 
requirement is that of the assisting State providing assistance whose receipt enabled the 
partner to divert its own resources to the commission of the wrongful act. See Moynihan, 
supra note 11, at 9–10.  
441. For a discussion thereof, see Robert Lawless, A State of Complicity: How Russia’s 
Persistent and Public Denial of Syrian Battlefield Atrocities Violates International Law, 9 HARVARD 











captured ISIS fighters. No mitigation measures may sufficiently curb the risk 
of such violations, but stopping the assistance may lead to equally bad con-
sequences (say, the resurgence of ISIS or the prolongation of the conflict).  
This, therefore, leads to the question I have touched upon above of 
whether the risks of such harms can be balanced against each other in some 
kind of lesser-evil, utilitarian calculus.442 While it appears inevitable that 
States will engage in such a calculus as a matter of policy—for example, UK 
ministers have openly acknowledged doing so443—risk-taking is difficult for 
the law to accommodate in the face of a causally proximate risk of assistance 
to serious violations of IHL and IHRL except, perhaps, in the most extreme 
(and unlikely) situations, through the application of circumstances preclud-
ing wrongfulness under the ASR or through any IHL- and IHRL-specific 
rules that may incorporate balancing. In most situations, it would not be 
possible to justify proceeding with the sharing of intelligence while appreci-
ating a risk of a serious violation of IHL and IHRL when such a violation 
subsequently occurs and is facilitated by the shared intelligence. In other 
words, a State engaging in risk-taking behavior generally must accept the le-
gal consequences of doing so—its responsibility for complicity—if the risk 
materializes.  
 
B. Sharing and Receiving Unlawfully Obtained Intelligence 
 
Let us now turn to the second basic scenario of intelligence sharing in mul-
tinational military operations—one where it is the intelligence itself that was 
 
442. See supra Section III.D. 
443. Under current policy guidance, see supra note 387, ministers retain a significant 
amount of discretion in deciding how to proceed in situations in which the sharing of intel-
ligence creates a risk (but not certainty) of harm. In 2019 an internal Ministry of Defence 
policy document stated that in such cases intelligence should not be shared “unless ministers 
agree that the potential benefits justify accepting the risk and the legal consequences that 
may follow.” See Use of Torture Overseas, 660 Parl. Deb. HC (6th ser.) (2019) col. 504 
(question by David Davies MP). Even more interesting are the (somewhat internally incon-
sistent) testimonies of several ministers before the Intelligence and Security Committee; 
some of the ministers thought that they could (although none have done so) exceptionally 
authorize the sharing of intelligence when there was a serious risk it would facilitate torture 
but doing so would prevent a “ticking bomb” scenario. They were more open to authorizing 
sharing if the risk was “merely” that of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. It was ac-
cepted that they could not lawfully authorize the sharing of intelligence if they know or 
believed (i.e., were practically certain) that torture would occur. See INTELLIGENCE AND 
SECURITY COMMITTEE, DETAINEE MISTREATMENT AND RENDITION: CURRENT ISSUES, 











unlawfully obtained, and is then shared, received, and used. For example, 
State A tortures a terrorist suspect it has captured into divulging intelligence, 
subjects its population to systematic electronic surveillance in violation of 
international privacy standards, or acquires the information from a third 
State in a manner that violates that State’s sovereignty or the inviolability of 
diplomatic premises. A then proceeds to share this information with State 
B, which is either practically certain or aware to some level of probability that 
the intelligence was acquired unlawfully by A. B nonetheless uses that infor-
mation (which is ultimately proven to be reliable, despite its mode of acqui-
sition), for purposes, such as targeting drone strikes, that are otherwise com-
pliant with applicable IHL and IHRL.  
In this scenario, A undoubtedly acted unlawfully—vis-à-vis some other 
State or an individual—when collecting the intelligence. It will also most likely 
be acting unlawfully by the further act of sharing the intelligence with B. This 
will most clearly be the case if the underlying violation is one of IHRL, for 
example, if the intelligence was obtained through torture or contrary to the 
right to privacy.444 For example, the jurisprudence of the European Court—
very likely to be emulated by other human rights bodies once they have the 
opportunity to deal with such cases—is clear that State acts beyond the col-
lection of personal information—including its automated and human pro-
cessing, analysis, and sharing with third parties—each constitutes a separate 
interference with privacy.445 This is also the position of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court of Germany under the German Basic Law.446 Indeed, the 
sharing of information could be a violation even if the collection was not, 
depending on whether the sharing can separately satisfy the justifiability test 
under IHRL, that is, it was provided for in law, pursued a legitimate aim, and 
was necessary and proportionate for the achievement of that aim—and ap-
plies safeguards specifically designed for the intelligence sharing context: 
 
 
444. The same goes in principle for violations of data protection law. See Elgizouli v. 
Home Secretary, supra note 369. To be clear, I am not saying that every act of spying, foreign 
or domestic, necessarily violates IHRL privacy guarantees—on the contrary, much of what 
States do in the espionage context could be justified under the IHRL necessity and propor-
tionality framework.   
445. See Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 & 
24960/15, ¶¶ 324–31, 496–97 (2021) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
210077.  











[I]t is now clear that some States are regularly sharing material with their 
intelligence partners and even, in some instances, allowing those intelli-
gence partners direct access to their own systems. Consequently, the Court 
considers that the transmission by a Contracting State to foreign States or 
international organisations of material obtained by bulk interception 
should be limited to such material as has been collected and stored in a 
Convention compliant manner and should be subject to certain additional 
specific safeguards pertaining to the transfer itself. First of all, the circum-
stances in which such a transfer may take place must be set out clearly in 
domestic law. Secondly, the transferring State must ensure that the receiv-
ing State, in handling the data, has in place safeguards capable of preventing 
abuse and disproportionate interference. In particular, the receiving State 
must guarantee the secure storage of the material and restrict its onward 
disclosure. This does not necessarily mean that the receiving State must 
have comparable protection to that of the transferring State; nor does it 
necessarily require that an assurance is given prior to every transfer. 
Thirdly, heightened safeguards will be necessary when it is clear that mate-
rial requiring special confidentiality—such as confidential journalistic ma-
terial—is being transferred. Finally, the Court considers that the transfer of 
material to foreign intelligence partners should also be subject to independ-
ent control. 447 
  
The European Court thus found, for example, that Sweden failed to im-
plement proper safeguards when sharing intelligence with its partners be-
cause, inter alia, the Swedish domestic legal framework did not provide that 
agencies had to establish that it was necessary and proportionate to share 
information implicating the privacy interests of a specific individual and to 
assess whether their partner had minimum safeguards in place.448 The posi-
tion of the Federal Constitutional Court is substantially similar in the Ger-
man context.449 Most States do not have domestic legal frameworks that reg-
 
447. Big Brother Watch, supra note 445, ¶ 362. 
448. Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden, App. No. 35252/08, ¶¶ 326–30, 371 (2021) (EC-
tHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-210078. 
449. 1 BvR 2835/17, supra note 319, ¶¶ 231–64. In particular, the Court held: 
 
Sharing data with other countries is ruled out if there is reason to fear that its use would 
lead to violations of fundamental principles of the rule of law. Under no circumstances may 
the State be complicit in violations of human dignity. In particular, it must appear certain 
that the information will be used neither for political persecution nor for inhuman and 












ulate the sharing of intelligence in a way that would satisfy IHRL require-
ments in terms of regulatory quality and clarity and effective domestic over-
sight.450 
The more difficult question is whether a State is acting wrongfully not 
by sharing but by soliciting, receiving, and using unlawfully obtained and shared 
information, perhaps for targeting purposes in a military operation. It is a 
question of fact, of course, as to whether the receiving State is aware of some 
degree of risk that the information was shared or obtained unlawfully; in our 
scenario above, that knowledge is postulated, but in real life the users of, for 
example, a fused intelligence product may not actually have any idea about 
the sourcing of a given item of information.451 That said, even given the req-
uisite degree of knowledge, this scenario does not in principle engage the 
general complicity rule in Article 16 ASR, which applies only to prospective 
assistance to an ongoing or future wrongful act.452 Like most domestic legal 
systems, international law does not contain a general rule on accessories after 
the fact.453 Modern criminal law similarly tends to create such liability only 
through the legislative creation of specific new offenses, such as the peddling 
 
the sharing of data collected by German authorities with other countries or international 
organisations does not erode the protections of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and other international human rights treaties. Given the exceptional nature of sur-
veillance and data sharing measures carried out by intelligence services, which may involve 
contacts with States not firmly committed to the rule of law, it must be ensured that the 
information provided is not used to persecute certain ethnic groups, stifle opposition or 
detain people without due process, kill or torture them in violation of human rights or 
international humanitarian law. The Federal Intelligence Service itself is responsible for ex-
amining and determining which rules of international law have to be observed in this re-
spect. In principle, receiving States must agree to rights to information so that adherence to 
international human rights standards can be monitored. 
 
Id. ¶ 237 (citations omitted). 
450. See generally Secret Global Surveillance Networks: Intelligence Sharing between Governments 
and the Need for Safeguards, PI (Apr. 24, 2018), https://privacyinternational.org/re-
port/1741/secret-global-surveillance-networks-intelligence-sharing-between-governments-
and-need (reviewing forty-two countries and finding an alarming level of under-regulation).  
451. See, e.g., NZOIGIS REPORT, supra note 303, ¶¶ 181–83, 323–25 (Inspector-General 
concluding that a New Zealand government agency inadvertently came into possession of 
information obtained by U.S. use of torture but disregarded red flags, such as incommuni-
cado detention, that could have pointed to the provenance of the information); Nottingham 
Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 20. To be clear, I am not arguing that the receiving State 
has a positive duty to check whether every item of information it receives or is given access 
to was obtained unlawfully—that would be a wholly impracticable requirement.  
452. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 20. 











of stolen property. 454 The ILC expressly excluded the provision of assistance 
after the wrongful act from the scope of Article 16;455 a fortiori, the mere 
passive receipt of information unlawfully obtained cannot violate that rule 
either, because it does not actually facilitate the commission of the wrong, 
which has already been completed.456  
Article 16 could be engaged, however, if the factual pattern were such 
that B was not a mere passive recipient of unlawfully obtained information 
but actually provided assistance to A’s wrongful act of unlawfully collecting 
and/or sharing intelligence. This could be the case in, for instance, situations 
of continuing cooperative relationships in which each party provides the 
other with some quid pro quo in a revolving cycle of interactions—B could 
be providing money, its own intelligence, or other assistance to A, which 
would continue sharing its intelligence with B. 457 If the underlying violation 
was a serious breach of jus cogens, the rule in Article 41(2) ASR that prohibits 
States from assisting the maintenance of a situation created by such a breach 
could potentially be engaged.458 
Similarly, a pattern of receiving information from a State that acquired it 
in violation of international law can evolve into an indirect form of prohib-
ited assistance to that State. As noted by the UK Parliament’s Joint Commit-
tee on Human Rights in the context of information procured through tor-
ture: 
 
[I]f the Government engaged in an arrangement with a country that was 
known to torture in a widespread way and turned a blind eye to what was 
going on, systematically receiving and/or relying on the information but 
not physically participating in the torture, that might well cross the line into 
complicity. Systematic, regular receipt of information obtained under tor-
ture is in our view capable of amounting to “aid or assistance” in maintain-
ing the situation created by other States’ serious breaches of the peremp-
tory norm prohibiting torture. As a number of witnesses to our inquiry put 
it, the practice creates a market for the information produced by torture. 
 
454. FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 645–46. 
455. See AUST, supra note 6, at 221. 
456. See also Ahmed & Anor v. The Queen [2011] EWCA (Crim) 184 [42] (“On ordinary 
principles of English law, if A aids or abets (ie assists) B to commit torture, or if he counsels 
or procures (ie encourages or arranges) torture by B, then A is no doubt guilty, as is B. But 
simply to receive information from B which is needed for the safety of A’s citizens but 
which is known or suspected to be the product of torture would not, without more, amount 
in English law to either of these forms of secondary participation.”).  
457. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 20–21. 











As such, it encourages States which systematically torture to continue to 
do so.459 
 
Even if the receipt and possession of unlawfully obtained and shared 
intelligence do not as such transgress the complicity rules of general interna-
tional law, they may violate regime-specific rules, such as those of IHRL or 
diplomatic law. For example, the storage and processing of an individual’s 
private information by the recipient State may constitute a separate violation 
of the right to privacy of that individual, regardless of the fact that it had no 
involvement whatsoever in its collection if the receiving State did not satisfy 
the requirements of the necessity and proportionality test, including an ade-
quate domestic legal framework with sufficient safeguards against abuse. 
Applying this approach, the European Court found that the United 
Kingdom’s regulation of the receipt of shared intercept intelligence was 
compatible with Article 8 ECHR.460 That conclusion may be debatable on 
the facts, in particular because the Court seemed to dispense with the re-
quirement of authorization independent from the executive when it came to 
the solicitation of intelligence from a partner.461 It is also not entirely clear 
how the Court’s analysis would apply to standing arrangements whereby the 
receiving State has direct access to the raw intelligence in the systems and 
databases of the sharing State or ones operated jointly.462 The basic point 
remains, however, that at least insofar as the sharing and receipt of infor-
mation that may implicate privacy interests is concerned, the receiving State 
must have an adequate domestic legal framework with sufficient safeguards 
in place, including independent oversight. It appears manifest that most 
States do not have such frameworks and are therefore exposing themselves 
to a substantial legal risk of violating IHRL.463  
 
459. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ALLEGATIONS OF UK COMPLICITY IN 
TORTURE: TWENTY–THIRD REPORT OF SESSION 2008–09, HL Paper 152/HC 230, ¶¶ 41–
42 (UK). 
460. Big Brother Watch, supra note 445, ¶¶ 500–514. 
461. See id. annex (joint partly dissenting opinion by Lemmens, J., Vehabović, J., Ran-
zoni, J., and Bošnjak, J.). 
462. See UK Mass Interception Laws Violates Human Rights and the Fight Continues . . . , PI 
(May 26, 2021), https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/4526/uk-mass-interception-
laws-violates-human-rights-and-fight-continues. 
463. See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right 
to Privacy in the Digital Age, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/29 (Aug. 3, 2018). See also Secret 











But this conclusion comes with two caveats. First, the extraterritoriality 
problem looms large in intelligence-sharing cases and is yet to be addressed 
explicitly by human rights bodies. In particular, while it is clear that human 
rights treaties would apply to B if B received information from A about in-
dividuals within B’s territory, it remains unsettled whether the treaties would 
apply if A shared with B information about individuals in A’s own territory 
or that of a third State. 464 Second, one would reasonably expect the relevant 
privacy guarantees to be applied more flexibly in the context of a military 
operation than in situations of relative normalcy, something that the IHRL 
necessity/proportionality framework can comfortably allow, but the point 
remains untested. Again, the privacy guarantees would apply in the first place 
only if the nature of the shared information was such that it actually impli-
cated the privacy interests of individuals.465 
Finally, the actual use of the unlawfully obtained and shared information 
would generally not taint an operation of the recipient State that would oth-
erwise be lawful. For instance, if B used information obtained through the 
use of torture by A to target an individual in a drone strike, and that individ-
ual turned out to be a combatant, the strike was thus directed against a purely 
military target. In such a case, there would be no violation of IHL even 
though B relied on information obtained through torture. Similarly, on an 
IHRL analysis, if a State used lethal force against an individual who in fact 
posed to others an imminent threat that could not be neutralized in any other 
way so that the use of force would be compatible with the right to life,466 the 
lawfulness of the use of force would not depend on the fact that some of the 
relevant information pointing to the threat was obtained unlawfully and 
 
464. The extraterritoriality issue has been avoided by the European Court (so far) on 
the basis that at least some of the applicants were in the respondent State’s territory. See Big 
Brother Watch, supra note 445, ¶ 272. See also Marko Milanovic, The Grand Normalization of 
Mass Surveillance: ECtHR Grand Chamber Judgments in Big Brother Watch and Centrum för 
rättvisa, EJIL:TALK! (May 26, 2021), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-grand-normalization-of-
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465. For example, information about the location of a military facility, weapons sche-
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466. See, e.g., General Comment No. 36, supra note 275, ¶ 12 (setting out IHRL criteria 











shared with the recipient State—if, again, the information was objectively 
accurate.467 
On the contrary, the rules of both IHL and IHRL may positively require 
resort to such intelligence, regardless of the fact that it was collected and 
shared unlawfully. If, say, the receiving State is put on notice through the 
shared information that there are civilians in an area that it intends to strike, 
ignoring that information would put the receiving State in violation of its 
duty to take all feasible precautions in attack and verify that all targets are 
military ones.468 Or, if the recipient State is put on notice of an imminent 
terrorist attack against one of its cities, it would act against its positive duty 
to protect the right to life of its people if it chooses simply to disregard that 
information on the ground that it was obtained unlawfully.469 However, the 
use of unlawfully obtained and shared information would be prohibited in 
specific contexts, for example, by the exclusionary rule applicable in judicial 
proceedings where the use of information obtained through torture would 
 
467. Information obtained by torture generally will not be; however, the information 
may nonetheless be obtained unlawfully in a way that does not entail its unreliability, e.g., in 
violation of State sovereignty or the human right to privacy. 
468. See CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 202, rr. 15–16; Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of In-
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469. See A v. Home Secretary (No 2) [2005] UKHL 71 [47] (“If under such torture a 
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flagrant breach of article 3 [ECHR] for which the United Kingdom would be answerable, 
but no breach of article 5(4) or 6.” [Lord Bingham], [68]–[69]). (“[I]f use of such information 
might save lives it would be absurd to reject it. If the police were to learn of the whereabouts 
of a ticking bomb it would be ludicrous for them to disregard this information if it had been 
procured by torture. No one suggests the police should act in this way[;] . . . [in] these 
instances the executive arm of the State is open to the charge that it is condoning the use of 
torture. So, in a sense, it is. The government is using information obtained by torture. But 
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fruits they are found to bear. Not merely, indeed, is the executive entitled to make use of this 
information; to my mind it is bound to do so. It has a prime responsibility to safeguard the 
security of the State and would be failing in its duty if it ignores whatever it may learn or 
fails to follow it up. Of course it must do nothing to promote torture. It must not enlist 
torturers to its aid (rendition being perhaps the most extreme example of this). But nor need 
it sever relations even with those States whose interrogation practices are of most concern. 











violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial470 or when the use of information 
obtained in violation of diplomatic law could further infringe the rights of 
the injured State.471 
In sum, in the scenario in which intelligence is unlawfully obtained and 
shared, the most difficult issues are those regarding the responsibility of the 
State receiving the intelligence. As a general matter, the mere receipt of un-
lawfully obtained information does not, as such, fall within the scope of ei-
ther the general complicity rule in Article 16 ASR or the IHL- and IHRL-
specific complicity rules.472 This will generally be the case in situations in 
which the intelligence sharing is sporadic or isolated. However, in situations 
of longer-term partnerships, especially those in which a pattern can be dis-
cerned in the behavior of the State or non-State actor sharing the intelligence, 
such as the use of torture, and when there is a standing relationship of mutual 
assistance, the recipient State may no longer be regarded as merely a passive 
recipient of tainted information but may be seen as encouraging or actively 
 
470. See, e.g., id. (House of Lords unanimously concluding that evidence tainted by tor-
ture was inadmissible in proceedings before a special immigration tribunal). See further Tobias 
Thienel, The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Torture under International Law, 17 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (2006).  
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Court, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/wikileaks-documents-are-ad-
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where the receiving State knew or ought to have known that the information was obtained 
through torture, ill-treatment or arbitrary detention would make the receiving State com-
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wrongdoing State. Notably, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales rejected Scheinin’s 
analysis as “significantly aspirational rather than declaratory of existing law” and “not based 











assisting the production and sharing of such information, including by cre-
ating a market for such violations.473 Consider, for example, the United 
Kingdom’s receipt of intelligence procured by third States through the mis-
treatment of detainees in the “war on terror.” Parliament’s Intelligence and 
Security Committee investigation found “198 cases recorded where UK per-
sonnel received intelligence from liaison services obtained from detainees 
whom they knew had been mistreated, or with no indication as to how the 
detainee had been treated but where, in our view, they should have suspected 
mistreatment.”474 Depending on the facts, such situations can fall within the 
scope of Articles 16 and 41 ASR or of the regime-specific complicity rules. 
Again, however, as a general matter, the use of tainted information by the 
receiving State, such as for targeting purposes in the course of a military 
operation, will not be internationally wrongful except in specific contexts, 
for example, in judicial proceedings. But if the information pertains to the 
private lives of specific individuals, the processing and use of that infor-
mation may, in the absence of sufficient privacy safeguards, run afoul of 




The complicity rules of international law may be underdetermined. But as 
this article has shown we nonetheless possess an ample toolbox with which 
to address complicity scenarios, including those triggered by the sharing of 
intelligence in the course of multi-partner military operations. Article 16 ASR 
is the most powerful tool in that toolbox because of its general applicability 
and its usefulness as a normative baseline for other, regime-specific complic-
ity rules. Most of this article was devoted to unpacking the fault elements of 
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sharing agreements, and when they require disclosure of personal data from third parties, 











such rules, elements that pose many complex and difficult questions and 
largely determine the reach of these rules. 
With regard to Article 16, I have argued that State assistance to another 
State that significantly or substantially contributed to the wrongful act of the 
latter State will be caught by Article 16 if the assisted State acted with (1) 
purpose/direct intent to facilitate the wrongful act, regardless of any deficits 
in knowledge; (2) with oblique/indirect intent to facilitate the wrongful act, 
that is if it was practically certain that the assisted State would commit the 
act, practically certain that the aid provided would facilitate the act and con-
sciously decided to provide the assistance nonetheless; or (3) with willful 
blindness, that is with a purpose to avoid acquiring information but for 
which it would have been acting with oblique intent. This variegated mental 
element is normatively justifiable and practicable, allows us to make sense of 
the internally conflicted ILC work product, and enables us to move beyond 
the false dilemma between intent and knowledge that has burdened much of 
the literature so far. As for Article 41(2) ASR as drafted by the ILC, it pos-
sesses no culpability requirement, but its apparent imposition of strict liabil-
ity for aiding and assisting does not seem appropriate even for serious 
breaches of jus cogens. Arguably Article 41(2) can use not only the culpability 
requirements in Article 16 ASR but also risk-based modes of fault, subjective 
or even objective, for a State negligently failing to know (to some degree of 
probability) that its aid would help maintain a situation created by a serious 
jus cogens breach. 
Regime-specific complicity rules coexist with the generally applicable 
ones and can be of great practical import. Both IHL and IHRL contain such 
rules, which can apply to State assistance in multinational military operations. 
The existence of the IHL rule is not in doubt. Again, we are speaking here 
of the negative duty of restraint not to encourage or facilitate violations of 
IHL, a duty with which any State can and should comply, and not about the 
much broader positive obligation to exert influence on third parties to put 
an end to their violations, which remains controversial. Even if some of its 
elements remain indeterminate, the IHL-specific complicity rule applies in 
all circumstances, regardless of whether the assisting State is involved in the 
armed conflict in which violations of IHL might occur, and regardless of the 
legal classification of that conflict. As for the IHRL rule, it is in the process 
of consolidation, in the course of which it will vary from treaty to treaty. Its 
practical utility also depends on the resolution of the extraterritoriality co-
nundrum. Even so, we can reasonably expect that in the long run human 











by the German Constitutional Court, holding that all State actions need to 
comply with guarantees of fundamental rights regardless of the location of 
the affected individual, and that “[u]nder no circumstances may the State be 
complicit in violations of human dignity” by sharing intelligence with third 
parties committing such violations.”476 
An added value of IHL- and IHRL-specific complicity rules over Article 
16 ASR lies in their application to assistance provided to non-State actors 
and, potentially, in their more relaxed fault requirements. In particular, as we 
have seen, States are arguably not acting in line with their negative duties to 
respect IHL and IHRL if they supply assistance to partners while consciously 
disregarding a risk that their partners will commit serious violations of those 
regimes. That probability threshold may be set at likelihood or one of the 
lower levels—substantial, clear, or real risk. In any event, States may imple-
ment mitigation measures that can decrease the appreciable risk below the 
prescribed threshold. It is unlikely, however, that States can lawfully balance 
that risk of harm against some other reason for providing assistance, at least 
if serious violations of IHL and IHRL are concerned. 
The determination of the assisting State’s fault will depend greatly on the 
perspective from which the assessment is being made. The officials of the 
assisting State, including legal advisers, will initially make ex ante decisions on 
whether the State would be acting with the requisite degree of fault if it pro-
vided the assistance. In particular, their assessment of the future conduct of 
the assisted party will inherently be contingent and probabilistic. Also, while 
it is a standard feature of international law as a decentralized system that 
factual and legal issues are initially going to be self-judged, it is perfectly nor-
mal for other entities, including domestic and international courts, to make 
determinations of the assisting State’s culpability ex post, i.e., after it provided 
the assistance that facilitated the wrongful act. From both perspectives, the 
key consideration will always be the existence, vel non, of any pattern of be-
havior by the wrongdoing partner.  
Finally, we have seen that there are two basic scenarios of intelligence 
sharing in multinational military operations that may raise questions of com-
plicity. The first is the sharing of intelligence that facilitates the wrongful act 
of a third party, either sporadically or as part of systematic assistance to a 
war effort more generally. The causal contribution and fault elements of Ar-
ticle 16 ASR and the IHL- and IHRL-specific complicity rules may all be met 
in such situations. In the second, intelligence is unlawfully collected and 
 











shared with the receiving State, which then uses it for its own purposes. In 
principle, the mere use of tainted intelligence will not make the receiving 
State’s conduct, such as an attack against a military object, unlawful. How-
ever, if the State is not merely a passive recipient of such information but 
expressly or implicitly encourages or assists the party that wrongfully obtains 
and shares it, the various complicity rules will be engaged. The storage, pro-
cessing, and use of unlawfully obtained personal information may also vio-
late discrete rules of IHRL, such as the right to privacy or (in a specific con-
text) the right to a fair trial.  
In sum, while the web of legal rules that apply in complicity scenarios, 
such as those of intelligence sharing in military operations, is a complex one, 
the conceptual and practical difficulties in interpreting, applying, and devel-
oping these rules are not insurmountable. As with all legal rules, their prac-
tical implementation will depend primarily on a gradual process of norm in-
ternalization and the building up of a culture of compliance for which capac-
ity-building efforts within governments are indispensable, partly as result of 
external and internal pressure, advocacy, and litigation. That said, the reality 
of coalition operations is that the relevant partners may be subjected to dif-
ferent treaties and mechanisms of outside scrutiny. But it is inevitable that 
the greater constraints to which some of the States involved may be subject 
will have spillover effects on their partners, who will in practice have to take 
them into account. As far as legal risks for partners are concerned, domestic 
and international litigation under IHRL will produce the most acute such 
risks, a tendency that will only grow in the future. 
 
